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Data provenance describes the derivation history of data, capturing de-
tails such as the entities involved and the relationships between entities.
Knowledge of data provenance can be used to address issues, such as
data quality assurance, data audit and system security. However, current
computer systems are usually not equipped with means to acquire data
provenance. Modifying underlying systems or introducing new monitor-
ing software for provenance logging may be too invasive for production
systems. As a result, data provenance may not always be available.
This thesis investigates the completeness and correctness of data
provenance reconstructed from log files with respect to the actual deriva-
tion history. To accomplish this, we designed and tested a solution that
first extracts and models information from log files into provenance re-
lations then reconstructs the data provenance from those relations. The
reconstructed output is then evaluated against the ground truth prove-
nance. The thesis also details the methodology used for constructing a
dataset for provenance reconstruction research.
Experimental results revealed data provenance that completely cap-
tures the ground truth can be reconstructed from system-layer log files.
However, the outputs are susceptible to errors generated during event
logging and errors induced by program dependencies. Results also show
that usage of log files of different granularities collected from the system
can help resolve logging errors described. Experiments with removing
suspected program dependencies using approaches such as blacklisting
and clustering have shown that the number of errors can be reduced by a
factor of one hundred. Conclusions drawn from this research contribute
towards the work on using reconstruction as an alternative approach for
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In day to day life we often encounter objects with an uncertain back-
ground, regardless of whether it is at work or during personal time (e.g.
an unmarked parcel, unmarked document). An intuitive response is to
question the object’s origins (e.g. where is this object from? How did it
get here?). One approach is to analyse the object’s derivation history –
information that depicts how the object arrived at its current state. How-
ever, in most situations, this piece of information does not accompany
the object and as such, has to be obtained through other means.
In computer science, an object’s derivation history is generally known
as provenance of the object or simply as provenance. In a survey on
provenance, Carata et al. [2014] conceptualised provenance as a graph
that captures the relationship between entities (e.g. people, process or
other objects) that are involved in the object’s derivation process. This
concept is shared by many other discussions on defining provenance,
such as those by Cruz et al. [2009] and Moreau [2010]. Due to its re-
lational properties, generating provenance requires specialised logging
mechanisms that focus on capturing relational information [Allen et al.
2010b; Carata et al. 2014].
Practical provenance research can be broadly categorised into two as-
pects: the applications of provenance and the collection and manage-
ment of provenance. Figure 1.1 briefly illustrates the relationship be-











Figure 1.1: Two main aspects of practical research in provenance
provenance focuses on how it can be collected, stored and queried [Cruz
et al. 2009; Biton et al. 2008; Ko and Will 2014]. The end results are
provenance systems, such as SPADE [Gehani and Tariq 2012] and Ko-
madu [Suriarachchi et al. 2015], that abstract tasks related to the collec-
tion and management of provenance from consumers (e.g. researchers
or solutions using provenance).
On the other hand, research on the applications of provenance focuses
on how it can be used to tackle issues ranging from data quality assur-
ance to experiment reproducibility and system security [Gotz and Zhou
2009; Biton et al. 2008; Dumitras and Neamtiu 2011]. The provenance
required to drive these researches and solutions are queried from exist-
ing provenance systems.
However, the provenance required may differ based on the context
of the research. For example, work by Gotz and Zhou [2009] looks at
analysing user activities using provenance depicting high-level user be-
haviours while Biton et al. [2008] looks at understanding complex work-
flows using workflow provenance. Existing provenance systems may not
2
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be able to capture all of the required provenance. As a result, solutions
such as those proposed by Gotz and Zhou [2009] integrate customised so-
lutions for capturing the required provenance into their proposed prove-
nance management frameworks. Regardless, we can establish that how
provenance can be used is inherently dependent on how it can be col-
lected. Such a dependency relationship hints at the importance of prove-
nance collection.
1.2 Motivation
Studies on techniques for collecting provenance by Allen et al. [2010a],
Carata et al. [2014] and Coe et al. [2014] noted that state-of-the-art tech-
niques either require modifying software running on the system (e.g. ap-
plications or the kernel) or manifest as software that actively monitors
different parts of a system and generates provenance during runtime.
However, it is not always possible to collect provenance using the pro-
posed techniques. For example, modifying existing software on produc-
tion systems is generally considered intrusive and may cause instability
in the system (e.g. introduce new vulnerabilities, incompatibility with
other existing software or components). Likewise, introducing new soft-
ware to the system for monitoring and generating provenance would
require extensive testing to ensure compatibility with existing software
and that it is secure. Deploying new software becomes even more diffi-
cult if the party requiring the provenance does not own the system (i.e.
third party) as it would involve the issue of whether the software can
be trusted. Another downside with existing provenance collection tech-
niques is that they have to be in place and running while the relevant
events are happening in order for the appropriate provenance to be cap-
tured. This is an issue for situations where provenance collection is an
afterthought (i.e. forensic investigation) or when the solutions are not
present or running when the event is happening. Without provenance,
solutions that rely on access to provenance will not be able to function.
An alternative approach to acquiring provenance is to reconstruct it
3
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from information sources commonly found on systems, such as event
logs (i.e. log files)1 and file meta-data. In comparison to collecting prove-
nance, event logging is common in systems and in many cases, an in-
tegral part of the system’s day to day operation. Security standards
such as the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) [National Secu-
rity Agency 1999] require tools that capture and record events describ-
ing the states or activities of the system to be deployed. Likewise, upon
starting up, the operating system generates information that can be used
to deduce the states and activities of the operating system [Ling 2013],
in the form of log files and file meta-data. In their work on analysing
different types of log files found on systems, Ghoshal and Plale [2013]
and Ling [2013] discussed how the analysed log files contain information
pertaining to events happening in the system and the involved objects.
Having said that, the focus of information captured in log files differs
from provenance. Provenance captures relational information describ-
ing the derivation history of an object while events in log files describe
what is happening in the system at a fixed point. Section 1.3 further
elaborates the difference between log files and provenance.
In recent work, Ghoshal and Plale [2013] have shown that it is possi-
ble to extract and model parts of provenance information (e.g. disjoint
elements of the provenance graph) from application log files. However,
the authors do not discuss how provenance that depicts the derivation
history of objects can be reconstructed using the extracted information.
Hence, this thesis focuses on investigating reconstructing data prove-
nance from log files as an alternate approach to active data provenance
collection.
1.3 Log files and Provenance
Provenance information can be stored either as metadata embedded in
the object the provenance is describing (i.e. data or workflow) [Groth
1In the context of this thesis, the term ’event logs’ is used interchangeably with the
term ’log files’.
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et al. 2012] or as a separate file. Storing provenance as a separate file
arguably gives it a log-file flavour. Having said, the difference between
provenance stored separately as a file and a log file is the focus of the
information captured within each.
Events stored within log files can be seen as entries within a visitor
sign-in book at a security guard’s booth. Each visitor entry captures in-
formation of visitors who have passed through the security booth. How-
ever, just by looking at the entry, it is not certain as to where exactly the
visitors have been or with whom the visitors have interacted after passing
through the security booth. Similarly, log files are considered to be the
result of logging mechanisms deployed at specific points within a com-
puter system. Most of these mechanisms only capture events observed
within their assigned scope and perspective. For example, a logger for an
application only captures events happening in relation to the application
and within the application’s execution space (e.g. memory region or exe-
cution stack). Thus relationships between objects and processes outside
the scope of the application (e.g. across other log files) are unknown.
In contrast, provenance describes how an object evolves over time and
contains information that allows an analyst to understand and attribute
the evolution process. Evolution of the object may span logically across
the execution space of multiple applications or systems. Information
within provenance differs from those in log files as they each describe
either a direct or indirect relationship between other objects and the ob-
ject the provenance is describing. For example, provenance of a visitor
would contain information on the places the visitor actually visited, the
people the visitor interacted with and the sequence of activities the visi-
tor went through before each activity.
Due to its relational properties, provenance is conceptualised and com-
monly visualised as a graph. Figure 1.2a illustrates such a graph, based
on an example extracted from documentation on PROV-DM, a provenance
model proposed by Moreau and Missier [2013]. Provenance can also be
expressed in record format using tuple-like formats that can adequately
express relationships between two objects, as shown in Figure 1.2b.



















(a) Sample of a provenance graph adapted from Gil and Miles [2013]












(b) Corresponding record format of the provenance shown above




Figure 1.3: A possible graph visualisation of event logs
log) would result in a graph that shows the states and objects the appli-
cation interacted with directly connected to the node representing the
application. This is much like a ‘one-step’ provenance. An example is
illustrated in Figure 1.3.
1.4 Thesis Question
Theoretically, disjointed pieces of provenance information modelled from
different log files can be piece together, by studying the cause and effect
relationship between events, to produce a reconstructed provenance of
an object. However, how well such reconstructed provenance accounts
for the object’s known derivation history remains unclear. Addressing
this uncertainty is critical to understanding whether reconstructing prove-
nance from log files can be a viable alternative to acquiring provenance.
Formally, this thesis seeks to address the following question:
“Can data provenance be reconstructed in an automated
manner from log files found on a computer system and,
if so, how does the reconstruction compare to the known
derivation history of the data?”
However, it is difficult to obtain the entire derivation history of data ob-
jects for evaluation. As such, this research focuses on addressing the the-
sis question from a more practical perspective, where the reconstructed
7
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provenance is compared against what is known of the derivation of the
data. This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
1.5 Scope of Research
Scope of Data Provenance
Surveys by Moreau [2010], Carata et al. [2014] and Simmhan et al.
[2005] have discussed different usages of provenance, such as results
reproducibility, data verification, workflow checking, data accountability
and system security. Ultimately, its usage has an influence on the form
and information required in the provenance and the type of dataset re-
quired to reconstruct the provenance.
In this thesis, we define data provenance as the information that
depicts the evolution process of a piece of data, including the en-
tities and activities involved in the process. Data, in this research, is
viewed at a file level where a file object is treated as a digital container
for data.
We consider a reconstructed data provenance to be sufficiently com-
plete if:
• it captures all entities, including any other derivatives of the data,
involved in the derivation process starting from the creation of the
data
• it captures the relationships between entities and their order, such
that the data provenance shows how the data and its derivatives
arrive at their current state
• it does not contain information that does not explain or is related to
how the data reaches its current state or any of its derivative
Data provenance that satisfies the two stated points would be able to
explicitly show how the data is being changed in every step of its deriva-
tion history. By analysing the data provenance, analysts would be able
8
1.5 Scope of Research
to reach a consistent and correct conclusion on what has happened to
the data and how it reaches its current state [Carata et al. 2014; Moreau
2010].
Access to such data provenance would be useful for activities where de-
termining when or how changes were made to the data or identifying the
root cause of an error in the data is the primary focus [Zhou et al. 2010].
Digital data investigation [Carrier and Spafford 2004a], data account-
ability and data verification [Aldeco-Pérez and Moreau 2008] are some
examples of data-oriented activities that can potentially benefit from hav-
ing data provenance.
Having said so, this thesis does not concern with the applications of
the reconstructed data provenance. Our focus is purely on investigat-
ing the reconstruction of data provenance from log files obtained from a
computer system.
Assumptions Made
In line with the motivation discussed in Section 1.2, the following as-
sumptions are made with regards to the state of logging and the com-
puter system:
1. we assume no provenance collectors or any other provenance sys-
tems are being actively deployed in the system.
2. we assume that all logging systems adopt its default configurations
(i.e. info log level), where each logging system outputs information
regarding the normal operations of the target of the logging.
3. we assume that only access to the log files are made available.
4. we assume that the log file are trusted and have not been tampered
with.
The rationale behind the assumption of default configurations stems
from our motivation that provenance acquisition is an afterthought. As
a result, we assumed that no intentional steps have been taken to en-
rich the log files with information that could have enhanced the results
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of the reconstruction. Assuming default logging configurations can also
provide a base-line understanding on the data provenance that can be
reconstructed from log files.
Definition of Computer System
In general, the term computer system can refer to different types of sys-
tems such as those within a private environment (e.g. private network of
computers) or systems in an open environment (e.g. the Internet). How-
ever, challenges such as privacy, ownership and trust issues surrounding
the dataset that can be used, are more complex when reconstructing
provenance in an open environment. These issues, although important,
are not directly relevant towards addressing the thesis question. As such,
by computer system we refer to any system within a private environment,
such as desktop computers or a cluster of computers connected within a
private network.
Categorisation of Log Files
A study by Ling [2013] noted that application log files are not the only
type of log files that can be collected off the system. Other types of log
files such as kernel and activities log may also be found on a computer
system. To study each type of log file separately in an exhaustive man-
ner would require an extensive amount of data and effort. Instead, we
broadly categorise log files according to where they are being generated
in the system. The view of a computer system as a multi-layered architec-
ture system, used in many modern day operating system textbooks such
as those by Silberschatz et al. [2005] and Tanenbaum and Bos [2008], is
adopted for this purpose.
Although views used by different textbooks may differ on the function-
ality and naming of each layer, they generally agree that an operating
system can be structured into hierarchical layers between the hardware
and the user.
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Each layer is responsible for a specific set of tasks and the communica-
tion of information between layers. Such a layered view of the operating
system is useful for debugging or even just simply for understanding how
various components, software and data structures interact with one an-
other.
Although this research concerns reconstructing data provenance from
log files and not debugging, viewing computer systems as multi-layered
architectures is still useful. As discussed later in Chapter 3, events gen-
erated by different logging mechanisms may differ in the level of detail
depending on where the events are generated from. Hence, being able to
objectively categorise events based on their granularity aids understand-
ing and modelling of events with relation to provenance.
We broadly categorise the layers between the system kernel and the
user into three layers. Log files are then categorised into one of the three
layers, based on the point within a computer system in which the events
are being observed and captured. The three layers in our multi-layered
view are illustrated in Figure 1.4 and defined as follows:
• User layer—the user layer represents the user’s perspective. Events
observed or generated at this layer relate directly to the activities
carried out by a user, such as their behaviours and interactions.
These events can possibly be produced through user intervention,
such as manual notes and transcripts of screen recordings or auto-
matically by components of an application (i.e. user interface).
• Application layer—the application layer sits between the user and
system layer. It represents the space in which user-space applica-
tions run on a computer system. Log files generated in this layer are
automatically generated by the logging functionality of applications
or user-space logging mechanisms (e.g. logging mechanisms that do
not require elevated privileges).
• System layer—the system layer represents the kernel space, where
management of the devices such as the Central Processing Unit
(CPU) and file system is carried out below the user-space. Log files
generated in this layer either require elevated privileges granted
11
Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.4: Layered view of a computer system derived from the multi-layered
architecture view by Silberschatz et al. [2005]
to the logging mechanism or need to be generated natively by the
devices (e.g. operating system kernel).
Layers beneath the system layer, such as the hardware layer, are not
included in the view because obtaining events from these layers usually
requires modifications (e.g. physical modification) to the system. Thus,
our layered view is not concerned with layers beneath the system layer
as it is uncommon for systems to log events beneath the system layer (i.e.
hardware layer).
1.6 Requirements
To address the thesis question, a solution for reconstructing data prove-
nance from log files is required. Drawing lessons from the work of
Ghoshal and Plale [2013], we recognised such a solution will require
the transformation from log events to provenance graph to be done in
multiple steps. As such, the following will be required to achieve such a
transformation:
RQ1 - a dataset for experimentation and evaluation. Such a dataset
would require both the data from which data provenance can be
12
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reconstructed (i.e. set of log files) and information on the actual
derivation history of files (i.e. ground truth).
RQ2 - a provenance model for modelling information extracted from log
files into provenance information.
RQ3 - an algorithm or approach for reconstructing data provenance from
the modelled provenance information.
RQ4 - a methodology for evaluating the reconstructed data provenance
against the ground truth. Such a methodology can also serve as a
platform on which the proposed approach can be evaluated against
other approaches for data provenance reconstruction.
1.7 Thesis Structure
Figure 1.5 structures the solution for reconstructing data provenance
from log files as a workflow, based on the list of requirements listed in
Section 1.5. The intention is to modularise the solution for each require-
ment, such that outcomes from future research (e.g. new algorithms for
reconstruction) are interoperable with the work done. The thesis is struc-
tured according to the proposed workflow so as to facilitate the descrip-
tion of this research.
Chapter 2 surveys and discusses work related to each of the require-
ments listed in Section 1.6. The goal is to provide an overview of the
research done with respect to each of the requirements and their gaps.
Emphasis is placed on the discussion of work related to RQ2, RQ3 and
RQ4. Detailed review of existing datasets for RQ1 is done in Chapter 3
in order to keep the discussion in Chapter 3 concise.
Chapter 3 discusses the work done to meet requirement RQ1. The
chapter first lays out a set of requirements for datasets suitable for prove-
nance reconstruction research and shows the lack of publicly available
datasets that meet the requirements. The methodology used in the gath-











Modelling Phase Reconstruction Phase
Figure 1.5: Illustration of the proposed data provenance reconstruction work-
flow
Chapter 4 discusses the model proposed for requirement RQ2. The
chapter first introduces the proposed multi-layered provenance model. It
then describes our approach to mapping provenance relations between
the different layers in the proposed model.
Chapter 5 outlines the reconstruction algorithm designed to satisfy
requirement RQ3. The problem of reconstructing data provenance from
the modelled provenance relations is formulated and presented in the
first section of the chapter. The rest of the chapter is devoted to describ-
ing how the algorithm works.
Chapter 6 presents and shows how the proposed evaluation method-
ology satisfies requirement RQ4. Using the proposed methodology, the
thesis question is addressed. Problems in the reconstructed data prove-
nance are also identified and discussed.





In this chapter literature related to requirements listed in Section 1.6 are
reviewed. The structure of this chapter follows the order of the workflow
for provenance reconstruction, shown previously in Figure 1.5. Work
related to extracting information from log files are first discussed. Fol-
lowing which, provenance models for modelling the extracted informa-
tion into provenance relations are reviewed. The review then focuses
on work relating to provenance reconstruction. Finally, approaches for
evaluating provenance reconstruction are discussed.
2.1 Extracting Information from Logs
To reconstruct data provenance from log files, entries in the log files have
to be modelled into provenance relations. Information that can be used
for identifying entities involved and inferring relationships between the
entities have to be first extracted from the log entries.
One of the objectives of log analysis research is to extract patterns
that describe expected behaviours of a system or application from the
log files. These patterns can then be used to monitor for abnormali-
ties during operation of the system. Research on extracting patterns
from log files by Vaarandi [2003], Nagappan and Vouk [2010] and Lou
et al. [2010] discussed how each log entry can be divided into two por-
tions: message signature and parameters. The message signature is usu-
ally free-form text that describes the event represented by the log entry
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while the parameters provide more specific contextual information such
as the process ID, process name or state of the application. By extracting
and analysing the message signatures, log entries can be classified into
different types, thereby allowing patterns to be extracted from the se-
quence of logs. Techniques such as frequent item mining [Nagappan and
Vouk 2010], source code analysis [Xu et al. 2009] and text analysis [Fu
et al. 2009] have been proposed for the extraction of message signatures
from log entries.
For the purpose of provenance modelling, techniques for extracting
message signatures can be applied to log files for separating log entries
into the two stated portions. The message signatures can be used for in-
ferring relationships while the parameters can be used for identifying en-
tities involved. However, techniques for extracting message signatures
can only resolve heterogeneity of log formats. Our initial analysis of dif-
ferent log files revealed that heterogeneity may exist in the parameter
portion of a log entry.
Differences in the implementation of logging mechanisms may cause
heterogeneity in the representation and the amount of information logged
for each parameter field. Such heterogeneity may be observed even if the
logging mechanisms are logging events from the same application type
(e.g. different implementations of web servers) or system device. As an
example, we look at log messages produced by two different kernel log-
ging mechanisms, Linux Audit Framework (LAF) [archLinux 2012] and
Sysdig [Draios Inc 2016], shown in Figure 2.1.
Both Sysdig and LAF log system calls invoked and the parameters
used, in the Linux system kernel. Parameters are logged in their raw
format into the log file in LAF. In contrast, Sysdig translates captured
parameters into human readable format before logging into the log file.
This heterogeneity in the representation of information being logged can
be observed by comparing parameters highlighted by the corresponding
boxes between Figure 2.1a and 2.1b. Such heterogeneity complicates au-
tomatic extraction of relevant information from log entries as a program
would also need to know when a parameter needs to be translated.
Different logging mechanisms may also produce parameters with dif-
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type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1431919800.905:5766096): arch=c000003e syscall=43 success=yes
exit=5 a0=3 a1=7fff8b0a8150 a2=7fff8b0a814c a3=0 items=0 ppid=1 pid=2050 auid=4294967295 









(b) Entry for accept system call in Sysdig
Figure 2.1: Comparing log formats of different kernel logging tools
ferent amounts of information. For example, the dotted red boxes in
Figure 2.1a and 2.1b highlight the parameter field that describes the
network address associated with a network socket. Converting the net-
work address parameter logged by LAF would show the values of a sin-
gle Internet Protocol (IP) address and the port number. However, Sysdig
records the IP address and port number used by both the local and re-
mote hosts as observed in Figure 2.1b. Due to such inconsistency in the
amount of information logged, a level of domain knowledge is required
for extracting the right information when processing log files from het-
erogeneous sources.
Ghoshal and Plale [2013] proposed a rule-based engine for parsing and
deriving provenance relations from log files. Since the rules are user-
defined, knowledge of the log formats can be incorporated into the rules.
However, rule-based engines require users to be familiar with the rule
formulation guidelines specific to the engine and how the engine works.
This increases the complexity of extracting information from log files.
Although extracting relevant information from log files is the initial
phase in our data provenance reconstruction workflow, proposing a gen-
eral approach that works across different types of log files (including
unknown log files) is out of the scope of this research. Instead, we im-
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plemented customised parsers for different types of log file. Doing so
allowed us to incorporate the extraction and modelling of information
into provenance relations in a single implementation, without having to
deal with the complexity of rule formulation. We discuss the extraction
of information from log files in more detail in Chapter 3.
2.2 Modelling Provenance Relations
Once information relevant to provenance has been extracted from log
files, the next step is to model the extracted information into provenance
relations. In this section, we review existing provenance models and
discuss the gaps in these proposed models.
Both theoretical and practical models had been proposed for modelling
provenance. Theoretical models such as those proposed by Green et al.
[2007], Luttenberger and Schlund [2014], Souilah et al. [2009] and Ch-
eney et al. [2008] focus on formalising the properties and forms prove-
nance can have. On the other hand, practical models such as Open
Provenance Model (OPM) [Moreau et al. 2011], PROV-DM [Moreau and
Missier 2013], D-PROV [Missier et al. 2013], Time-aware Provenance
model (TAP) [Zhou et al. 2011] and many others focus on modelling infor-
mation gathered off different systems (e.g. workflow systems, computer
systems, distributed systems) into provenance.
Many proposed practical models operate at a flat granularity, treating
information observed by different tools to be of the same level of de-
tail. In their discussion on how provenance graphs can vary from one
another, Coe et al. [2014] showed how graphs generated from different
provenance collectors based on existing provenance models can differ in
granularity. Provenance collectors that monitor the execution of a work-
flow at the application space, such as Vistrail [Bavoil et al. 2005] and
Taverna [Hull et al. 2006], capture activities such as reading of a file and
running of a script as separate individual events. However, provenance
collectors monitoring shared system components (e.g. the kernel or file
system), such as Progger [Ko and Will 2014] and SPADE [Gehani and
18
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Apache logs (Application logs)
Sysdig logs (Kernel logs)
 
130.217.250.77 - - [07/Oct/2016:21:10:55 -0700] "GET /challenge/index.html" ...
130.217.250.77 - - [07/Oct/2016:21:10:55 -0700] "GET /challenge/Resources/scroll.png" ... 
2016-10-07 21:10:55.854907787;pid=21988(apache2); ... ;sys=open <;
param:fd=13(<f>/var/www/challenge/index.html) ... flags=4097(O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC) 
 
2016-10-07 21:10:55.855783642;pid=21988(apache2); ... ;sys=close >;
param:fd=13(<f>/var/www/challenge/index.html)
2016-10-07 21:10:55.889660864;pid=21988(apache2); ... ;sys=open <;
param:fd=13(<f>/var/www/challenge/Resources/scroll.png) ... flags=4097(O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC)
2016-10-07 21:10:55.889673454;pid=21988(apache2); ... ;sys=close >;
param:fd=13(<f>/var/www/challenge/Resources/scroll.png) 
Figure 2.2: Comparing messages between application and kernel logs
Tariq 2012], may observe the same file read as a series of read events.
Since most existing provenance models do not consider the granularity
layer on which they operate, the events would be modelled equivalently.
As a result, the graphs would differ in shape and size even though they
are describing the same activities. This is an issue when attempting to
compare provenance graphs generated from different granularity lay-
ers of a system. Although transformers or similar tools may be used to
reduce the impact of granularity during provenance query, it may not
produce the right results for all cases. For example, a web server may
access the same file back to back due to requests from different remote
clients. In such situations, provenance collectors operating at the system
layer may capture the two accesses as a series of sequential accesses to
the same file. As such, the transformer may not be able to differentiate
the series of accesses and collapse the accesses observed by the system
provenance collectors into a single access operation.
The difference in granularity described by Coe et al. [2014] can also
be observed in log files. Figure 2.2 shows how activities can be captured
differently in the application and kernel logs. Requests for two files made
to the application, Apache, are logged as two events in the application
log. However, each file request is logged as a pair of open and close
system call events in the kernel log. If a flat granularity provenance
model is used to model both log files, the provenance graph modelled
from the application log file will differ from the graph modelled from
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the kernel log. This creates an issue when attempting to resolve the
two graphs (i.e. determine if the two graphs are the same or looking for
duplicated relations).
One possible solution for resolving the differences caused by granu-
larity in log files is to incorporate the concept of multi-granularity into
provenance models. This would allow events observed at different gran-
ularities to be modelled as separate provenance relations. Association
between provenance relations of different granularities can then be ex-
pressed through mappings between the different granularity layers in
the model. Such a multi-layered provenance model and mapping would
allow provenance graphs modelled from different log files to be mapped
to and compared at the same granularity. Any comparison at the same
granularity would ideally be free of the differences in shape and size of
the graph (assuming they are looking at the same activity) caused by the
difference in granularity described by Coe et al. [2014].
The need to incorporate granularity when modelling provenance was
identified as early as 2007 by Barga and Digiampietri [2007]. From the
literature reviewed, two types of abstraction have been identified for
achieving multi-granularity in provenance. We term the two forms of ab-
straction contextual abstraction and structural abstraction. A quick
overview of the abstraction types and the approaches to implement them
is shown in Figure 2.3. The two forms of abstraction used are discussed
in detail in the following sections.
2.2.1 Contextual Abstraction
Contextual abstraction reduces the amount of contextual information
shown in the provenance graph as the granularity approaches coarse-
grained, influencing the understanding of elements in the graph (e.g.
edges and nodes) in the process. Contextual abstraction can best be
understood through the view of Barga and Digiampietri [2007] on dif-
ferences between granularity layers in a provenance graph. A coarse-
grained provenance graph captures the structure of a workflow but not
details surrounding each element in the graph. As the granularity be-
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Figure 2.3: Summary of the different types of abstraction in provenance and





Figure 2.4: Difference between granularity layers caused by “contextual ab-
straction”
comes more fine-grained, information that describes each element in
more detail is added to the graph, thereby giving a more contextual un-
derstanding of each element. For example, at a coarse-grained level, an
input parameter to a function could be captured as a single node that
denotes an input Field. However, as the granularity increases, more el-
ements can be associated to the Field node to capture more contextual
information, such as the value and data type of the Field. Such contrast
in the level of detail between provenance graphs of different granularity
is portrayed in Figure 2.4.
Contextual abstraction in provenance enables users to query prove-
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nance with customisable precision, based on their needs. In their discus-
sion on the level of detail that should be captured in provenance graphs,
Daniel et al. [2015] linked the requirement on the level of detail to the
specificity of the query. The authors argued that by capturing more detail
surrounding each element of the provenance graph, queries over a range
of specificity, ranging from “retrieve the list of input for a workflow” to
“retrieve the list of input of a specific data type for a workflow” can be
executed.
Thus far, contextual abstraction in provenance models have been im-
plemented using two approaches. Barga and Digiampietri [2007] pro-
posed introducing layering into their workflow provenance model. Each
layer in the model is responsible for modelling a specific set of informa-
tion, such as information obtainable from runtime. These sets of infor-
mation can originate from the separate phases of executing a workflow.
For example, L0 (Layer 0) would contain only abstract descriptions of
the services used in the workflow. These descriptions can be obtained
during the workflow composition stage. In contrast, L3 (Layer 3) would
capture details, such as the value and value type, of data observed during
runtime execution.
Another approach to implementing contextual abstraction is through
extending existing models with specialised classes for capturing finer-
grained detail. The extended classes are then appended to the coarse-
grained provenance graph as associations, so as to allow elements to
be described in more detail. For example, Daniel et al. [2015] proposed
PROV-Wf, an extension of the PROV-DM model. Concepts in PROV-Wf that
are based on PROV-DM are used to model workflow provenance (e.g.
structure of workflow). However, the PROV-DM concepts are not suffi-
ciently fine-grained to allow modelling of contextual information such as
value and type of the data. Hence, the authors extended the PROV-DM
model with classes designed to allow domain-specific data and informa-
tion pertaining to the execution of the workflow to be modelled. Likewise,
Probst and Hansen [2013] extended the ExASyM model, a model for mod-
elling the spatial and organisational aspects of an organisation proposed
by Probst and Hansen [2008], to allow the modelling of security policies
22
2.2 Modelling Provenance Relations
and activities surrounding data, information which is more fine-grained
compared to the structure of a organisation. In doing so, the resulting
model, acKlaim, allows analysis concerning data, such as provenance of
data, data policy violations and data security to be carried out.
However, even with changes in the structure, interpretation of the in-
terconnectivity (i.e. edges that do not denote associations) between the
elements remains constant throughout the layers. With reference to Fig-
ure 2.4, one can still deduce that Field is still a direct input to Function,
regardless of the granularity. This is the main difference between con-
textual and structural abstraction.
2.2.2 Structural Abstraction
Structural abstraction refers to simplification made to the structure of
the provenance graph, thereby influencing the interpretation of relation-
ships between elements. Such relationships may represent different se-
mantics, such as flow of information between entities or sequences of
execution. For example, in Figure 2.5, one would not know exactly how
many processes the data passed through before reaching the recipient
process by analysing only the abstracted graph (i.e. coarse-grained).
Structural abstraction in provenance is mostly used to aid analysis of
large provenance graphs and to group and annotate segments of a graph.
For instance, in visualisation tools proposed by Borkin et al. [2013] and
Macko and Seltzer [2011], techniques such as clustering and hierarchical
grouping have been employed to summarise a group of nodes, reducing
the number of elements users have to analyse. Abreu et al. [2016] argued
that by applying structural abstraction to provenance graphs, segments
of the graphs can be grouped and annotated with higher-level semantic
descriptions. Such descriptions would allow users or algorithms to op-
erate using semantic-rich information to understand and process prove-
nance graphs. For example, a series of interconnected nodes that show
the execution sequence of a function can be abstracted and annotated
with the function’s name. This allows users to relate the execution of the
function as part of the provenance.
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Figure 2.5: Difference between granularity layers caused by structural ab-
straction
Structural abstraction for summarising a group of nodes or for seg-
menting a provenance graph can be achieved directly through the use of
grouping techniques. These techniques can further be divided in two
based on whether a priori knowledge of elements in the provenance
graph was used.
Without using a priori knowledge, Macko et al. [2013] proposed the
use of metrics such as closeness, betweenness and eigenvector to iden-
tify nodes that are inter-related, clustering them together to form local
clusters. These local clusters can be used to relate segments of a prove-
nance graph to known activities.
Borkin et al. [2013] applied a time-based hierarchical grouping tech-
nique to a provenance graph to create groups of nodes, based on the
distance between nodes in the time domain. The creation of groups
through measuring temporal distance can then be applied recursively
on the groups, until the graph is aggregated to a suitable size for visu-
alisation. Such a visualisation can be said to be hierarchically layered,
allowing users to “zoom” into different segments by expanding the ag-
gregated nodes into their original form.
Moore and Gehani [2013] proposed Simple Event Logic (SEL), a domain-
specific language for implementing filters that can be used to aggregate
streams of provenance events (i.e. nodes, edges and attribute events)
generated by provenance collection tools. Differing from previous work,
SEL aggregates sequential edges and nodes having the same attributes.
For example, when a provenance collector generates a series of prove-
nance events showing a process reading the same file, these events are
all buffered and aggregated as they possess the same process ID, file ID
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Figure 2.6: Counter use-cases for structural abstractions without using a priori
knowledge
and activity type. However, once sequential reads are broken by other
activities such as a write, the aggregated elements are output and the
aggregation is reset. Such a measure is necessary as the authors do not
assume that they have an unlimited amount of memory to buffer events.
By not relying on a priori knowledge, the discussed approaches can
be applied generically to various types of provenance graph. However,
they may produce semantically incorrect groupings. Figure 2.6 shows
two use-cases where the discussed approaches would produce incorrect
groupings.
In the left use-case, variation in the distance between two sets of se-
quential reads may result in approaches that use distance metrics to
erroneously aggregate the nodes into two semantically different nodes.
Likewise, the right use-case shows how erroneous aggregation of nodes
can happen for approaches that use order of events for determining
group membership. Due to events from one process interleaving with
events from a different process, structural abstraction using event order
would fail to aggregate the events.
Macko and Seltzer [2011] and Buneman et al. [2012] both assumed ac-
cess to a priori knowledge such as the control flow and function call tree
of the application the provenance is describing. Patterns that describe
the sequence of nodes to expect or relationships between the nodes can
be extracted from the a priori knowledge. These patterns are then used
to guide the abstraction, such that the abstracted graph may reflect the
structure seen in the a prioriknowledge (e.g. functions in the function
call tree), as illustrated in Figure 2.7.
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Abstracted node that reflects
features or structure observed 
in the a-priori knowledge
Figure 2.7: Structural abstraction using a priori knowledge such as the func-
tion call tree
Such abstraction can be applied recursively to the provenance graph,
thereby inducing different levels of granularity into the resulting prove-
nance graph. Lee et al. [2013] proposed an approach to split an applica-
tion’s system trace into units by first deriving the application’s hierarchi-
cal loop structure through runtime monitoring. Using the derived loop
structure, the application is instrumented to emit specific events denot-
ing the start and end of loops in the system call trace. While this work is
done from a non-provenance perspective, provenance models modelling
the resulting system call trace can utilise the loop-start and loop-end
events to abstract segments of the provenance graph.
Biton et al. [2008] assumed the workflow specifications (e.g. struc-
ture, components of the workflow) and the set of relevant elements1 is
known. This contrasts with the previously discussed models where the
relevant elements are derived from the call tree. Structural abstraction
is achieved by collapsing non-relevant elements together with each rel-
evant element into composite modules. Each composite module is con-
fined to having at most one relevant element, but can have an unbounded
number of non-relevant elements. Through such a constraint, the au-
1In the discussions, the authors describe “relevant elements” as “relevant modules”.
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thors seek to maintain the data flow between relevant elements in each
abstracted graph.
The main advantage of using a priori knowledge is that semantically
meaningful patterns that map lower granularity provenance relations to
those of higher granularity can be extracted from the knowledge, result-
ing in more accurate abstractions. For example, from an application’s
call tree Buneman et al. [2012] were able to extract the set of directly
connected nodes that can be mapped to a higher granularity provenance
relation. The extracted set can be viewed as the pattern that maps to the
higher granularity provenance relation. Counter use-cases, such as those
shown in Figure 2.6, can be resolved using the patterns extracted from
a priori knowledge as the nodes to expect are defined by the patterns.
However, access to a priori knowledge cannot always be assumed.
Arguably, being able to structural abstract provenance graphs mod-
elled from log files is more critical, as compared to identifying their con-
textual abstraction, when comparing or resolving graphs modelled from
different granularity. For example, an application reading from a file can
be logged as a single read event in the application log file. However, the
same read can manifest as a series of read operations in the kernel log
files. Modelling events from both log files would result in two structurally
non-equivalent provenance graphs even though they are describing the
same file read event.
Structurally abstracting provenance graphs modelled from log files us-
ing models that do not assume a priori knowledge can potentially pro-
duce semantically incorrect abstractions like those illustrated in Figure
2.6. On the other hand, models based on a priori knowledge of elements
in the provenance graph can only abstract graphs describing those ele-
ments. For example, models based on workflow specifications for work-
flow A will not work for other workflows. For reconstructing provenance
from log files, obtaining a priori knowledge of applications running on a
system is infeasible due to the number of possible applications existing
on a system. Obtaining the required a priori knowledge of each appli-
cation is also subject to the availability of information concerning the
application, such as its source code or binary. Such information cannot
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be assumed if only access to log files is made available.
Another solution for structurally abstracting provenance graphs mod-
elled from log files is by defining patterns that describe known generic
operations or behaviours of applications (e.g. read, write). Abreu et al.
[2016] proposed a conceptual workflow that would potentially allow such
patterns to be extracted without relying on a priori knowledge. A prove-
nance graph is segmented into different segments. Semantically mean-
ingful patterns are then extracted from each segment using analytic
techniques such as feature extraction. However, as the authors have
pointed out, discovering segmentation strategies for provenance graphs
is an open research issue in provenance research. In Chapter 4, we
present our proposed multi-layered provenance model and discuss how
a set of patterns that map provenance relations between different gran-
ularity layers is derived and implemented.
2.3 Provenance Reconstruction
Provenance reconstruction can be broadly seen as reconstructing the
sequence of events that explain the resulting state of an object or inci-
dent. In this section, research that relates to this view in the areas of
provenance, digital forensics and workflow planning are reviewed and
discussed.
2.3.1 Reconstruction in Provenance
A call for solutions for reconstructing provenance was issued as a re-
cent challenge in the provenance challenge series [?]. The objective is to
address the impractical assumption that provenance can always be col-
lected or collected completely. The challenge is symbolic of the problem
being recognised as an important issue in provenance research by the
community as the challenge series has been a platform for addressing
key challenges. Past issues addressed include the need for a standard
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Figure 2.8: Timeline and focus of the series of provenance challenges [Moreau
et al. 2010; Groth 2014]
erability; issues that affect the application of provenance. Figure 2.8
illustrates the series of issues addressed. In this subsection, we cate-
gorise and discuss research on reconstructing provenance according to
the methodologies the approaches take.
Inference-based
Inference-based approaches reconstruct provenance by inferring the miss-
ing segments or the complete provenance from existing provenance knowl-
edge, such as the provenance of other similar objects. Huq et al. [2011]
proposed using coarse-grained workflow provenance, collected during
setup, from workflows working with streaming data to reconstruct fine-
grained data provenance. The coarse-grained provenance which cap-
tures parameters, input sources and other information regarding the
processing elements in the workflow is used to reconstruct a process-
ing window. The window is then used to infer which data tuples in the
input data stream are the contributing input data tuples that resulted in
the queried output tuple. While the proposed solution allows inference
of the contributing data tuples, it assumes that the set of transformations
the data undergoes (e.g. the workflow template) before reaching its final
state is known.
Both Govindan et al. [2011] and Zhao et al. [2011] discussed how miss-
ing parts of a provenance graph can be reconstructed by inferring the
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missing segments from the provenance of objects similar or related to
the object described by the partial provenance graph. Govindan et al.
[2011] considers the scenario where data provenance may be incomplete
due to attacks from malicious users or nefarious nodes in the computer
network. Two scenarios where provenance could be lost were addressed:
complete loss of provenance information for a network node (i.e. missing
nodes in the provenance graph) and partial loss of provenance informa-
tion on a network node (i.e. incomplete information on a node in the
graph).
To reconstruct partial provenance loss, the missing information was in-
ferred from past complete provenance of the node. In the event where
the missing information could not be inferred, the provenance for that
node is deemed lost and discarded; to reconstruct the provenance graph
with missing nodes, a list of possible paths the data could have taken
through the network is derived by computing the reachability set or in-
ferred from past behaviour of the network. The most likely path is then
selected based on total length of the graph or by the order of common
sequences. Zhao et al. [2011] reconstruct partial loss of provenance for
data items used in reservoir engineering using an approach similar to
how Govindan et al. [2011] reconstruct partial provenance loss. Their
approach first searches for data items which are semantically similar to
the data item with incomplete provenance. The missing segments are
then inferred from the complete data provenance of those semantically
similar data items. The underlying assumption is that semantically simi-
lar data items are processed in a similar manner.
These approaches have demonstrated that missing segments or the
complete provenance graph can be inferred from the provenance of re-
lated objects. However, they rely on access to existing provenance knowl-
edge. Our research assumes no provenance collectors were being de-
ployed. Hence, it is assumed that no such knowledge is available.
Planning
Assuming a library containing all possible transformations is available,
Groth et al. formulates reconstructing data provenance that shows the
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transformation process of a piece of data as a planning problem [Groth
et al. 2012]. A prototype based on A* search and heuristic functions
based on edit distance is implemented. The prototype searches for possi-
ble sequences of transformations that could explain how the data reaches
its output state from its initial state. However, the authors highlighted
the search space for possible sequences being unbounded as one of the
challenges that needs to be resolved. Another challenge of the proposed
solution is that the search may yield incomplete results if there are trans-
formations not defined in the library.
Formulating provenance reconstruction as a planning problem has two
requirements. First, like in workflow planning, the set of possible trans-
formations or provenance relations from which the provenance can be
reconstructed is required. For our research, the set of provenance re-
lations can be modelled from the log files. Second, the end goal needs
to be clearly defined and known. However, discerning which objects are
relevant to the data provenance from a dataset on which we assume zero
knowledge is difficult. As such, formulating the problem of reconstruct-
ing data provenance from log files as a planning problem would also face
the challenge of an unbounded search space.
Code Analysis
Code analysis approaches reconstruct the provenance of a workflow by
analysing the source code or binary of a given piece of software. Huq
et al. [2013] reconstructs the workflow provenance of a script by first
parsing the program code in the script and constructing an abstract syn-
tax tree from the code grammar used. Based on the syntax tree, the
authors’ implementation prompts the user for operation-specific infor-
mation, such as whether an operation is reading or writing persistent
data. Corresponding elements in the syntax tree are then annotated with
the user’s responses. Finally, the tree is converted into a workflow prove-
nance graph.
Viewing provenance from a phylogenetic tree perspective, Dumitras
and Neamtiu [2011] tackle the problem of malware profiling by attempt-
ing to reconstruct the phylogenetic tree for families of malware. Through
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analysing the source or binary, malware are classified into families based
on similarities in how they operate. By ordering the different versions
of malware, the resulting phylogenetic tree can show the evolution of
malware within each family.
Since the functionality of an application can be inferred from its source
or binary (i.e. execution steps or sequence of transformations of the ap-
plication), data provenance that shows how an application transforms a
piece of data can be reconstructed. However, in situations where the
data is propagated or used by multiple applications, the reconstructed
provenance would resemble a set of disjointed graphs. This is because
the relationships inferred from the sources would only capture activities
within each application’s scope. Inter-application communication would
fall outside of such scope. Take for example the case where the output of
one application is fed directly to the stream input of another application.
Relationships inferred from the latter’s source would not show the ori-
gins of the input data is from the first application since the input source
will be treated generically as a stream object.
Content-based
Content-based approaches reconstruct the provenance of a file by com-
paring the difference in content between files. This is based on the as-
sumption that files which are related (i.e. different revisions of a file)
would have similarities in their content. The general approach first re-
constructs the relevant entities of the graph by correlating files based
on similarity of their content. Using temporal information such as time
of creation, correlated files can then be arranged into a time-ordered
coarse-grained provenance that shows how a file evolve through differ-
ent revisions over time. Measuring content similarity may be done based
on the actual content or through the semantic properties of the content.
Magliacane [2012], Deolalikar and Laffitte [2009] and Aierken et al.
[2014] measured content similarity using distance measures such as co-
sine similarity and longest common subsequence. Interestingly, in eval-
uating a prototype developed by Magliacane and Groth [2012] against a
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set of clinical documents, the authors reported issues with deriving the
appropriate temporal order due to differences in the file metadata. This
is a major issue for content-based approaches that rely on timestamps
for inferring file revision order as different file systems may update the
file metadata in a different manner as discussed by Knutson [2016] and
in ForensicsWiki [2015].
Nies et al. [2012] considered the case where revisions of a file may
differ in content length. Instead of computing the content similarity
distance of two news articles, semantic properties associated with each
news article, such as Named Entities, are extracted. The coarse-grained
provenance is then generated by correlating news articles based on sim-
ilarities between their semantic properties. Fine-grained provenance
is then inferred by identifying and modelling each difference between
the content of two correlated news articles. Modelling of content dif-
ference is done using relations defined in the PROV-DM model [Moreau
and Missier 2013]. The proposed approach was then extended by adding
new parameters to how similarity between documents is measured and
applied on the 2014 provenance reconstruction challenge dataset by Nies
et al. [2016].
In a separate work, Nies et al. [2015] adapted their approach for recon-
structing provenance between news articles to social media messages.
Fine-grained provenance is reconstructed using knowledge such as how
users are interconnected on social media, message IDs, timestamps and
other meta-data. The reconstructed fine-grained provenance is able to
show how a message or news is diffused from the original source within
the connected network of users (e.g. network of friends and friends-
of-friends). However, it does not cover messages that were copied or
revised manually (e.g. not shared or retweeted through the social me-
dia software). To reconstruct coarse-grained provenance that captures
the missing relationships, tracked copies of messages in the fine-grained
provenance are first removed from the set of all messages. A similarity
matrix for all messages is then built using a feature model and seman-
tic similarity function (e.g. TF-IDF and cosine similarity). The messages
are then clustered and messages within each cluster are ordered based
33
Chapter 2 Literature Review
on timestamps to produce the coarse-grained provenance. Finally, by
integrating both forms of provenance, the graph that shows both mes-
sage diffusion between users who are friends and possible relationships
between messages not captured by the social media software is recon-
structed.
Although content-based approaches have demonstrated the possibility
of reconstructing provenance, they are reliant on being able to access
and compute the content of files. In a computer system, given the large
number of files that can exist, it is computationally expensive to cor-
relate every file. Data communicated between processes using volatile
memory are also transient. This implies that acquiring the data required
to establish communication between processes may not be possible. Fi-
nally, while content comparison allows the inference of how data is being
transformed, the question of which processes or applications are respon-
sible for the transformations remains. In contrast, studies by Ghoshal
and Plale [2013] and Ling [2013] showed information relating to events
happening and involved objects are being captured in log files. This infor-
mation leads to reconstructing provenance that shows the activities (e.g.
read, write) and entities involved in the transformation to be promising.
2.3.2 Digital Forensics
Part of a digital forensic investigation involves having to reconstruct the
sequence of events happening at a digital crime scene2 such that it can
be used to reason about or infer how a crime was committed. Recon-
struction is usually based on digitised evidence such as computer logs,
saved states of a system or even disk images. This is directly relevant
to our research on reconstructing data provenance from log files gath-
ered from the system. In this section, we identify two schools of thought
surrounding research in reconstructing the sequence of events in digital
forensics: timeline and event reconstruction.





Timeline reconstruction aims to temporally order events such that fur-
ther reasoning (usually manual) can be applied on the timeline to infer
the cause of the observed incident (e.g. digital crime or anomalies). The
general approach is to first extract events from the digital evidence gath-
ered from the system. Events are then ordered based on their timestamp
into a linear time sequence that reflects the order in which the events
took place. Approaches mainly differ in how events are being extracted
and processed.
Chabot et al. [2014], Hargreaves and Patterson [2012] and Buchholz
and Falk [2005] utilised different types of parser to extract timestamped
events, along with other relevant information from collected evidence.
Extracted events are processed into event nodes that encapsulate infor-
mation relevant to each event (e.g. start and end time, type, source of
extraction) before inserting it into the timeline.
Khan et al. [2007] addresses the issue of where extracting events3 in
the past becomes harder as the evidence becomes older (e.g. repeated
execution of an application would result in modification to the metadata
of files the application accessed). To overcome this issue, the authors
proposed the use of neural networks for automatic classification and ex-
traction of the execution time frame and files manipulated for a set of
known applications. Training of the neural networks is done using file
system activities that describe the behaviour of each application in the
set. Experiments conducted using the implementation showed that a
highly accurate timeline of the applications can be reconstructed despite
multiple applications and multiple file accesses happening at the same
time. However, the reconstruction only works for applications the neural
network is trained for. Identifying new applications would require the
neural networks to be retrained.
While a timeline captures the sequence between events, its linear prop-
erties are not intuitive for capturing relationships between events, which
is key to understanding the ’hows’ and causes of events. This is espe-
3In this case, the authors are looking at traces of execution of an application.
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Figure 2.9: Case where linearity of timeline is not intuitive for deducing rela-
tionship between events
cially the case if two related events are far apart on the timeline or that
there are many other events taking place between the two events (e.g.
noise), as illustrated in Figure 2.9. As a result, approaches for timeline
reconstruction are insufficient for reconstructing provenance.
Event Reconstruction
Deviating from timeline reconstruction, event reconstruction approaches
reconstruct each event4 as a separate entity. Such an entity would con-
tain information that describes the event, extracted from different evi-
dence. For example, FACE, an event reconstruction implementation by
Case et al. [2008], reconstructs an entity that describes a process as an
event. Such an entity would contain information on the files the process
accessed, the sockets it opened and other contextual information. From a
provenance perspective, each entity is equivalent to a node in the graph
or a small segment of the graph.
Once events are reconstructed, reasoning can be applied such that the
sequence of events that led to an incident can be reconstructed (e.g.
cause and effect). Carrier and Spafford [2004b] defined a conceptual
4In the reviewed literature, the definition of the unit term ’event’ varies between two
definitions: 1)Event is equivalent to an entity. 2)Event as in a singular activity ex-
ecuted by an entity. It is not our goal to provide a unified understanding of ’event’
in this review. As such, we use ’event’ to interchangeably refer to both definitions,
based on the context of the discussed work. Having said that, this variation of defini-




framework that consists of the following five phases to achieve this end
goal.
1. Evidence examination—Identify and extract objects likely to be re-
lated to the investigation, its relevant information and characteris-
tics from the gathered evidence.
2. Role classification—Classify objects as the cause or effect of an
event, based on the information and characteristics associated with
the object.
3. Event construction and testing—Different objects and events are
correlated, such that each event has a cause and an effect. The
aim is to allow reasoning on how a cause object could have brought
about changes that resulted in the effect object, through the known
event.
4. Event sequencing—Events that are reconstructed in the previous
phase are sequenced together, forming a chain of events. The end
result may be a list of possible chains of events or even series of
small event chains that needs to be sequenced further.
5. Hypothesis testing—Each chain of events is tested with the discov-
ered evidence or known facts about the crime to see if the chain of
events can explain the crime.
The majority of work on event reconstruction focuses on phases one
to three. Tools such as ECF by Chen et al. [2003], FACE by Case et al.
[2008] and FIRESTORM by Ahmad and Ruighaver [2002] place emphasis
on providing a platform that collects and associates information relevant
to an event from different sources. Phase four, the most important phase,
where the sequence of events is reconstructed, is however delegated to
the user. This is achieved through tools, such as FACE by Case et al.
[2008], that allow users to query or visualise the reconstructed events
for manual correlation and reasoning. However, as pointed out by Schatz
et al. [2004], such tools would not scale as the number and complexity
of events to be investigated increases. An increase in the number and
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complexity of events can be due to several causes, such as increased
workload on the system under investigation, investigation of an incident
that happens across long periods of time or inclusion of multiple sources
of evidence.
To overcome the increase in volume and complexity of events, rule-
based correlation engines such as SEC by Vaarandi [2002] and FORE
by Schatz et al. [2004] were proposed. Events extracted from evidence
are formulated as knowledge. User-defined rules that describe known
patterns or anomalies in the form of antecedents (e.g. cause) and conse-
quences (e.g. effect) are then fed to the correlation engine and executed
over the knowledge base. The engine can return either the sequence of
events that matches the defined rules or return the effects of the matched
rules. Rule-based correlation engines provide the flexibility for users to
update rules periodically, thereby increasing the coverage of incident
types that can be detected. However, the specificity of the rules affect
the results returned. If the rule is overly strict, the engine may miss
other relevant events. In contrast, if the rule is too general, the engine
may return a large number of false positive results. In addition, knowl-
edge of the patterns or anomalies is required for the formulation of rules.
This makes it difficult to detect an unknown sequence of events.
Another approach to event reconstruction is through profiling the digi-
tal fingerprints of specific applications performing different actions. Pro-
filing is achieved by monitoring changes in the timestamps in the meta-
data of files (e.g. access, modify, create timestamps) in the file system,
as discussed by Kalber et al. [2013] and James et al. [2011]. By match-
ing profiles showing sequences of file activities expected from applica-
tions to the file metadata of the current state of the system, analysts can
reconstruct which applications are running at the instant of time of the
snapshot. However, the disadvantage is that the profiles can only identify
when the last time the application executed as the file metadata would
have been overwritten by the latest file activity. Profiling digital finger-
prints of applications also suffers from an inability to detect unknown
applications running on the system
Phase four of the conceptual framework defined by Carrier and Spaf-
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ford [2004b] is more relevant to provenance reconstruction as the key
challenge is establishing the relationship between entities. However, we
note approaches using rule-based engines require knowledge on struc-
ture of the provenance graph or expected behaviour of the entities for
rule formulation. We do not assume such knowledge in this research.
2.3.3 Workflow Planning
Our review exercise on techniques that reconstruct sequences of events
led to work surrounding workflow planning. It is not our intention to
provide an extensive review of the work in this area, but rather to gather
inspiration on how relationships between entities can be reconstructed.
In his article on the application and implementation of classical plan-
ning in game development, Vassos [2012] defined the planning problem
as:
“Given the initial state of the world (world model), a set of ac-
tions that describe how the world changes in terms of precon-
ditions and effects and a goal condition, find the sequence of
actions (plan) such that when applied one after the other, they
would transform the current state description into one that sat-
isfies the goal condition.”
The Standford Research Institute Problem Solver (STRIPS) by Fikes and
Nilsson [1971] is an implementation of the classical planning technique.
In STRIPS, each action consists of a set of preconditions that must be
met in the world model before the effects of the action can be applied
onto the world model and a set of effects in the form of a delete and add
list. The delete list contains the set of conditions that are to be removed
from the world model and the add list contains the set of conditions that
are to be added to the world model. In general, STRIPS works as follows:
1. A theorem prover is used to prove whether the world model, M0
satisfies the goal conditions, G. If the prover is able to find a valid
proof, the planning is deemed complete and any applied actions will
be output as the plan (if the planner is able to prove M0, then the
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problem is solved trivially). If not, STRIPS treats the incomplete
proof as the difference between the state of the world model and
the goal conditions.
2. STRIPS searches for actions with effects that can reduce the differ-
ence between the state of the world model and the goal conditions.
The preconditions of such actions then become subgoals.
3. STRIPS uses the theorem prover to check if there are instances of
the selected action that can be used to prove the subgoal. If not,
Step 2 is applied onto the subgoal. If it can, the action is applied
to transform M0 to a new world model, M1. From here, the planner
goes back to Step 1 using M1 as the new world model instead.
Although different implementations of classical planning may adopt dif-
ferent searching algorithms and heuristics, these implementations gen-
erally are exposed to the issue of a large search space as the number
of valid actions increases in each state of the world model. In addition,
classical planning also suffers from an unbounded length of the plan and
does not guarantee an optimal solution. We note that these issues have
been raised by Groth et al. [2012], where they investigate formulating
reconstructing data provenance as a planning problem.
While there are other strategies proposed for workflow planning, such
as temporal planning [Chen et al. 2006; Cushing et al. 2007] and Hi-
erarchical Task Network planning (HTN) [Nau et al. 1999; Georgievski
and Aiello 2014], the problems and assumptions that these strategies
are designed for renders them irrelevant to our scenario. For exam-
ple, the assumption for HTN is that the abstract structure of the plan
is known. The plan can then be broken down to different subtasks, such
that the sequence of actions required to achieve each task can be dis-
covered separately. However, we do not assume that the structure of the
provenance graph is known. Likewise, temporal planning was designed
to solve problems where time constraints surrounding the concurrent ex-
ecution of different actions are considered. However, we do not assume
such constraints in our reconstruction scenario.
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2.4 Evaluating Provenance Reconstruction
In the process of reviewing literature on provenance reconstruction in
Section 2.3, we noted the inadequate discussion on the evaluation of
results. Details such as how are the results measured and the metrics
and dimensions used in the evaluation are lacking. Discussions such as
those by Huq et al. [2011], Dumitras and Neamtiu [2011], Groth et al.
[2012], Zhao et al. [2011] and Nies et al. [2015] either did not discuss or
only briefly mentioned the results of their evaluation. The methodology
that led to the authors arriving at the stated results was not documented.
This makes it difficult to replicate or compare other approaches with the
discussed work. However, some of the authors also highlighted the lack
of a suitable dataset for evaluation as the main reason for the absence of
evaluation.
Govindan et al. [2011] evaluated the performance of their algorithm for
reconstructing missing segments of a provenance graph under different
loss ratios5 using the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve.
The algorithm was repeated a hundred times using a random starting
point for each loss ratio. The rate in which the missing provenance seg-
ments are correctly reconstructed is then plotted against the rate of in-
correct reconstruction results to form the ROC curve. By plotting the
ROC curve for each loss ratio on the same chart, the performance of the
algorithm under different loss ratios can be deduced quickly from the
chart. Instead of a ROC curve, Zhao et al. [2011] directly plotted the pre-
cision of their algorithm against different loss ratios. However, from the
discussion, it is not clear how precision was calculated or what it means.
The authors only briefly state that it was calculated by comparing the re-
constructed provenance with the ground truth. In both discussions, the
proposed algorithms were evaluated based on whether the missing seg-
ments were correctly reconstructed. The metrics used (e.g. ROC curve,
precision-to-loss ratio) do not provide insights to the quality of the recon-
structed provenance, such as the amount of redundant information (i.e.
noise) in the output.
5Loss ratio refers to the ratio between the size of the lossy provenance graph and the
provenance graph without loss (ground truth).
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Most content-based approaches, such as those by Aierken et al. [2014],
Nies et al. [2012] and Magliacane and Groth [2012], assume that the en-
tire provenance graph is not available (i.e. 100% loss). As a result, the
approaches are not evaluated against varying loss ratios. Instead, eval-
uation is centred on understanding how well the reconstructed prove-
nance represents the ground truth using metrics such as precision and
recall. Unfortunately, how precision and recall are computed and the
significance of those metrics were not discussed in the experiments.
Knowing the approach to how the values for precision and recall is
derived is important as there can be different methods for calculating
those metrics. These methods can potentially result in different values.
Manning et al. [2009] described precision as “the fraction of retrieved




where tp is the number of retrieved items that are relevant (true posi-
tive) and fp is the number of retrieved items that are not relevant (false
positive) and can be computed by subtracting tp from the total length of
the result. However, in their research on proposing an automatic ma-
chine translation evaluation methodology for computational linguistics,
Papineni et al. [2002] highlighted two different approaches to measuring
tp. Assuming matching unigrams, traditional approaches to calculating
precision would equate tp to be the max(Countresult ,Counttruth) , where
Count is the number of matches in the respective sentences between the
result and the ground truth. In some cases, the traditional precision cal-
culation would yield high precision but questionable translations, such
as the case shown in Figure 2.10a. The authors argued that this ap-
proach is different to how humans would distinguish the performance of
a translation.
Instead, the authors proposed to take the minimum count between the
result and the ground truth when computing tp. The authors remarked
that counting the minimum is closer to how humans distinguish a good
translation from a bad one as compared to the traditional approach to
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Ground Truth:
Translation Result:
The fox jumps over the wall
The fox the fox the fox wall
tp = 7,  precision = 7/7




The fox jumps over the wall
The fox the fox the fox wall
tp = 4,  precision = 4/7
(b) Considering the minimum match count when computing true positives
Figure 2.10: Difference between traditional approach to computing true posi-
tives and approach proposed by Papineni et al. [2002]
computing tp. Figure 2.10b illustrates the outcome of the proposed mod-
ified approach. While the discussion surrounds computing precision, it
applies to recall too as tp is also a key variable for deriving recall, as




where fn (false negative) is the number of items falsely deemed non-
relevant. Although subtle, these two different approaches yield different
evaluation results. As such, it is important that the approach to how the
metrics are computed be documented in any discussion on evaluation.
Cheah and Plale [2014] suggested that quality of a provenance graph
can be deduced by measuring the correctness and completeness of the
graph. The authors defined correctness to be associated with the degree
in which the graph is free of errors and inconsistencies and complete-
ness to the ratio of loss or over-completeness of a graph in comparison to
the expected provenance graph. A framework that evaluates the correct-
ness and completeness of a provenance graph is proposed. Correctness
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is evaluated by searching for conflicting annotations6 and timestamp in-
consistencies between connected nodes7. Completeness is evaluated by
comparing the provenance graph with knowledge of the graph, such as
a workflow template, to determine if there are missing elements. The er-
rors found were then averaged over the expected nodes and edges into a
single scoring metric that is used to denote the quality of the graph.
While the dimensions used by Cheah and Plale [2014] can also be ap-
plied to evaluating a reconstructed provenance graph, consolidating the
outcome to a single scoring metric is insufficient for highlighting the
aspect the reconstruction faired poorly in. Also, the authors’ proposed
framework only factored missing segments into their quality metric. We
argue that noise (e.g. extra provenance relations in the graph) is also a
factor that should be included in the evaluation as it reduces quality and
hinders comprehending the provenance graph.
In Chapter 6, we address the lack of evaluation methodology for prove-
nance reconstruction research. We argue that addressing this gap is
critical for future research as an open and clear evaluation methodology
is key for comparison and performance evaluation of proposed solutions.
2.5 Dataset for Provenance Reconstruction
An important research gap highlighted by some of the work reviewed
in Section 2.4 is the lack of a suitable dataset for evaluation. Maglia-
cane and Groth [2013] discussed their efforts identifying such a dataset
for their research on reconstructing file provenance given a set of files
whose relationship is unknown. Their survey was based on the following
use cases:
1. Detecting plagiarism, text and multimedia content reuse.
6In the context of their work, the authors referred to annotations as the contextual
information associated with each node in the graph, in the form of name-value pairs.
7Since in a provenance graph, each edge is equivalent to a dependency relationship
between the two connected nodes, timestamp inconsistencies can be checked by
observing the causal order of the two nodes.
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2. Connecting publications with related data such as other research
data and blog posts.
3. Tracking the evolution of scientific knowledge and discourse through
publications and informal communications between scientists.
As a result, the datasets surveyed were mostly corpora of text documents
and multi-media datasets. Since the scope of this research is on com-
puter system log files, the findings reported by the authors were not
applicable. Having said that, the authors broadly discussed some guide-
lines for selecting a dataset for evaluating provenance reconstruction.
Based on these guidelines, we defined a list of requirements for identi-
fying datasets that can be used for our research. To keep the discussion
concise, the requirements for the datasets and our work on surveying
publicly available datasets is discussed in Chapter 3.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, work related to the requirements identified in Section 1.6
are reviewed. Figure 2.11 illustrates the categories of work reviewed.
Techniques used in log analysis, such as frequent item mining and text
analysis, can be used to extract the message signature and parameters
portion of log entries in a log file. However, our review showed that
these techniques do not handle the heterogeneity found in parameters
caused by logging mechanisms. Extracting the correct information from
the parameter portion of a log entry is critical to modelling log entries
into provenance relations. Having said that, proposing a general solu-
tion for resolving heterogeneity in both the message signature and pa-
rameter portions of a log entry is not within the scope of our research.
Instead, we combine the extraction of information from different log files
together with the modelling of such information and implemented them
as customised parsers. We elaborate upon our approach in Chapter 4.
A provenance model is required to model information extracted from
log files into provenance relations, such that they can be used for recon-
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Figure 2.11: Structure illustrating the categories of work reviewed
structing the data provenance. Existing provenance models can be cat-
egorised into those that operate on flat granularity and models where a
multi-granularity view is induced using abstraction. However, modelling
log files generated from different granularity layers using flat granularity
models would result in disparate provenance graphs. We argue that dif-
ferences between log files, induced by granularity, resemble structural
differences in the graph. Hence, multi-granularity provenance models
based on structural abstraction are potential candidates for modelling
log files generated from different granularities into provenance relations.
However, existing models either assume a priori knowledge on elements
of the provenance or are sensitive to noise or interference in the data.
Our proposed provenance model and approach to mapping provenance
graphs between different granularity layers is discussed in Chapter 4.
In Section 2.3, research relating to reconstructing the sequence of
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events in the areas of provenance, digital forensics and workflow plan-
ning are reviewed. Work on reconstructing provenance either references
existing provenance or access information such as the application source
code or content of data files for deducing the missing provenance. How-
ever, this research does not assume provenance is available or collected.
Approaches relying on access to application source code or data files may
also incur high computational cost due to the number of applications and
files that can exist on a computer system. Many timeline and event recon-
struction techniques in digital forensics do not focus on reconstructing
the relationships among events and entities. While some have proposed
using rule-based engines for inferring relationships, users are expected
to possess knowledge of either the provenance graph or behaviour of the
entities in order to formulate correct rules. However, this research as-
sumes no knowledge on the structure of the provenance graph. In Chap-
ter 5, we present and discuss our proposed algorithm for reconstructing
data provenance from the set of modelled provenance relations. The pro-
posed algorithm leverages the causality of events and assumes only basic
domain knowledge on how operating systems function.
Although there are published work on provenance reconstruction, dis-
cussion on how the approaches are evaluated have been brief. One of the
attributing reasons was the lack of suitable datasets for evaluation pur-
poses. We address this gap in Chapter 3 by constructing and making pub-
lic, a set of datasets for provenance reconstruction research. Amongst
work that discusses evaluating their proposed approaches, none have de-
tailed or referenced the methodologies used in the evaluation. In most
cases, only the metrics used and the results are presented. Although the
metrics used were known metrics such as precision and recall, we argue
that it is still important to detail or reference the approaches used for
deriving the values. This is because there can be a different interpreta-
tion of the metrics and approaches for computing the values. In Chapter
6, we detail our methodology for evaluating reconstructed provenance





Constructing a Dataset for
Provenance Reconstruction
Research
A dataset that allows provenance to be reconstructed while possess-
ing the ground truth for evaluation is essential to addressing the thesis
question—how complete the reconstructed data provenance is compared
the known derivation history of the data. Hence, to systematically iden-
tify suitable datasets from a pool of publicly available datasets, a set of
requirements is defined. However, our survey revealed a lack of suitable
datasets, prompting the Cyber Security Lab to record the New Zealand
Cyber Security Challenge (NZCSC’15) dataset. This chapter details the
process and setup used to create the dataset. The discussion wraps up
with a description of a set of use cases that we derived for evaluation
purposes from the NZCSC’15 dataset.
3.1 Requirements for Dataset
Magliacane and Groth [2013] broadly stated the following requirements
for a dataset to be considered suitable for evaluating provenance recon-
struction research:
• The dataset needs to contain the information that the provenance
graph can be reconstructed from.
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• The dataset needs to have a gold standard provenance graph which
the reconstructed provenance can be compared with.
However, the authors did not elaborate further on the kind of information
required for provenance to be reconstructed. Based on the requirements
stated by Magliacane and Groth [2013], the following list of requirements
are proposed to aid the selection of dataset:
Requirement 1 (R1). Entities—the dataset should contain information,
independent from the ground truth, that can lead to the identification or
inference of at least a partial set of entities involved.
Requirement 2 (R2). Relations between entities—the dataset should
contain information, independent from the ground truth, that would pos-
sibly allow at least partial set of the relationships between entities to be
inferred or established.
Requirement 3 (R3). Ground truth—the ground truth is a separate
portion of the dataset that sheds light on the sequence of events happen-
ing during the generation of the dataset. Depending on how the ground
truth is collected, it can either be in provenance form (which will be
equivalent to the gold standard provenance stated by Magliacane and
Groth [2013]) or data from which the gold standard provenance can be
derived.
Here, we draw a distinction between the base data and the ground
truth data. The base data is the portion of the dataset used for recon-
struction. The ground truth data is a separate portion of the dataset used
mainly for verifying the reconstructed output. The ground truth can be
generated through manual annotation or captured from a perspective
separate from the generation of the base data. It should be noted that
the ground truth is used purely for evaluation purposes and not in the
reconstruction.
On top of those listed above, we further extend the requirements for
our desired evaluation dataset to include capturing events from multiple
perspectives in a computer system. This is in line with our scope of study-
ing data provenance reconstructed from log files generated at different
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granularities of a computer system, stated in Section 1.5. We break down
the multiple perspective requirement into the following types of events:
Requirement 4 (R4). Multiple Perspective
• (R4.1) System events—events collected from the system layer. These
events provide information on process interactions with other ele-
ments within a computer system such as files, processes or remote
systems. Example of system events are system call traces and net-
work events.
• (R4.2) Application events—events collected by logging mechanisms
operating at the application layer. Application events detail the op-
erational details, state and activities of applications monitored and
are usually consolidated into application log files.
With these requirements in mind, we first look at some publicly avail-
able research datasets and evaluate their suitability.
3.2 Evaluating Public Datasets
Following the scope defined in Section 1.5, the survey focuses on datasets
describing events happening within a computer system. Table 3.1 sum-
marises the datasets surveyed with respect to the list of requirements
presented in Section 3.1.
3.2.1 Provenance Datasets
ProvBench [ProvBench 2012] is the product of an effort to construct a
repository of provenance datasets for interoperability testing, validat-
ing proposed approaches and benchmarking of solutions by the prove-
nance community. To-date, the repository contains a handful of datasets
collected using various provenance collection tools. As a result, most
datasets in the repository are in the form of complete provenance graphs
modelled using provenance models such as PROV [Moreau and Groth
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2013; Moreau and Missier 2013]. Since the provenance graphs are al-
ready captured, the use of the ProvBench datasets contradicts the objec-
tive of reconstructing data provenance.
Since the ProvBench datasets are never intended for provenance re-
construction research, they are not published with ground truth data.
As such, the ProvBench datasets do not satisfy requirement R3. Hence,
these datasets cannot be used for evaluating the success of a reconstruc-
tion.
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3.2.2 Network and System Logs
While there are many publicly available network and system datasets,
most of them only provide a single perspective (i.e. system events). In
the following, we review some of the common datasets used for system
security research:
• Netresec Dataset Collection—Maintained by Netresec [Netresec
2010], the collection consists of network traffic datasets collected
from various cyber security competitions, deployed honeypots and
sandboxes for malware analysis. These datasets describe various
forms of network based attack and remote intrusion. The objective
was to provide data for intrusion detection research. As a result,
most of the datasets do not capture events from the application
perspective, hence, fail to satisfy requirement R4.2. Most of the
datasets also do not satisfy requirement R3 as they do not have
ground truth data in the releases.
• Stanford Large Network Dataset Collection (SNAP Dataset)—
the Stanford SNAP group looks at analysing large social and infor-
mation networks. Amongst the rich set of social and communica-
tion network datasets hosted on the group’s website [Leskovec and
Krevl 2014], there are some on computer network communications.
These datasets range from monitored email exchanges to peer-to-
peer networks. However, like the ProvBench datasets, the datasets
hosted here are mostly modelled graph data. Hence they are not
relevant for provenance reconstruction research. Having said that,
it is interesting to note that the datasets capture a variety of data
from different applications such as email clients, Twitter and other
social media applications.
• UNB ISCX Intrusion Detection Evaluation Dataset—the dataset
was generated by the Information Security Centre of Excellence
(ISCX) at the University of New Brunswick (UNB) in 2012 [Shiravi
et al. 2012]. Agents were created to simulate real world services
such as web, mail and file services and were deployed in a testbed
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environment. Various kinds of multi-stage attacks against those
agents were then carried out and the network traffic was captured
as the dataset. By simulating attacks and services in a segregated
network, the authors were able to generate a labelled dataset that
was free from real-time background traffic (i.e. noise). The labels
serve as a form of data from which the ground truth can be derived.
However, the dataset only describes events happening on the net-
work. It does not capture application events, hence does not satisfy
requirement R4.
• ADFA Intrusion Detection Dataset—the Australian Defence Force
Academy (ADFA) Intrusion Detection Dataset [Creech and Hu 2013]
was intended to replace the outdated KDD99 dataset [UIC 1999] re-
leased during the Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD) con-
ference in 1999 for system intrusion detection research. The ADFA
dataset consists of system call traces captured off systems that were
subjected to simulated malicious attacks. The main advantages of
the ADFA dataset are the dataset’s relevancy to modern computer
systems (the dataset was generated on recent versions of Linux and
Windows operating systems) and that the dataset was labelled, sep-
arating the malicious and normal system call traces. Having said
that, the arguments associated with the system calls invoked were
not captured in the dataset (i.e. the system call traces only contain
information on system call types executed by the process). This
made it not possible to derive the relationships between elements
and as a result, unable to fulfil the entity and relationship require-
ment (R1 and R2 ). On top of that, the dataset contains only events
from the system perspective and hence does not meet requirement
R4.2.
• DARPA Intrusion Detection Dataset—the Defense Advanced Re-
search Projects Agency (DARPA) Intrusion Detection Dataset is one
of the most comprehensive system research datasets, capturing sys-
tem events such as system call traces and network traffic. It was
generated by subjecting agents that simulate real systems to scripted
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attacks. System call traces, along with their arguments, were col-
lected from those systems on a daily basis. The entire simulation
was conducted in an isolated environment. A document that de-
scribes the attacks carried out, a brief description of each type of
scripted attack and their start times was published together with
the dataset. The documentation acts as an approximated ground
truth data which can be used to verify the results. Unfortunately,
the dataset focuses on collecting only system events and neglects
events generated by the applications running on the system. Hence,
the DARPA dataset does not fulfil requirement R4.2. Another down-
side of the dataset is that it is generated on the niche Solaris oper-
ating system. As a result, the dataset is considered to be outdated
compared to modern systems.
The ground truth column in Table 3.1 shows even with recent released
datasets, ground truth data is usually not included in the releases. Some
datasets use labels to annotate and differentiate abnormal events from
the normal ones. However, labels do not capture the semantics of the ac-
tual incidents (e.g. actual flow of the attack, how it happened or whether
two different attacks are related) as the labels only denote whether the
respective events were relevant or not. Since a key aspect of provenance
is the relationship between entities, it is important that the reconstructed
relationships can be evaluated too using the ground truth. As such, the
use of labels as the sole ground truth is insufficient for evaluation.
Due to the lack of ground truth data, most of the surveyed datasets
could not be used for our research. The documentation that details at-
tacks carried out in the DARPA dataset can be used to derive an approx-
imated ground truth. Based on the description of the attacks and their
start times, it is possible to determine which events in the system logs
are the relevant attack events. Relationships between entities can then
be inferred manually from the relevant events. However, since there is
no indication of how long each attack lasted, the ground truth can only
be approximated. As stated above, DARPA dataset also does not include
application events, making it not possible to evaluate provenance recon-
struction using application log files.
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Since none of the surveyed datasets can fulfil the listed requirements,
we set out to collect and construct our own evaluation dataset from the
New Zealand Cyber Security Challenge 2015 (NZCSC’15). The setup for
the data collection and the methodology used for the dataset construction
is discussed in the following sections.
3.3 New Zealand Cyber Security Challenge 2015
Before describing the NZCSC’15, we would like to clarify the author’s
contribution with regards to the work done towards constructing the
dataset. Although the design and execution of the challenge is critical
to the construction of the dataset, it is a group effort together with other
members from the University of Waikato Cyber Security Lab. Hence, the
design and implementation of the challenge discussed in this section are
not part of the contributions claimed by the student for the work done
towards constructing the dataset. Instead, the author’s contribution sur-
rounds the design and methodology used for capturing and constructing
the dataset, specifically, the round 2 portion of the dataset. This section
aims to provide the background knowledge for understanding the dataset
discussed in Section 3.5.
The NZCSC’15 was designed to raise awareness of cyber security, par-
ticularly on web application vulnerabilities and the potential types of at-
tack vectors a vulnerable system is susceptible to. The challenge was
structured into two rounds, with round 1 conducted in a capture-the-flag
style and round 2 as an attack and defence scenario.
In round 1, participants were required to identify and exploit existing
vulnerabilities on a set of hosted web services in order to retrieve a “flag”
from the respective systems. Depending on the challenge, the flag could
be embedded in source code or within the text of an HTML document.
Vulnerabilities introduced were mostly implementation and configuration
based, such as lack of user input sanitisation and erroneous permission
configuration. This translates to very little file interaction on the system1.
1To recap, as stated in Section 1.5, the scope of provenance views data at a file level.
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As a result, the data gathered from this round was not used and hence,
will not be discussed further in this chapter.
Round 2 was designed to test participants’ skills on system and web
application security. Participants were designated as the defenders and
assigned to different “blue” teams. Each blue team was required to main-
tain the availability of a set of services representative of those found
commonly in a corporate environment. The set consisted of a file shar-
ing service, a web server and an email server. Vulnerabilities introduced
into the servers were intended to emulate a poorly secured proprietary
environment (e.g. a company providing online services). These vulner-
abilities include poorly implemented web applications (e.g. unsanitised
parameters and exposed management interfaces), outdated applications
with vulnerabilities published in the Common Vulnerabilities and Expo-
sure database [MITRE 2017] (e.g. shellshock and php vulnerabilities),
weak security and account configurations [van der Stock et al. 2015].
Blue teams had to patch and harden the security of each service so as to
prevent the services and their systems from being compromised.
The participants were pitted against volunteers from industry spon-
sors, who were penetration testers by trade from various security com-
panies, and volunteers from our own research lab. Together, these vol-
unteers form the “red” teams. The red teams’ task was to disrupt the
services maintained by the blue teams.
Each blue team was scored based on the availability of their services by
a scoring machine. Availability was determined using a script that peri-
odically checked if the respective services of each team could be reached
from the scoring machine. Points were then awarded to the respective
team based on the services reached successfully. Figure 3.1 shows the
schematic for the setup used in Round 2.
All system were hosted on Virtual Machine (VM)s running Linux Ubuntu
15.04 as the operating system. The entire virtual environment was hosted
using OpenStack [The OpenStack Foundation 2010], a private cloud vir-
tual infrastructure management suite. The OpenStack version used was
the Havana release. Each blue team was assigned three VMs, each run-
Hence, emphasis is placed on file and system interactions.
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Figure 3.1: Schematics of the setup used for Round 2 of NZCSC’15
ning a service; a web server, a file server and an email server. VMs for
each team were placed in a virtual network allocated to each team so
as to prevent interference between the blue teams. Each blue team was
also allocated a Technician VM for tunnelling into their allocated virtual
network from the physical network. Participants would then access the
VMs hosting the services through the tunnel.
Blue team networks are shown as the blue boxes in Figure 3.1. The red
team systems were placed in a separate red team virtual network. This
was to simulate attackers from outside of a proprietary network (e.g. the
Internet). Each red team VM was pre-installed with Metasploit [Rapid7
2016], a penetration testing suite, as the basic tool. A list of attacks
observed to have been carried out by the red teams on the blue teams2
is attached as reference under Appendix A.
2This is done by going through the video recordings captured on both the blue and red
teams. Details on the video recording is discussed in Sections 3.4 and 3.5.
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3.4 Setup for Data Collection
As the dataset to be constructed is intended for evaluation, events in
the dataset should be generated in a realistic manner, as opposed to a
simulated dataset where events that happened are planned. Evaluat-
ing against such a realistic dataset would allow us to truly understand
whether the proposed reconstruction solution works.
The NZCSC’15 provided a platform for capturing data that are close to
real-world data. Although the vulnerabilities introduced in the challenge
were specifically selected, there was no control on the attack vectors
used (e.g. types of exploit used) or the breath of the attacks (e.g. activi-
ties executed after a successful exploitation). This introduces a sense of
uncertainty on the impact and effect of each attack, even if two attacks
are exploited using the same vulnerability. Potential limitations of the
dataset will be discussed in Section 3.7.
To construct the base data, both system and network events were col-
lected from both blue and read team VMs. From the system perspective,
events were collected from both the system and application layers. At the
system layer, kernel logging mechanisms Sysdig [Sysdig 2014] and LAF
[archLinux 2012] were used for collecting system call traces from the
kernels. Both the system calls invoked and their associated arguments
were logged. This was done to fulfil requirements R1 and R2, which
deals with being able to infer the entities and relationships involved.
The motivation behind using different tools for logging events was so
that interoperability between different data formats could be tested (i.e.
that a proposed solution is able to digest different log formats). On the
application layer, where possible, application logs produced by the var-
ious services were collected at the end of the competition. From the
network perspective, Daemonlogger [Roesch 2006] was used to moni-
tor and log both incoming and outgoing network traffic on each VM. By
collecting events from the system, network and applications running, re-
quirement R4 is satisfied. Table 3.2 lists the logging mechanisms used
and the types of log file captured.
The main challenge with constructing a realistic dataset that satisfies
59
Chapter 3 Constructing a Dataset for Provenance Reconstruction Research






















- - - VLC
Red VM Sysdig - Daemonlogger -
the requirements listed in Section 3.1 is generating the ground truth data
without affecting the base data. In simulated datasets such as the DARPA
dataset, events are planned (e.g. simulated attacks made on the sys-
tems). As such, the authors of the datasets are aware of details concern-
ing those events. Ground truth can then be produced by documenting
those details. However, with constructing a non-simulated dataset, au-
thors should have no influence or role over events that happened. Hence,
alternative means, independent of the those used for capturing the base
data, is required to generate the ground truth.
For the data collection exercise, ground truth data is generated us-
ing VideoLan Client (VLC), screen recording software. Screen activities
of participants from both teams are captured as video recordings from
each team’s physical terminals using the software. Since no data logging
was done on the physical terminals, such a setup ensured that the video
recording did not interfere with the data collection. Also, since control
of the VMs was done through the physical terminals, recording the ac-
tivities from the physical terminals ensured that all activities for each
team were captured. Figure 3.2 illustrates a simple overview showing
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Figure 3.2: Environment separation between data logging and video capture
3.5 NZCSC’15 Dataset
Overview of the NZCSC’15 dataset
In total, data was gathered from five blue teams and three red teams (two
industry experts and the backdoor VM). Permission to record screen ac-
tivities was obtained from all members of the teams for ethics approval.
Unfortunately, one of the blue team’s recording was found to be cor-
rupted after the competition. Hence only recordings for four blue teams
and the two red team experts were retrieved successfully. We also did
not manage to obtain a set of usable log files from the file server applica-
tion due to a misconfiguration in the logging mechanism. A breakdown
of the data collected is as follows:
Blue Team:
• Network traffic log – 5 sets
• System call trace log on web server – 5 sets (Sysdig)
• System call trace log on file server – 5 sets (LAF)
• Apache web server log – 5 sets
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Red Team:
• Network traffic log – 3 sets
• System call trace log – 3 sets (Sysdig)
Video Recording:
• Blue team – 4 sets (Blue 2–5)
• Red team – 2 sets (Red-1 and Red-2)
In the following subsections, we discuss the format and process used
for transcribing the video recordings into ground truth data.
Format of transcript
To enable the video recordings to be machine-processable, each record-
ing was transcribed into text form. Each observed event in the video was
transcribed as an entry in the resulting transcript. An example of an en-
try in the transcript is shown in Figure 3.3. Each entry in the transcript
is broken down into seven data fields. This is to allow for a systematic
approach to transcribing the video and to help preserve the semantics of
the events observed in the video. The data fields used are as follow:
1. Time - the time field records the observed system timestamp when
the event first took place on the system. Because the timestamp
observed was obtained by monitoring the desktop clock, we were
only able to capture the timestamp to minute granularity.
2. Action - the action field describes the observed event. Values of this
field are structured to first contain a short description of the com-
mand or action observed, followed by the VM the event was carried




















Figure 3.3: An example of an entry in the transcript
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out on (i.e. location), the user account that executed the action and
finally the means through which the action was executed (e.g. com-
mand line, web browser). To simplify the transcription process, lo-
cation is not transcribed if the event happened on the VM to which
the transcript belongs. Similarly, means of execution is not recorded
if the action was executed through the command line interface.
3. Local Command - the local command field records the observed
command and arguments used by the user in carrying out the ob-
served event. This field is only valid for events happening on the
command line interface.
4. Send - the send field provides a general description of the data sent
to the remote host on the network due to the observed event. It
details the nature of the data sent and to which VM the data is being
sent.
5. Receive - similar to send, the receive field details the nature of the
data received at the local host (the VM which the transcript is for)
on the network and the VM from which the data was sent.
6. Comments - recording the semantics of the observed events into
fixed fields is not an easy task due to the wide variation of visual
feedback possible and domain knowledge required to understand
the observed events. Hence, the comments field is a free-text field
that records either a description of the feedback from the system or
comments that will provide insights into what is happening in the
observed event.
7. Intent - in some situations, it is not easy to understand what a user
is trying to achieve through just one event. As such, the intent field
is used for annotating what the participant is attempting to achieve
over one or more observed events. The information provided in the
intent field is derived through one or a combination of two methods.
The first method was through observing what happened over the
series of events. The second method was by looking at the Google
search queries carried out on the browser by the participant when
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attempting to perform tasks related to the observed event. As such,
the information provided in the intent field is a best effort attempt.
Having said that, we believe that annotating the perceived intent of
the participant can facilitate reasoning about and understanding of
the ground truth data. This field is left empty if the comments or
event description is clear in expressing the intention of the partici-
pants.
The next subsection describes the process used for breaking down each
event observed in the video recording into the defined fields.
Video transcribing process
Events observed in the videos can be generated either by the user or the
system. An event is considered user generated if it is observed that the
event is the result of a direct action by a participant (i.e. a participant
executed a command or action). The time of execution, the command
used and the data sent are noted for each observed user generated event.
This information, along with a brief description of the action or command
executed are transcribed into the transcript using the format described
above. The system is then observed for feedback returned to the user in
relation to the command or action executed. Such feedback may come
as a message prompt returned by the system or as a visual effect caused
by the participants’ action, such as the successful loading of a web page.
Feedback observed is transcribed into either the comments or receive
fields or both. In the case where a goal is achieved through a series of
events, the intent field for the respective entries will be annotated with
the same goal.
On the other hand, an event is considered system generated if the ob-
served event happened suddenly or automatically without the partici-
pant’s involvement. An example of a system generated event could be a
sudden disconnection of the participant’s remote terminal to one of the
servers, observed in video recording. In such cases, the time at which








Figure 3.4: Flowchart depicting the video transcribing process for system and
user generated events
in the respective fields. If required, further details are noted in the com-
ments field. It should be noted that a system generated event could
be caused by user generated events from other teams (i.e. attacks from
red teams causing immediate visual feedback on blue team terminals).
In those cases, the responsible event is transcribed as a user-generated
event in the other team’s transcript. As such, it is possible to correlate
two transcripts and deduce the cause and effect of actions or commands
executed by other teams. However, we do not annotate such correlation
into the ground truth so as to avoid complicating the ground truth data.
The transcription process is illustrated as a flowchart in Figure 3.4.
Two examples of the resulting video transcripts are shown in Figure
3.5. Figure 3.5a shows the result of transcribing an observed standalone
event. Information in the action field is decomposed using boxes and
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(a) A single transcribed event. The action field is highlighted with different
colours and annotated with numbers to illustrate formatting used
Time Actions Local Command Send Receive Comments Intent





















list cronjobs for root
user as root
sudo crontab -u root -l no cronjobs listed.
Participant removes
all cronjobs for root
user.
(b) Intent field used to annotate relation and intention behind executing a series
of observed events
Figure 3.5: Examples of the video transcript of the ground truth
numbering to demonstrate the format described in the field descriptions
above. The intention behind having a format for the fields is to allow
the transcript to be processed in an automatic and structured manner.
Figure 3.5b shows how the intent field is used to semantically group a
series of events together. Although the intent field is in free text form, it
can be used to conveniently group and label events into event groups.
After transcribing the video recordings, the NZCSC’15 dataset would
have event log files and the transcripts describing the participants’ ac-
tivities. These two sets of data represent the base data and the ground
truth data, discussed in Section 3.1, respectively. The event log files will
be used for data provenance reconstruction, while the transcripts will be
used for deriving use cases for evaluation. Next, we describe the use
cases derived.
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access (21:43, cat, /etc/hosts)
Time Actions Local Command Send Receive Comments Intent














Figure 3.6: Converting event in transcript to ground truth provenance
3.6 Use Cases from the NZCSC’15 Dataset
Using the transcript, a sample set of use cases was derived for the pur-
pose of evaluating the proposed reconstruction solution. For each use
case, a piece of data (e.g. file) is first selected. Events in the transcripts
that are relevant to the file (e.g. events that modify, access or propa-
gate data in the file) are then identified. Information such as timestamp,
the actions and involved entities are then extracted and expressed as
a provenance graph using concepts described in our proposed prove-
nance model, discussed later in Chapter 4. Figure 3.6 shows a simple
example of an event in the transcript being converted to ground truth
provenance. From the actions field of the entry in the transcript, one
can deduce that the application cat is used to read data from the file
/etc/hosts. Using concepts in the proposed provenance model, the entry
is translated to a tuple format that shows the relationship between the
two entities. The format of the tuple is discussed along with concepts in
the model in Chapter 4. The tuple can also be converted into graph form
for visualisation purposes, as shown in the figure. The resulting prove-
nance graph for each use case is the ground truth provenance with which
the reconstructed data provenance can be compared for evaluation.
The derived use cases and selection of files are designed to test the
reconstruction solution on the following capabilities:
1. ability to retrieve all relevant entities and relationships
2. reconstruct the sequence that depicts how the data is derived from
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its origin
3. reconstruct the sequence that shows how the data evolve from a
given state
In the following, a brief description of the scenario and the simplified
ground truth provenance3 are presented for the use cases derived.
Use-case 1—Backing up Critical Files
Scenario - Participants from the blue team, web-co2, were attempting
to backup a set of critical files which they were supposed to protect from
the red team. First, the blue team checked the content of the file /home-
/tech/PrivateFiles/PrivateFile1 by reading it using the application less on
the terminal. After ensuring that the file was correct, they copied it from
the file server to the technician VM using the scp application. A check-
sum was then generated for the file using the md5sum application.
Based on Pechanec [2007]’s explanation of how scp utilises the under-
lying secure shell (ssh) daemon, sshd, for sending data to remote hosts,
we added the passing of data from the scp to a sshd process into the
provenance graph. The resulting high level provenance graph is shown
in Figure 3.7. The dotted arrow represents host-to-host network commu-
nication.
This simple use case covers not only day to day user interactions with
files but also communication between processes. Process-to-process com-




Figure 3.7: Use-case 1—Backing up /home/tech/PrivateFiles/PrivateFile1 to re-
mote host, Technician VM
3In some cases, certain events were repeatedly executed over time. For simplicity,
these repeated sequences are not shown in the figures.
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3) access2) modify
4) access
Figure 3.8: Use-case 2—Modification of /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file in order
to gain remote shell access through ssh
munication is an important behaviour in the operating system, used mainly
to move data from files to other locations such as other files or hosts. By
selecting the file /home/tech/PrivateFiles/PrivateFile1 as the data whose
provenance is to be reconstructed, this use case tests whether the prop-
agation of data across different processes and over the network can be
reconstructed.
Use-case 2—Malicious File Modification
Scenario - One of the first things the red teams did upon successfully
compromising the blue teams’ VMs was to enable password-less remote
shell access for themselves. To achieve that, the red team injected their
own ssh-key into the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file on the blue team’s
VM. Modification of the file was done via a malicious backdoor shell
installed previously. The red team then checked to see if the ssh-key had
been successfully injected by reading and displaying the content of the
file using the cat application. Every time the red team logs in remotely to
the VM using ssh, the file authorized_keys will be automatically accessed
by the ssh daemon (i.e. sshd).
The high-level provenance graph for use-case 2 is shown in Figure 3.8.
Use-case 2 is an example of how hidden malicious software can alter the
system, eventually leading to the system being compromised. It tests if
the modification of /root/.ssh/authorized_keys and events showing differ-
ent applications consuming the modified data over time can be recon-
structed.
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2) access1) create
3) delete
Figure 3.9: Use-case 3—Injecting Malicious Payload via Database
Use-case 3—Malicious Payload
Scenario - Use-case 3 captures the red team injecting malicious shell
code into one of the blue team’s VMs via the MySQL database, mysqld.
Access to the blue team’s web server (httpd) is gained by leveraging the
malicious shell code and the method depicted in use-case 2. Finally, the
shell code is deleted so as to cover the attackers’ tracks.
Figure 3.9 shows the high-level provenance graph of use-case 3. Dif-
fering from the previous use cases, use-case 3 captures the entire life-
cycle of the file red.php; from its creation till its deletion. Creation and
deletion of a file are important relationships in data provenance as these
relations mark the beginning and end of a file’s life cycle. As such, the
proposed reconstruction solutions should not only be able to reconstruct
the interactions but also the creation and deletion of files.
Use-case 4—File Versions
Scenario - In this use case, the red team first injected a malicious shell
code, red0.php into one of the blue team’s VM web folders /usr/local/a-
pache2/htdocs/. To ensure availability of the shell code on the compro-
mised VM, the red team made backups of the shell code in various direc-
tories. This was achieved by copying the file to other directories using
the cp application. Two different backups were created, the first one
from the original file to another web server directory and the other to
the system temporary file folder.
Figure 3.10 shows the ground truth provenance for file, ../test/red0.php.
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Figure 3.10: Use-case 4—Data provenance showing the derivation of the file
/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/red0.php
The file is selected intentionally to test whether the relationships that
show how the file is derived from ../htdocs/red0.php and how it evolves
to /tmp/red0.php can be reconstructed.
These four use cases are examples of the type of use cases that can be
extracted from the ground truth for testing provenance reconstruction
solutions. These use cases demonstrate some scenarios of file tampering
and file evolution during the competition4. However, the use cases do
not exhaustively represent the different variety of attacks that can be ob-
served in the real world ,such as those encountered in a digital forensics
investigation. This is due to the limitation in the scope of the dataset,
which will be discussed in Section 3.7.
Having said that, the use cases are sufficient for representing the ba-
sic operations that can be carried out on a file (e.g. create, read, write,
delete) and the communication of data between entities. By focusing on
reconstructing these aspects, we can verify if the proposed reconstruc-
tion solution can produce data provenance that allow questions such as,
“how was the file created?" and “where did the data in this file origi-
nate from?" to be addressed. Such a reconstructed output is relevant to
4Other use cases that can be derived from the ground truth can be inferred from the
list of attacks, listed in Appendix A, carried out in the challenge.
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Use-case 1 3 3 3
Use-case 2 3 3
Use-case 3 3 3 3
Use-case 4 3 3 3 3 3
the data provenance we defined in Section 1.5 of Chapter 15. Table 3.3
provides an overview of the aspects captured in each use case.
3.7 Limitations of the NZCSC’15 Dataset
Although the NZCSC’15 dataset was captured from a live platform, we
do not assume that the dataset is complete and perfect. In this section,
we discuss limitations of the dataset that stems from how it was captured
and constructed.
Enclosed Virtual Environment
Due to constraints regarding the venue of the competition, it was decided
that the competition be hosted in a closed environment (e.g. a virtual en-
vironment separated from external networks). This decision has an ef-
fect on the amount of non-malicious activities captured and represented
in the dataset.
Although non-malicious activities are still being generated throughout
the competition (e.g. participants testing and checking their system func-
tionality; events generated by scoring machine;execution of background
services), the amount of non-malicious activities captured is still limited
compared to a real-world environment. This may affect the fuzziness of
5We defined data provenance as, “the information that depicts the evolution process
of a piece of data, including the entities and activities involved in the process”
72
3.7 Limitations of the NZCSC’15 Dataset
the dataset required for evaluating security research such as intrusion
detection.
Another limitation that resulted from the decision to host the compe-
tition in a virtual environment is the tools that can be used for collect-
ing the ground truth. Participants interacted (e.g. keyboard typing and
mouse clicks) with the virtual environment from the physical environ-
ment where installing monitoring software such as key loggers was not
possible. As a result, more precise ground truth could not be captured
and we had to rely on screen recording for generating the ground truth.
We intend to address this limitation through revisiting the design of the
architecture used for the competition in future efforts in dataset collec-
tion.
Focus of the Challenge
The objective of the NZCSC’15 challenge was to educate the partici-
pants on the impact of poorly implemented and secured web applica-
tions. Hence, vulnerabilities introduced into the challenge were targeted
at web applications and system perimeter defense6. The variety of at-
tacks (e.g. types of payload and exploits used) executed and captured
were also constrained by the duration of the competition. As a result,
the data captured may not be rich enough to represent the wide range of
types of exploits and payloads seen in the real-world. These two factors
may constraint the types of use cases that can be generated for research
purposes.
Having said, based on our observation on the attacks carried out, events
captured in the dataset does cover the different phases of a system intru-
sion (e.g. reconnaissance, vulnerability scanning, vulnerability exploita-
tion, malware insertion and covering up) [Wai 2002; Lois 2015]. Tam-
pering of user files and system configurations are also included in the
types of payload observed to be executed. These factors allow for the
generation of use cases suited for research that emphasis on root cause
6For more information on the type of vulnerabilities introduced, reader can refer to
the attack labels listed in the Table in Appendix A.
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analysis, such as system or data security using a provenance approach.
Structure of the Ground Truth
One of the initial goals set for the NZCSC’15 dataset was to cater to
research work in the areas of provenance and security. However, the
format for the ground truth required for the different types of research
work may differ. For example, provenance research often require the
ground truth to be in the form of graphs, usually modelled using defined
provenance models [Magliacane and Groth 2013; Nies et al. 2015]. In
contrast, research that explores the use of machine learning approaches,
such as classifiers [Nari and Ghorbani 2013] and neural networks [Khan
et al. 2007] for detecting malicious and abnormal events relies on la-
belled ground truth.
Hence, instead of providing the ground truth in multiple formats, we
opted to represent the ground truth in a structured document. This is
such that it can be automatically processed into the desired ground truth
format for experimentation use. However, this adds another processing
step of converting the transcript into a format that can be readily con-
sumed.
3.8 Summary
A list of requirements for datasets that can be used for evaluating prove-
nance reconstruction was proposed and discussed in the beginning of
this chapter. Using the list, we showed how publicly available datasets
used commonly for system security and other system related research
are not suited for evaluation of our research. As such, the NZCSC’15
dataset was constructed.
The dataset was constructed through a data collection exercise done
in conjunction with the NZCSC’15 competition. Events happening on
the VMs used were collected as the base data for reconstruction. Video















Figure 3.11: Mapping between the log files and transcript in NZCSC’15
dataset to granularity level of computer system
form to act as the ground truth data from which use cases and their
respective ground truth provenance can be derived for evaluation pur-
poses. The use cases, shown in Section 3.6, demonstrate the types of
use cases that can possibly be derived from the transcripts for experi-
mentation. The data gathered in the NZCSC’15 dataset is summarised
in Figure 3.11. Limitations caused by how the data was collected and
constructed were also discussed in Section 3.7.
The NZCSC’15 dataset contributes towards the effort by the Cyber Se-
curity Lab on constructing a comprehensive repository of datasets for
research use. At the point of writing this thesis, the NZCSC’15 dataset
is being used internally by other researchers of the Cyber Security Lab.
Requests for the dataset (e.g. for examination purposes) can made to the
lab at info@crow.org.nz. Together with the NZCSC’16 and NZCSC’17
datasets, this dataset will be published for public consumption by 2018.
The next step of the reconstruction workflow, shown in Section 1.7, is
to extract and model information from the log files, such that it can be
used for reconstructing the data provenance. In the next chapter, the
approach used for the extraction and the model proposed for modelling




Modelling Log Events as
Provenance Relations
This chapter discusses how information is extracted from log files and
modelled into provenance relations, to be used for reconstructing the
provenance. The approach that is adopted for information extraction
is discussed. To address the need to model log events from a multi-
granularity perspective, the Data Flow Provenance Model (DFPM), a
multi-layered provenance model for modelling log events into provenance
relations, is proposed. A set of patterns that defines how provenance re-
lations can be mapped between different layers in the model is then pre-
sented. Together with the defined patterns, the proposed model allows
data provenance, reconstructed from fine-grained log files, to be com-
pared with the ground truth provenance, derived from events observed
at the user layer.
4.1 Modelling Log Events to Provenance
Relations
One of the challenges of extracting information from log files is dealing
with heterogeneity in the logs (e.g. in log format and parameters). How-
ever, as pointed out in Section 2.1, proposing a generic approach for ex-
tracting information from different types of log file is not the focus of this
thesis. Instead, an adaptor-based architecture is adopted for processing
different types of log file, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. This architecture
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the adopted adaptor-based architecture for process-
ing log files
has been used in state-of-the-art analytic tools such as ArcSight [Bam-
benek 2007] and Splunk [Splunk Inc 2005]. For each type of log file, an
adaptor is designed for extracting parameters and message signatures
using regular expression and string parsing techniques. Contextual in-
formation such as timestamps and results returned from the events are
also extracted for correlation purposes.
Knowledge such as the structural format of the arguments and the
types of encoding used to encode the arguments are applied in the re-
spective adaptors for processing the extracted parameters. By incorpo-
rating such knowledge into the respective adaptors, the heterogeneity
in parameters caused by variations in the implementations of logging
mechanisms can be managed.
Information extracted from each log entry is modelled into pair-wise
provenance relations using the model described later (Section 4.3). Each
pair-wise provenance relation shows how data is propagated or the re-
lationship between two entities. These provenance relations form the
basic building blocks that will be used by the reconstruction algorithm,
discussed later in Chapter 5, for reconstructing the data provenance.
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of granularity layers used in the log and provenance
domain
4.2 Assumptions Made
Before presenting the proposed model, the problem and assumptions
used are first discussed. In Section 2.2, the issue of modelling log en-
tries generated at different granularity layers into provenance was high-
lighted. Due to differences in the level of detail, modelling log entries of
different granularity using a flat granularity provenance model would re-
sult in disparities in the resulting graphs. To resolve this, a multi-layered
provenance model is required. Hence, the first assumption is made:
Assumption 1. The provenance domain can be divided into the same set
of granularity layers used to describe the log domain.
The granularity layers used were discussed in Section 1.5 and are il-
lustrated here in Figure 4.2. Based on Assumption 1, the following two
problems are identified:
1. How can relationships be modelled from the log domain into the
provenance domain?
2. How can provenance relations be mapped between granularity lay-
ers in the provenance domain?
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In the context of modelling, the term translation is used to describe the
modelling of information (e.g. entities and relationships) between the two
domains. Likewise, the term mapping is used to describe the abstraction
of provenance relations between granularity layers.
With respect to the first problem identified, learning the translation be-
tween the log and provenance domain would require extensively labelled
datasets from both domains. While log files can be scraped from running
computer systems, obtaining the corresponding provenance datasets is
challenging. For example, provenance datasets discussed in Chapter 3,
such as the ProvBench datasets [ProvBench 2012], do not have the cor-
responding log files packaged in the releases. Existing provenance col-
lectors, such as SPADE [Gehani and Tariq 2012], assume the translation
using their understanding of the events being monitored (e.g. domain
knowledge). Based on this, the second assumption made follows:
Assumption 2. Knowledge about translating relationships from the log
domain to the respective layers in the provenance domain can be inferred
from the nature of the activities described by log events (e.g. reading and
writing of data).
The rest of this chapter focuses on addressing the second problem iden-
tified. Concepts defined in the model proposed in Section 4.3 allow re-
lationships to be represented in the provenance domain. The patterns
defined in Section 4.4 address how provenance relations can be mapped
to other granularity layers.
4.3 Data Flow Provenance Model
Data Flow Provenance Model (DFPM) is proposed for addressing the
need for a multi-layered provenance model for modelling log events into
provenance relations. It is based on the Open Provenance Model (OPM)
[Moreau et al. 2011], a model proposed for modelling provenance. The
model has been used in the past for modelling provenance in computer
systems [Gehani and Tariq 2012; Groth and Moreau 2011]. While OPM
models relationships between entities from an ancestry perspective (e.g.
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derivedFrom, wasGeneratedBy), DFPM models how data flows between
entities. This results in a difference in the vocabulary used, even though
the format and fields used by both models are similar. Having said that,
the main difference between the two models is the treatment of the gran-
ularity of provenance. OPM treats all provenance relations to be of the
same granularity, while in DFPM provenance relations are modelled into
different granularity layers.
The motivation for modelling data flow between entities is in relation to
our objective to reconstruct data provenance that depicts the evolution
of a piece of data. A process can create multiple files, but only writes the
relevant data to one of those files. Based on our definition of data prove-
nance in Chapter 1, the reconstructed data provenance should capture
only the file with the relevant data. Hence by modelling the data flow, the
reconstruction can directly identify which file or entities have interacted
with the data.
Concepts defined in DFPM are also heavily influenced by the treatment
of data in this thesis. To recap the research scope defined in Section 1.5,
a piece of data is viewed at a file level. Although by no means exhaustive,
the concepts are intended for modelling the basic interactions (e.g. cre-
ate, read, write, delete) [Silberschatz et al. 2012] and the types of entity
that can interact with files in the context of a computer system.
DFPM consists of two classes - Entity and Activity. Entity associates to
beings or objects that exist either in the real world or digitally. Examples
of entity can range from user accounts to processes or remote hosts in
a computer network. On the other hand, Activity models the propaga-
tion of data and the management of channels required for data to flow
between entities.
4.3.1 Entity
The Entity class encapsulates two concepts - Agents and Objects. Col-
lectively, these two concepts are termed as “entities”. They are defined
as follows:
• Agents—Agents refer to entities that are capable of initiating or
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being held responsible for an activity observed with another entity.
Examples of agents are processes, users or even network hosts.
• Objects—Objects refer to entities that are understood to be inca-
pable of initiating any form of activity on their own. Objects are
often viewed as data sources or data sinks. Objects can range from
file descriptors used by the kernel for data communication to files
within a file system.
Each entity can be expressed into a provenance record1 that captures
information regarding the entity. The format used for expressing each
entity is as follow:
Entity_type(ID, [owner], [context1 ;context2 ;...])
Entity_type is used to record whether this entity is of Agent or Object
type. ID captures the label used by the respective logging mechanisms
for uniquely identifying the entity2. Owner is used to capture informa-
tion regarding the user who created or owned this entity. Lastly, context
captures any contextual information that can provide insights into the
identity of the entity. Such information can either be used to distinguish
two entities with the same ID3 or for correlating between entity instances
across granular layers4. Multiple pieces of contextual information in the
context field are separated using semi-colons.
Classification of entities is based on the expected behaviour of the en-
tity. However, in situations such as a malicious attack, it is possible to
have entities with behaviours overlapping that of an agent and object.
1A provenance record is an entry in a provenance log. Its relation to a provenance log
is akin to a log entry’s relation to a log file.
2Note that processing of events are done independently at log file level. As such, labels
for the same logical entity may differ across different logging mechanisms.
3In cases such as kernel logs from two different systems, entities with the same ID may
exist in both logs. However, both entities are essentially different as they originate
from different systems. As such, contextual information such as the identity of the
host can be used to differentiate them.
4A process can be identified by its binary name at the application layer or by its process
ID at the system layer. If the respective binary name or process ID are also captured
at the system or application layer respectively, they can be represented in the context
field.
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Table 4.1: Composition of concepts for layers in DFPM in BNF form
<prov_graph> ::= <user_layer> | <app_layer> | <system_layer>
<user_layer> ::= <user_a><user_layer> |
<application_a><user_layer> |
<system_a><user_layer> |
<user_a> | <application_a> | <system_a>
<app_layer> ::= <application_a><app_layer> |
<system_a><app_layer> |
<application_a> | <system_a>
<system_layer> ::= <system_a><system_layer> | <system_a>
<user_a> ::= merge | copy
<application_a> ::= createfile | access | modify_rw | modify_w |
datatransfer
<system_a> ::= create | generate | delete | open | connect |
close | read | write | transfer
For example, a malicious PDF document can automatically download or
execute background programs in the system when opened by a user. In
this case, the PDF document is classified as an object, as a PDF docu-
ment is known to be a file. However, when analysing the provenance,
it may appear that the object is initiating activities. In such cases, the
definitions listed here can be formulated into a rule for detecting abnor-
malities within the provenance graph.
4.3.2 Activity
Concepts defined in the Activity class (otherwise known as “activities”)
are derived based on the operations used by operating systems when
handling files and processes, as discussed by Silberschatz et al. [2005].
The defined concepts aim to express the data flow relationship and the
construction of data channels required for data flow between entities.
DFPM is divided into user, application and system layer; three hier-
archically ordered layers with the system layer being the finest granular
layer. Each layer is composed of a set of layer specific activities and of the
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activities defined in the layer beneath it. This hierarchical composition of
activities is described using Backus-Naur Form (BNF)5[McCracken and
Reilly 2003; Backus et al. 1960] in Table 4.1. The reason for layers to
adopt activities defined in the layer below is to allow events that are
semantically and structurally equivalent (i.e. events that cannot be de-
composed into a group of activities in the layer below) to be modelled
in the layer the event was observed at. For example, a simple file open
observed at the application layer is equivalent to a file open in the sys-
tem layer. Hence, by having an open activity defined in the application
layer, granularity of the modelled events from the log file can be kept
consistent.
The format used for modelling each activity into a provenance record
is as follows:
activity_type(time, source_entity, target_entity, [context1 ;context2 ;...])
Activity_type denotes the activity this record is describing and is based
on concepts defined in the following subsections. Time records the ac-
companying timestamp observed in the log event and as such denotes
when the activity occurred. The source_entity denotes the entity re-
sponsible for initiating this activity while the target_entity denotes the
recipient entity of this activity. Lastly, the context field captures contex-
tual information that provides further information that is specific to this
activity.
In the following, we list only the layer-specific activities for each layer.
Activities inherited from the lower layers use the same definitions, hence,
are not repeated.
System Layer
The system layer is composed of concepts that model events concern-
ing data flow and the setting up of data channels observed beneath the
5BNF is a context-free grammar introduced by John W. Backus and Peter Naur and is
traditionally used for describing structure in a language
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abstraction layer of operating systems. These events include those ob-
served in the kernel or file system. Since the system layer is the finest
granularity, the following concepts can be viewed as basic activities in
DFPM.
• Create—models an agent creating a new object. A channel that
allows data to be communicated between the agent and the object
is also assumed to be established as part of the process of creating
the new object. Either the owner of the agent or the agent itself
(if the identity of the owner of the agent is unknown) would assume
the ownership of the new object.
• Generate—models the generation of a new entity by an existing en-
tity. Similar to create, the owner of the parent agent will assume
ownership of the new agent immediately. However, it does not as-
sume a data channel is automatically created between the two enti-
ties.
• Delete—models the attempt made by an agent to remove or destroy
an existing object.
• Open—models an agent establishing a new data channel with an
existing object.
• Connect—models the establishing of a new data channel between
two existing agents. The target agent can be either a local (e.g.
process) or remote (e.g. network host) agent.
• Close—models the termination of an opened data channel from the
initiating agent to either an existing object or another agent.
• Read—models the initiating agent obtaining data from an existing
object or agent with which it has an opened data channel.
• Write—models the initiating agent outputting data to an existing
object or agent with which it has an open data channel.
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• Transfer—models the transfer of data across the network between
the initiating agent and another remote agent. Like read and write,
a data channel must be established beforehand between the two
agents.
Application Layer
Concepts defined in this layer model events concerning data flow ob-
served in applications the application layer (e.g. application log files).
Such data flow can take place between other systems or even files.
• Createfile—models the initiating agent creating a new object. The
agent may subsequently perform a combination of read and write
activities using the data channel created along with the object.
• Access—models the initiating agent performing read-only opera-
tions on an existing object. Such activities may retrieve partially or
the entire data content of the object. Access also models the exe-
cution of the content of the object (e.g. execution of a script by a
process).
• Modify—models the initiating agent modifying the content of an
existing object. Unlike access, at least one change is made to the
object. Modify is also represented by two instances, modify_w and
modify_rw to distinguish between instances of blindly writing to an
object and reading and writing to an object.
• Datatransfer—models the exchange of data between the initiating
agent with a remote agent across the network. The exchange may
be bi-directional (i.e. multiple transfers that includes sending and
receiving data between both agents).
The key difference of createfile from access and modify is the creation
of a new object. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Without createfile,
a create activity would need to be added before access or modify to
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(b) Separating object creation using create
Figure 4.3: Difference between having createfile and using the create activity
to represent file creation at the application layer
model the creation of the new object first. However, as shown later in
Section 4.3.3, create and open can be used for separating system layer
activities into groups. As such, prepending a create before the access or
modify may give rise to the misinterpretation that the read-write events
are independent of the create (i.e. there is an open in-between the create
and the read-write events).
User Layer
Lastly, user layer concepts model high level entity relationships that are
not captured in the application and system layers and events observed
from a user’s perspective.
• Merge—models the information flow between two existing objects.
Merge denotes the convergence of either partial or full content of
the source object into the target object.
• Copy—models the derivation relationship from an existing source
object to a newly created target object. It signifies that the tar-
get object would contain either partial or full content of the source
object ’s content.
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(b) Modelled System layer relations may appear to be sequential reads from











(c) Open and close activities can be used to clearly separate logically non-
sequential reads
Figure 4.4: Example showing how open and close can be used to group rela-
tions into logical groups
4.3.3 Modelling Data Channels
The purpose of modelling the management of data channels is to allow
series of reads and writes to be separated into logical groups of activities
that are independent (i.e. not a series of reads/writes that result from
the coarser-grained action). An example adapted from the Apache Web
Server logs, shown in Figure 4.4, is used to explain the separation of
activities.
Figure 4.4a illustrates three log events showing an Apache server ac-
cessing two different files. While the three events from the application
log hinted at three groups of system layer activities surrounding reads to
the two involved files, the exact number of read activities in each group
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is unknown. Without open and close, the group membership of the read
activities cannot be determined accurately, as illustrated in Figure 4.4b.
However, with the open and close activities, relevant read activities can
be enclosed. Series of data flow activities can then be segmented into
groups that reflect events observed in the less granular layers with high
confidence, as shown in Figure 4.4c. As discussed in Section 2.2, an issue
with existing structural abstraction provenance models is the reliance on
a-priori knowledge of elements in the provenance graph for deriving an
accurate abstraction. However, it is observed that the same user action
achieved through different applications can result in slightly different
sets of activities in the finer-granular layers. For example, creating a
new file using the vim document editor would result in a set of system
events that differ from using the nano document editor. This difference
stems from how applications can be implemented differently even for
tasks of the same nature. In the following subsection, the approach used
to discover a generic set of patterns for abstracting concepts defined in
the model is discussed.
4.4 Aggregating Activities
4.4.1 Discovering Patterns
Instead of learning patterns specific to a set of applications, as discussed
by Macko and Seltzer [2011] and Buneman et al. [2012], the following
study focuses on discovering patterns that can be used independently of
applications to map provenance relations. The study assumes that each
mapping that maps a group of fine-grained activities to a coarse-grained
activity (e.g. set of system layer activities to an application layer activity)
has a consistent structure and hence can be derived from the patterns
observed.
Based on the activities defined in the user and application layer of
DFPM, sets of scenarios for accomplishing each of those activities using
different applications were designed. For example, the use of different
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Process system call trace




Figure 4.5: Segmentation of system call trace for each scenario
text editors and approaches for creating a file constitute the set of sce-
narios for the createfile activity. System events generated at the kernel
were captured for each scenario using Progger, a tool for logging system
call events [Ko and Will 2014], and translated using activities defined in
the system layer6. The scenarios used for each activity defined in the
model are listed in Appendix B for reference.
For each scenario, the modelled system call trace is manually seg-
mented into four phases, as shown in Figure 4.5. The process spawn
phase consists of events executed by the kernel when spawning a new
process. The main objective is to establish the input and output data
channels to various devices, such as the standard input and output ter-
minals, for the process. As such, events executed mainly concern the
opening, connecting and closing of pipes. This phase is almost identical
for all processes. The initialisation phase is specific to each application
type. In this phase, library functions and other functionality required by
the application are loaded from system and application-specific library
files. These files can be identified by looking at their full system paths.
They are usually prefixed with known shared system directories such as
“/etc” and “/usr/lib”. All files accessed in this phase are on a read-only
basis (e.g. no write relations). The workload phase is where the applica-
tion executes events for accomplishing the task set out in the scenario.
The beginning of this phase is identified by the first event executed on an
entity used in the scenario (e.g. opening of a file or connecting to known
network host). The workload phase would terminate either when the




















Patterns extracted based on 
target entity field and sequence
of relations
Figure 4.6: Illustration of the extraction of patterns from modelled provenance
relations in the workload phase
process’s system call trace ends or when the process termination phase
begins. The process termination phase is the final phase of a process’s
system call trace. Its appearance is subject to how the process is being
terminated; hence, it may not appear in all system call traces. It can
be identified by the closing of the data channels established during the
process spawn phase, right before the system call trace ends.
Each scenario is executed several times and the workload phase is ex-
tracted from each modelled system call trace. The extracted segments
from scenarios within the same set (e.g. all scenarios designed for create-
file) are then compared manually. The comparison attempts to identify
common sequence of events with the same target entities. This compar-
ison is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Common sequence of events observed
across all segments are then extracted as the patterns for abstracting
provenance relations to the respective model activity. We describe the
identified patterns in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 using BNF. Each set of pro-
duction rules describes the abstraction of activities from one layer to its
immediate higher granularity layer (i.e. activities in application layer to
user layer; activities in system layer to application layer). Although in
practice, activities may be abstracted across multiple layers (i.e. system
to user layer), we assume abstraction across multiple layers is done in
multiple parses.
Since the production rules in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are either in the form
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Table 4.2: Abstracting system layer activities to application layer
<createfile_c> ::= create<CF>
<CF> ::= write<CF> | read<CF> | close
<access_c> ::= open<AR>
<AR> ::= read<AR> | close
<modify_w_c> ::= open<MW>
<MW> ::= write<MWD>
<MWD> ::= write<MWD> | close
<modify_rw_c> ::= open<MA>
<MA> ::= read<MA> | write<MD>
<MD> ::= write<MD> | read<MD> | close
<datatransfer_c> ::= open<DT> | connect<CT>
<DT> ::= connect<CT>
<CT> ::= transfer<TR>
<TR> ::= transfer<TR> | close
Table 4.3: Abstracting application layer activities to user layer
<merge_c> ::= access<MER> | modify_rw<MER>
<MER> ::= modify_w | modify_rw
<copy_c> ::= access<CPR> | modify_rw<CPR>
<CPR> ::= createfile
of A → aB or A → a, where A and B are non-terminals and a is a termi-
nal, we can say the grammar defined is regular [Linz 2012]. Using the
approach discussed by Linz [2012], where non-terminals are treated as
states and terminals as transitions, we elaborate on the patterns using
Finite State Automata (FSA). The FSA is defined as follows:
FSA = (Σ, Q, δ, q0, F )
where:
• Σ is defined as the set of input alphabets represented by the con-
cepts defined in the Activity class.
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• Q denotes the finite set of states,
{S ,MER,CPR,CF ,AR,MA,MD ,MW ,MWD ,DT ,CT ,TR,TER}.
• δ denotes the transition function Σ × Q → Q and is represented by
the right hand side expressions in Tables 4.3 and 4.27.
• q0 denotes the start state, S.
• F denotes the final state, TER.
The FSA8 for identifying each layer specific activity are as follow:
Createfile
Createfile uses create and close to enclose relevant read and write re-
lations that are executed using the data channel that resulted when the
initiating agent created the object. While createfile can have zero or




Figure 4.7: FSA for ‘createfile’ activity
Access
The pattern identifying Access is very much similar to createfile. Except
instead of create, open is used to denote the start of the group pattern
for Access. Objects can be accessed for various reasons (e.g. a process
reading data from the file or executing the file, which may be a piece of
code) and in some cases may not involve any read operations. As such,
access can have zero or more read relations.
7Each activity-state pair is treated as a state transition rule. In this case, the ‘|’ symbol
used in the BNF can be treated as a rule separator.
8In the FSAs illustrated, we adopt the shorthand notation of using a comma in transi-
tion labels to simplify multiple transitions that have the same initial and destination
states but with different labels into a single transition, as shown in [Hopcroft et al.
1979; Anderson 2006].
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Figure 4.10: FSA for ‘modify_w’ activity
Modify models edits made to an object and hence, should contain one or
more write relations. On the other hand, read relations are not essential
but should not be excluded from the patterns as it is possible for agents
to both read and write data to an object using the same data channel.
The distinction between a process blindly writing to a file and a process
reading and writing to a file is made through modify_w and modify_rw
respectively.
Datatransfer
In the description of system layer activities, connect is explained to de-











Figure 4.11: FSA for ‘datatransfer’ activity
can be used to mark the beginning of the set of relations that describe
the communication of data between two agents. However, due to the
way that modern operating systems work when communicating with re-
mote systems, a network communication channel has to be associated
to a socket. As a result, in cases where a socket for the network com-
munication is newly initiated, an open is used to denote the creation of
the socket. Like modify, we only identify a group as datatransfer if the
group consists of one or more transfer relations, denoting that data has






Figure 4.12: FSA for ‘copy’ activity
Copy models not only the derivation of the content in the target ob-
ject but also the creation of a new object. As such, a createfile activity
should come after the initiating agent has obtained a full or partial copy
of the data from the source object. Although it is possible to first create
the object before obtaining a copy of the data from the source object,
we simplify such cases and express them using merge and precede the
merge with a createfile relation. It should also be noted that the pattern
here precludes blind writes made to a file as the agent will have to obtain
data from the first object first.
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Figure 4.13: FSA for ‘merge’ activity
Unlike copy, merge models the derivation of data between two exist-
ing objects. Therefore either a modify_rw or modify_w is expected in the
place of a createfile, indicating an edit done to the target object. Like
copy, the agent is expected to obtain data from the first object first,
hence a modify_rw is expected before the modification of the second ob-
ject.
Unlike application layer activities, there are no activities that can be
used to denote the start and end of a pattern. Hence an alternative
approach to determining the relevancy of relations when automatically
abstracting relations for user layer activities is required. One possible
alternative is through temporal reasoning.
It is assumed that events observed close together in time are more
likely to be related to each other than if they are observed a long time
apart (e.g. sequence of functions called automatically to accomplish a
task). Based on this assumption, the likelihood of relevancy between
activities can be determined by modelling the time intervals at which
the activities were observed using Allen’s interval algebra [Allen 1983].
Allen defined the thirteen relationships possible between two individual
intervals shown in Table 4.4.
Pairs of application layer activities that satisfy any of the relations in
the set, {meets, overlaps, starts, during, finishes, is equal to} can be
grouped together automatically. The automata can then be applied to
each group to determine whether the activities can be rolled up.
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The main objective of describing the patterns identified using BNF gram-
mar and FSA is to facilitate the understanding of how activities can be
abstracted. Proposing an efficient approach for parsing the modelled
provenance relations for abstraction is beyond the scope of this research.
Having said so, the parsing and detection of patterns can be achieved
using Complex Event Processing (CEP) systems, such as Beepbeep [Hallè
and Varvaressos 2014; Laboratoire d’informatique Formelle 2015] and
Flink [Rohrmann 2016] or through parsers generated using tools that
supports various parsing methods (e.g. LALR(1) [Grune and Jacobs 1990]),
such as HIME [Iwouters et al. 2014] and PLY [Beazley 2001]. The gram-
mar presented in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 can either be used directly as input
to parser generators, such as those listed above, or reformulated as rules
for event detection systems.
In this section, we briefly describe some of our experiences in pars-
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ing the stream of provenance relations. Ideally, the discussion here can
be useful when considering which systems can be used for parsing and
detecting patterns.
Interleaving Events
Due to concurrency in operating systems, it is common for events gen-
erated by different processes to appear in the log file in an interleaving
manner. Further complicating the situation, a process can also interact
with multiple objects in an interleaving manner (e.g. a process reading
concurrently from two different files). The interleaving of events may
affect the detection of sequential patterns. In a recent comprehensive
survey on CEP systems, Hallè [2017] noted that few systems support fea-
tures that allow event streams to be sliced, such that different computa-
tions (i.e. different patterns) can be executed over the different slices.
A simple work-around for this issue is to pre-process the stream of
events, such that events are segmented based on their attributes, into
segments of inter-related events. For example, events resulting from
a process reading from two files concurrently can be segmented into
two segment of events, one for each file. Each segment can then be
parsed and computed by the event processing system. Segmentation of
provenance relations modelled from log files using DFPM is discussed in
details in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.5 of Chapter 5.
Arbitrary Pattern Length
In their survey on CEP systems, Hallè [2017] and Cugola and Margara
[2012] noted the language used by some CEP systems only permit prim-
itive sequential patterns, such as “A follows B", to be expressed. More
complex notions, such as negations and expressing unbounded number
of sequential events (e.g. “zero or more” or “one or more”) cannot be
expressed directly9.
9It is interesting to note that while some CEP systems, such as RAPIDE [Luckham
et al. 1998; Luckham and Frasca 1998] allow repetitions to be expressed, they do
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The ability to express patterns with arbitrary length of sequential events
is important as it is difficult to predict the amount of data transfer rela-
tions (i.e. read, write, transfer) to expect for each pattern. For example,
the number of read system calls a process invokes when reading data
from a file is dependent on the size of data to be read. Hence, the num-
ber of read can only be known during runtime. Variations may also exists
in the patterns shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. For example, applications
may reuse an existing socket or open a new socket for establishing a con-
nection with another host or process. As a result, the open socket event
is observed only in some cases. This creates variations in the pattern
that abstracts to the datatransfer activity.
4.4.3 Verifying the Patterns
The patterns identified are implemented as a FSA for parsing and aggre-
gating the provenance relations. The system takes a finite list of prove-
nance relations (e.g. the reconstructed data provenance) as input and
assumes that the provenance relations are already segmented according
to their attributes10. Relations in each segment is parsed and evaluated
against the FSA. If a segment matches a pattern (i.e. reaches the TER
state), the system will output the activity corresponding to the matched
pattern. In contrast, if a segment does not match any patterns, the sys-
tem outputs the original segment. The system completes execution once
there are no more segments available for parsing.
To verify the patterns, the implemented FSA system was applied to
the system log files captured in the NZCSC’15. Since the patterns focus
on mapping data flow relations, the count for read, write and transfer)
relations before and after applying the FSA are shown in Figure 4.14.
The results showed that the discovered patterns were indeed able to
map majority of the data flow relations to coarser-grained activities (e.g.
not allow variations (e.g. “zero or more”) in pattern definitions. Having said that,
this limitation can be resolved by explicitly formulating each possible variation of
the pattern as a separate rule.
10The approach used for the segmentation will be discussed in Sections 5.2.1 of Chapter
5.
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application layer activities). Investigation into the read and write re-
lations that are not mapped successfully showed those relations were
interacting with the system input and output terminals. Channels to the
system input and output terminals usually do not have open relations
associated with them as they are created at system initialisation and re-
main open throughout the operating system’s uptime. Having said that,
segments of read and write relations to some files were noticed to fail
the mapping. Large amount of network transfer relations are also ob-
served to have not been mapped successfully for log files captured from
the red team. Reference to the ground truth data (i.e. the transcript and
video) showed that mapping for these segments of relations was unsuc-
cessful because the processes were terminated abruptly before the data
channels could be closed (e.g. no close relation). Since the FSA imple-
mented requires a close relation to enclose the patterns, the FSA would
determine those segments to have failed the matching conditions. The
workaround is to relax the patterns defined, such that matching for a
close relation is optional. Results in Figure 4.14b showed the relax FSA
was able to map majority of the network transfers.
4.5 DFPM and OPM
This section highlights the differences between the OPM used for mod-
elling provenance in computer systems Gehani and Tariq [2012] and the
proposed DFPM.
Modelling of Entities
The approach taken to model entities is the first difference between the
two models. To explain this difference, a snippet of events, taken from a
LAF log file and shown in Figure 4.15, is used. The snippet consists of
three events. Event 1 shows the parent process, pid:26272, creating a
data channel that will be used for data communication. Event 2 shows
the spawning of the child process, pid:26273, and the inheritance of the
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(a) Read and write relations
(b) Network transfer relations
Figure 4.14: Results for applying the FSA on the NZCSC’15 system log files
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type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1431919799.945:49458): arch=c000003e syscall=22 
... pid=26272 auid=0 uid=0 ... comm="scp" exe="/usr/bin/scp" ...
type=FD_PAIR msg=audit(1431919799.945:49458): fd0=5 fd1=6
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1431919799.945:49462): arch=c000003e syscall=56 
... pid=26272 auid=0 uid=0 ... comm="scp" exe="/usr/bin/scp" ...
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1431919803.497:50401): arch=c000003e syscall=1 




Figure 4.15: Events snippet from a LAF log file, simplified to show only the
relevant fields
data channel set up in Event 1 by the child process. Event 3 shows the
use of the data channel for data communication from the parent to the
child process.
In OPM, users are modelled as Agents, running processes as Processes
and files and other passive entities as Artifacts. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.16, where events in Figure 4.15 are modelled using the OPM
model adopted by Gehani and Tariq [2012] in their system provenance
monitoring tool, SPADE.
Figure 4.16 shows OPM models not only the relationship between the
parent and child process, but also the owner of those processes (i.e.
user:0 ). However, this level of detail is achieved at the expense of adding
a large number of nodes and edges to the provenance graph.
Although this overhead is manageable when modelling events at the
user layer, the same cannot be said for events at the finer granularity
layers. The volume of events and entities generated is higher in the
finer granularity layers due to the increasing level of detail captured in
those layers. As a result, modelling all this information will result in
the provenance to be overwhelmed with information. This increases the
complexity and difficulty of analysing the provenance.
To reduce the impact caused by the volume of new entities and events
generated, DFPM only models entities which have a direct impact on the
movement of data. Figure 4.17 illustrates the result of using DFPM to
model events shown in Figure 4.15. Entities such as users are modelled
implicitly using the entity and context fields. This difference between
102


















(b) Corresponding OPM provenance graph
Figure 4.16: OPM provenance resulting from modelling snippet of events from
LAF log file
the two modelling approach can be observed by comparing Figures 4.16b
and 4.17b.
As shown in Figure 4.17a, ownership association between an user and
a process is implicitly captured through the owner field in the agent
record. Although not shown in the graph, ownership and other role based
association can still be visualised through the use of property graphs,
where nodes and edges can be decorated with contextual information.
By not explicitly modelling every entity, the resulting provenance is sim-
plified to focus only on activities that shows how data is moved between
entities.
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agent(pid:26273, user:0, process:/usr/bin/ssh;host:192.168.2.23)
agent(pid:26272, user:0, process:/usr/bin/scp;host:192.168.2.23)
generate(1431919799.94505, pid:26272, pid:26273, host:192.168.2.23)
connect(1431919799.94505, pid:26272, pid:26273, type:pipe;readfd:5;writefd:6;host:192.168.2.23)
write(1431919803.49703, pid:26272, pid:26273, fd:6;bytes:25;host:192.168.2.23)




(b) Provenance graph modelled using DFPM
Figure 4.17: Provenance of the snippet of events in Figure 4.15 modelled using
DFPM
Concepts and Terminologies
While concepts defined are based on those in OPM, DFPM uses a differ-
ent set of terminology to show how data is propagated between entities.
The mapping between concepts in the two models are shown in Table
4.5. From the table, one can observe that there are no mappings between
some of the concepts between the two models. From OPM, there are no
mappings to model association between Agents and Processes as DFPM
does not model ownership of entities. There are also no OPM equivalent
relations for {close, delete, connect, transfer, datatransfer} due to the
difference in focus between the two models. DFPM models data flow
and setting up of data channels while OPM emphasises how entities are
associated with each other. As such, OPM is not concerned with data
channels or when objects cease to exist. We argue that modelling the
termination of entities is critical for provenance in computer systems as
entities such as files and processes can be reused. Without knowledge of
when entities cease to exist, confusion can arise when entities are being
reused as activities related to the new entity will be linked to the old
instance.
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Figure 4.18: Illustration of the extraction and modelling of log events into
provenance relations
Multiple Layers of Granularity
The last main difference between DFPM and OPM is the view of the
provenance domain as a multi-granularity domain. The motivation of hav-
ing a multi-layered model for provenance has been discussed in Chapter
2 and as such, will not be discussed again here.
4.6 Summary
DFPM models the information extracted from log events into provenance
relations that describe how data flows between different entities. Through
the extraction and modelling of information, heterogeneity in the log
format and parameters is being normalised. This allows the following
phases of the reconstruction workflow to easily consume the information.
Figure 4.18 illustrates the transformation of log events to list of prove-
nance relations that can be used for reconstruction. First, the adaptors
extract key parameters and message signatures from the log files. Using
the DFPM model, the extracted information is then modelled into prove-
nance relations.
A set of patterns are also derived and implemented as FSA for map-
ping provenance relations between different granularity layers. These
FSA will be used for mapping the reconstructed provenance graph to the
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granularity of the ground truth provenance, such that the two can be
compared without disparities in their structure and semantics. Abstrac-
tion of provenance relations is done after the reconstruction and will be
discussed further in Chapter 5.
After modelling log events into provenance relations, the next step is
to reconstruct the data provenance graph that describes the derivation
of a piece of data. Chapter 5 discusses the problem and the proposed





This chapter discusses how provenance of a piece of data can be recon-
structed from the list of provenance relations modelled from the log files
using DFPM. In Section 5.1, the problem of data provenance reconstruc-
tion is defined. Reconstruction is achieved through a two-step process. In
the first step, the data provenance is reconstructed using the algorithm
described in Section 5.2. Following which, the reconstructed output is
mapped to the granularity layer of the ground truth provenance using
the FSA discussed in Section 4.4. This is demonstrated and explained in
Section 5.5.
We adopt the following notation for this chapter:
Notations:
R set containing all pair-wise provenance relations modelled from
the dataset
E set containing all entity instances modelled from the dataset
e the object whose data provenance is to be reconstructed, e is a
member of E
rg a group of provenance relations from R between two entities,
based on the FSA defined in DFPM
DP(e) the set of provenance relations that constitute the data
provenance of e
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5.1 The Data Provenance Reconstruction Problem
In most situations, provenance relations in R are not focused on a sin-
gle entity and thus contain provenance relations that are not relevant to
DP(e). This is because e is usually not known during logging, causing
events to be logged in an indiscriminate manner. Hence, the problem of
reconstructing DP(e) from R can be viewed as finding all likely source
and derivative objects of e and the paths that link each of those objects
to e. An object is considered the source of e if:
1. The object has an instance that contains at least part of the data in
an instance of e.
2. There exists a path from the object instance to the instance of e,
such that it shows data being propagated from the object to e.
Likewise, an object is considered the derivative of e if:
1. The object has an instance that contains at least part of the data in
an instance of e.
2. There exists a path from the instance of e to the object instance,
such that it shows data being propagated from e to the object.
The problem of reconstructing DP(e) can be decomposed into the fol-
lowing two sub problems:
1. Reconstructing the derivative provenance - Given an instance of
e, find the likely derivative objects of e and the paths, such that each
path describes how e eventually reaches the state of each derivative
object.
2. Reconstructing the source provenance - Given an instance of e,
find the likely source objects of e and the paths, such that each path
describes how e is derived from each source object.
We define rg to be a structure that describes the flow of data between
two entities, e1 and e2 (i.e. pair-wise provenance relation):
rg = (r, t, e1, e2) (5.1)
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Figure 5.1: Illustration of source and derivative provenance from e
where r is a member of the set of concepts defined in DFPM, shown in
Table 4.1 in Chapter 4. r also denotes the direction of the data flow and
is illustrated in the last column in Table 4.5. e1 denotes the source_entity
and e2 denotes the target_entity between the two entities connected by
rg . Both e1 and e2 are members of E. t denotes the timestamp at which
rg was first observed. Note that rg is a group containing one or more
distinct provenance relations from R. The approach used and benefits of
grouping is discussed in Section 5.2.1.
A path connecting two objects, o1 and o2, can then be defined as a
sequence of rg:
P (o1, o2) = (rg1, rg2, ...rgn)
= ((r1, t1, e11, e21), (r2, t2, e12, e22), ..., (rn, tn, e1n, e2n)) (5.2)
with the following constraints:
1. (rg1, rg2, ...rgn) is ordered such that tn−1 < tn
2. rg1 describes the data flow between an agent and o1 while rgn de-
scribes the data flow to o2 (e21 = o1 ∧ e2n = o2)
3. rg in the sequence are connected to each other through the entities
such that either e1n = e1n+1 or e2n = e1n+1
Note that each path does not have branches. Instead, multiple objects
passing through the same entity are considered as separate paths. As
such, DP(e) can be composed of multiple paths joined together to form a
graph. Figure 5.1 illustrates the relationship of the source and derivative
provenance with respect to e and the notation defined thus far.
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Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Reconstructing Data Provenance of e
1: Input: e_id . user input that denotes id of e
2: R,E ← readModelledData() . modelled relations and entities
3: Initialise: Q← ∅,DP(e)← ∅
4:
5: Lsorted, Tlookup ← groupRelations(R) . sort
6:
7: I,DP(e) . find instance
← findInstances(e_id, E, Lsorted, DP (e), Tlookup)
8: Q← Q ∪ I
9:













Data-out array: [ write(t1) ]
Data flow arrays of Agent2
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the content of data-in and data-out arrays from
Agent2’s perspective
5.2 Algorithm for Reconstructing Data
Provenance
Based on the problem stated in Section 5.1, an algorithm for reconstruct-
ing both source and derivative provenance for a given instance of e is
proposed. The algorithm is based on the principles of the happens-before
causal relationship defined by Lamport [1978].
The notion of applying causality to log events have been explored in
various fields of research in computer science, such as workflow mining
[van der Aalst et al. 2004] and intrusion tracking [King and Chen 2003;
King et al. 2005]. These approaches generally determine causality be-
tween entities by observing the order of events appearing in the logs.
While the algorithm proposed here adopts a similar approach of using
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the hypothetical use case that will be used in the
explanation of the reconstruction algorithm
temporal information, the activity involved (e.g. read, write, transfer) is
also considered when determining causality between two provenance re-
lations. Overall, the algorithm consists of three phases, namely the sort,
find-instance and the reconstruction phase. The pseudocode in Algorithm
1 gives an overview of the algorithm.
The algorithm works on the assumption that an entity has to obtain
the data before it can be propagated to other entities. Based on
this assumption, two arrays, data-in and data-out, are initialised in each
entity’s instance data structure. The two arrays capture the inflow and
outflow of data with respect to the entity, as illustrated in Figure 5.2.
Note that assignment of data flow provenance relations differs for agent
and object type entities due to their definitions. The difference is dis-
cussed in Section 5.2.4.
The algorithm first locates entities that are directly connected to e, the
object of interest, in the find-instance phase and initialises them to a
queue, Q. Based on Q, the algorithm traverses through the data graph in
a breadth-first manner. The traversal uses the function findInOutEdges,
which is based on Lamport’s happens-before principles, to determine
which entities (vertex) or relations (edges) to visit. Visited entities or
relations are placed on DP(e) and returned as the final reconstructed
data provenance graph.
The following hypothetical use case will be used to illustrate how the
algorithm works as the different phases of the algorithm is explained.
Figure 5.3 shows the data provenance for File-x. The provenance shows
how File-x is being derived from files File-S1 and File-S2 (i.e. source
objects of File-x) through the application, P1. File-D1 is the derivative
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object of File-x, through the application, P3. The provenance also shows
that File-S2 is being influenced by the application, P2.
5.2.1 Sort Phase
The sort phase calls the groupRelations function for sorting and group-
ing provenance relations in R into lists of rg . Relations are first sorted
based on their source_entity field into separate lists of provenance rela-
tions and stored in a sorted list, Lsorted1. Note that R is modelled from
log files gathered from across different computer systems. Hence, it is
possible to have entities with the same source_entity value but originate
from different computer systems. Contextual information such as the
host ID captured in the context field2 is used in conjunction with the
source_entity field to uniquely identify each entity.
After sorting, provenance relations in each list in Lsorted are grouped
into sets of rg . Grouping is done based on the FSA patterns defined
in Section 4.4. Based on the patterns, sequence of provenance relations
between the same pair of source_entity and target_entity can be grouped
and mapped to a lesser granular activity. However, in practice, order of
the log events observed from the same source_entity may show events
to different target_entity interleaving each other. This can happen when
a process accesses multiple files at the same time. Since provenance
relations are modelled from log events, the interleaving behaviour will
be reflected in the order of the modelled relations. Therefore, to account
for interleaving of events, the algorithm also considers the value of the
target_entity in addition to the activity_type when determining group
membership of each provenance relation. This is done in conjunction
with using the FSA patterns for determining the start and end of a rg .
Figure 5.4 visualises the sorting phase using the use case given in Fig-
ure 5.3. Although grouping is done based on the FSA patterns, the algo-
rithm does not replace each group with the coarser-grained activity as-
sociated to the matched pattern. This is to preserve the granularity so as
1We assume that the modelled provenance relations are already in chronological order.
2Context field is defined in the format of an activity (see Section 4.3.2).
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one rg

























































Figure 5.4: From unsorted relations to list of rg , illustrated based on use case
shown in Figure 5.3
to allow the search for relevant provenance relations to be as precise as
possible. For the rest of the discussion on the algorithm, we use “sorted
relation list” or Lsorted to reference the sorted and grouped relation list,
unless otherwise indicated.
The motivation behind grouping provenance relations into rg is to facil-
itate the retrieval of data channel provenance relations associated with
the relevant data flow provenance relations. As pointed out in Section
4.3.3, data channel relations are an integral part of segmenting relations
into logical groups and the FSA. Hence, by grouping relations, the al-
gorithm can focus on analysing data flow relations when reconstructing
the paths. The associated data channel relations can be retrieved to-
gether with the group when one of the data flow relations in the group is
determined to be relevant to DP(e).
A lookup table is also generated while parsing provenance relations
during sorting to facilitate the search for related entities in other phases
of the algorithm. The table holds a relational mapping between entities
and returns a set of entities that are associated (i.e. have one or more
provenance relations that connect the two entities) to a given entity.
The mapping for an agent entity is updated whenever the correspond-
ing agent in the source_entity field is observed to be associated to a new
target_entity. Mapping of an object entity is updated when the corre-
sponding object in the target_entity field is observed to be associated
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with a new source_entity. The update of mapping is done differently be-
tween agent and object entities due to objects being regarded as passive
(e.g. not able to initiate activities).
5.2.2 Find Instance Phase
After the sort phase, the algorithm retrieves e from E and attempts to
find all agents directly connected to e using the findInstances function.
The pseudocode for the function is shown in Algorithm 2. We use the
form rg .r to represent attributes associated to rg (e.g. the provenance
relation associated to rg). i.dIn and i.dOut represents the data-in and
data-out arrays associated to the entity instance i.
Retrieval of e is done using e_id, a user supplied string that denotes the
ID of the object whose data provenance the user wants reconstructed3.
Once e is retrieved, the algorithm starts reconstructing the source and
derivative provenance of e. Since e is an object entity, entities that con-
nect directly to e are expected to be of agent type (e.g. agents executing
activities in relation to e).
A list of IDs of agents associated with e is retrieved using the lookup
table constructed in the sorting phase. Based on the list, the instance
that represents each agent is retrieved from E. The algorithm then looks
for rg that connects each agent directly to e by searching for rg with e as
its target_entity value in the respective agent ’s sorted relation list. Each
qualified rg is assigned to the agent ’s respective data flow array. Assign-
ment of rg to the arrays is based on the data flow direction described
by the provenance relation. Details of the assignment is discussed later
in Section 5.2.4. Once all agents’ sorted relation list are processed, the
agent instances are returned and inserted into Q for processing in the
main function.
Referencing the example use case in Figure 5.3, Figure 5.5 shows the
progress of reconstructing at the end of the find instance phase. In-
stances of agent directly connected to File-x, P1 and P3, are retrieved
3Note that e will always be an object type entity (e.g. file object) due to the scope of
our research.
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Algorithm 2 Function: findInstances
1: Inputs: e_id, E, Lsorted,DP(e), Tlookup
2: Initialise: Enew ← ∅
3:
4: e← E[e_id]
5: if e is null then terminate algorithm
6: S ← Tlookup[e]
7: DP(e)← DP(e) ∪ {e}
8:
9: for each s ∈ S do
10: i← E[s]
11: RGread ← {rg ∈ Lsorted[s] | (rg .r = read ∧ rg .e2 = e)}
12: i.dIn ← i.dIn ∪ RGread
13:
14: RGwrite ← {rg ∈ Lsorted[s] | (rg .r = write ∧ rg .e2 = e)}
15: i.dOut ← i.dOut ∪ RGwrite
16:
17: Enew ← Enew ∪ {i}
18: end for
19: return Enew, DP (e)
from E. rg that directly connects the agents to File-x are assigned to
the respective agents’ data flow array. Q shows the agents that will be
processed in the next phase of the reconstruction.
5.2.3 Reconstruction Phase
Source and derivative provenance are reconstructed in an iterative man-
ner by finding directly connected rg that can logically explain the ‘next
step’ of the data flow. This is done in two steps.
First, the algorithm identifies the entity on which to perform the search
by checking for the ID of the instance being processed. Based on the ID
of the instance, the entity’s sorted relation list is retrieved from Lsorted.
Next, the algorithm tries to find matching rg from the retrieved list for
each rg in the instance’s data-flow arrays.
Matching is done using Lamport’s happened-before causal relationship
[Lamport 1978]. Lamport defined a happened-before b if a comes before
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Figure 5.5: State of DP(e) at the end of find instance phase (with reference to
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Figure 5.6: Finding a match for a data-in rg on Agent. Dotted arrows represent
ruled out provenance relations
b in terms of clock order (in our case, we use timestamp) and that b is
the recipient of the message sent by a. A rg is considered to be causally
related (i.e. a match) if it meets the following two conditions:
1. The rg in the provenance relation list complements the rg in the
data flow array in terms of the direction of data flow. For example,
to match a data-in rg , the rg in the provenance relation list should
describe data flowing out of the entity (i.e. write provenance rela-
tion).
2. The timestamp on the pair of rg satisfy the causal order stated by
our assumption in the beginning of Section 5.2. That is to say, the
timestamp on a data-in rg should be smaller or equal to the times-
tamp on a data-out rg .
Figure 5.6 illustrates the conditions for the matching. Assuming that
the algorithm is matching a read at time tn, the read on the object by
Agent would fail to complement the read in the data-in array since both
provenance relations describe data flowing into Agent. The write to
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retrieved rg are placed 
in the next nodes data-in array
retrieved rg are placed 
in the next nodes data-out array
Figure 5.7: Illustrating the concept of data-in and data-out rg at agents along
a path
Algorithm 3 Function: findInOutEdges
1: Inputs: i, E, Lsorted, Tlookup,DP(e)
2: Initialise: Enew . To hold new nodes
3:
4: if i is an agent then
5: Enew, i← findAgentEdges(i, E, Lsorted)
6: else if i is an object then
7: Enew, i← findObjectEdges(i, Lsorted, Tlookup, E)
8: end if
9: DP(e)← DP(e) ∪ Enew
10: return Enew, i
Agent3 would fail to meet the conditions too due to the timestamp being
smaller than the data-in read.
For every instance in Q, part of the derivative provenance is recon-
structed by searching for matching data-out rg in the entity’s sorted re-
lation list for each rg in the data-in array. Source provenance is recon-
structed in a similar fashion, except the algorithm searches for match-
ing data-in rg for each rg in the instance’s data-out array. For each rg
matched, the algorithm retrieves the instance for each unique entity in-
troduced by the rg from E. The newly matched rg is then assigned to
the mirroring data flow array on the new instance the rg is matched to
(e.g. if matching rg in data-in, newly matched rg is placed into the new
instance’s data-in array). This process is visualised in Figure 5.7 and
is implemented in the findInOutEdges function used in the reconstruc-
tion phase. The general structure of findInOutEdges is shown in the
pseudocode described in Algorithm 3. For clarity, the searching of rg is
described separately in Section 5.2.4 (Algorithms 4 and 5).
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Figure 5.9: Progress of reconstructing the example use case after processing
P3
The findInOutEdges function is called by the traversal for every in-
stance in Q. Newly discovered instances at the end of findInOutEdges
are placed onto Q. The processed instance is then placed into DP(e).
The reconstruction stops once Q is empty. The algorithm then checks
for duplicated provenance relations in DP(e) before returning it as the
result of the reconstruction.
Figure 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate two iterations of the reconstruction phase
when reconstructing the example use case. Calling findInOutEdges
when processing P1 will result in the discovery of File-S1 and File-S2
due to the rg connecting them to P1. In the example, it is assumed that
these two rg satisfy the conditions for the matching. Once P1 is pro-
cessed, the newly discovered entities, together with the rg that connects
them to P1 are added to Q. The state at the end of the second itera-
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Algorithm 4 Function: findAgentEdges
1: Inputs: i, E, Lsorted
2: Initialise: Enew ← ∅
3:
4: tsmall ← findSmallestTime(i.dIn)
5: tlarge ← findLargestTime(i.dOut)
6: for each rg ∈ Lsorted[i] do
7: n← E[rg.e2 ]
8: n.dIn ← n.dIn ∪ {rg | rg .r = write ∧ rg .t ≥ tsmall ∧ rg .e2 /∈ DP(e)}
9: n.dOut ← n.dOut ∪ {rg | rg .r = read ∧ rg .t ≤ tlarge ∧ rg .e2 /∈ DP(e)}
10:
11: i.dOut ← i.dOut ∪ ({rg} \ n.dIn)
12: i.dIn ← i.dIn ∪ ({rg} \ n.dOut)
13: Enew ← Enew ∪ ({n} \ DP(e))
14: end for
15: return Enew, i
tion is shown in Figure 5.8. Note the rg placed in the data-out array for
File-S1 and File-S2 as the algorithm reconstructs the source provenance
from P1. Likewise, the third iteration, shown in Figure 5.9, processes
P3 in a similar manner using findInOutEdges. Over time, the algorithm
reconstructs the source and derivative provenance one step at a time.
5.2.4 Agents and Objects
Differences in the definitions of agent and object4 resulted in the search
for relevant rg for the two entities to be slightly different. Algorithm
4 and 5 contain the pseudocode for the search function for agents and
objects respectively. Objects in DFPM are treated as passive entities;
they are unable to initiate activities by themselves. This implies that ob-
ject entities will not appear in the source_entity field of a provenance
relation. Since rg in the sorted relation list are sorted based on the
source_entity field, the algorithm will need to know which entity’s list
to look at. This is done by retrieving the list of entities that have inter-
acted with the object using the Tlookup table.
4The two entities are defined in Section 4.3.1.
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Algorithm 5 Function: findObjectEdges
1: Inputs: i, Lsorted, Tlookup, E
2: Initialise: Enew ← ∅
3:
4: tsmall ← findSmallestTime(i.dIn)
5: tlarge ← findLargestTime(i.dOut)
6: S ← Tlookup[i]
7: for each s ∈ S do
8: RGderive ← {rg ∈ Lsorted[s] | (rg .r = read ∧ rg .t ≥ tsmall ∧ rg .e2 = i)}
9: RGsource ← {rg ∈ Lsorted[s] | (rg .r = write ∧ rg .t ≤ tlarge ∧ rg .e2 = i)}
10:
11: n← E[s]
12: n.dIn ← n.dIn ∪ {rg ∈ RGderive | (rg .e1 /∈ DP(e))}
13: n.dOut ← n.dOut ∪ {rg ∈ RGsource | (rg .e1 /∈ DP(e))}
14:
15: i.dOut ← i.dOut ∪ (RGderive \ n.dIn)
16: i.dIn ← i.dIn ∪ (RGsource \ n.dOut)
17: Enew ← Enew ∪ ({n} \ DP(e))
18: end for
19: return Enew, i
Another implication of the difference in definition is the interpretation
of the data flow direction for each rg . Due to object entities being pas-
sive, write relations always originate outside of the object, causing write
to be seen as an inflow of data from the object’s perspective. Read re-
lations are also interpreted in the same manner; reading data from an
object is seen as data flowing out from the object’s perspective. This
contrasts how read and write relations are interpreted for agents.
Agent entities are viewed as active entities. Hence, provenance rela-
tions associated with an agent originate from the agent (i.e. source_entity
is the agent). This changes how read and write are interpreted from an
agent’s perspective. A read is seen as obtaining data from other entities,
thus is viewed as data flowing into the agent. Likewise a write is equiva-
lent to data being output from the agent. The interpretation of data flow
for both entity types is illustrated in Figure 5.10.
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(b) Flow interpretation for an
Agent entity
Figure 5.10: Difference in the interpretation of provenance relations in terms
of data flow direction between Object and Agent entities
5.2.5 Reducing the Number of Iterations on Relation List
The path reconstruction approach described in Section 5.2.3 tries to find
all matching pairs of rg for each rg in the respective data flow array5 of
the entity being processed. This is due to a lack of information on data
content being communicated between the two entities described by each
provenance relation. As a result, the algorithm can only determine like-
lihood of a rg being related by determining if two rg are causally related.
Figure 5.11 depicts an example scenario that illustrates the issue of not
being able to accurately identify the relevant provenance relation.
It is assumed that both write provenance relations satisfy the matching
conditions for determining causal relation when matched with the read
provenance relation in Figure 5.11. Without knowing the actual data be-
ing communicated (shown as the letters in round brackets beneath each
edge), the algorithm cannot accurately determine which write relation
is the actual relevant activity. Therefore, the algorithm would have to
include all rg that satisfy the causal order requirement so as not to over-
look the ‘correct’ provenance relation. This results in the dependency
explosion problem, which will be discussed in Section 6.4.
The algorithm iterates through the entity’s sorted relation list n times,
where n is the number of rg in the respective data flow array, so as to
5Data-in and data-out for reconstructing derivative and source provenance respec-
tively.
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Figure 5.11: Example scenario for why considering causal order alone cannot
accurately determine relevancy of a rg . Letters in round brack-
ets under each edge represents the content of the data communi-







Data-in rg rg matches in list
{read(t1), read(t5), read(t11)}
iterations
Figure 5.12: Overlapping of results (dotted bars) for each iteration in the path
reconstruction process
find all rg that satisfy the causal order requirement. Since each iteration
looks for rg of the same type (e.g. finding matching write rg in the list
for every rg in data-in and vice versa), the search can be optimised to
just one pass through the list. A sample case, illustrated in Figure 5.12,
where the algorithm is trying to match rg in an entity’s data-in array is
used to demonstrate how the number of iterations can be reduced.
In the sample case, we consider an entity with three rg in its data-in
array being removed from Q for processing. The entity’s data-in array
is shown on the left side in Figure 5.12, with the rg simplified to show
only their time sequence order. The assumed matched rg in the entity’s
provenance relation list is shown on the right hand side of the figure. The
red arrow marks the starting point in the list for provenance relations
that satisfy the causal order requirement for each iteration. The dotted
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bars indicate the rg that complement the rg in the data-in array.
It can be observed from Figure 5.12 that the results returned from the
rg with a larger timestamp is a subset of the results from matching the rg
with the smallest timestamp. Based on this observation, simply matching
the rg with the smallest and largest timestamp in the data-in and data-out
array, for reconstructing derivation and source provenance respectively,
will return the set of rg that satisfy all rg in the respective arrays. This
optimisation is reflected in the implementation of the algorithm, where
the respective timestamps are computed at the beginning of findAgent-
Edges and findObjectEdges in Algorithm 4 and 5 respectively.
5.3 Analysis of Algorithm
In this section, we analysis the complexity of the algorithm by analysing
each phase of the algorithm. The sort phase attempts to sort relations
in R according to their source_entity field (i.e. agent) and group re-
lations into rg . Sorting and grouping is done in two separate parses,
once through R and the other through the relation list for each identified
agent.
In the first parse, the algorithm extracts the source_entity field and in-
serts each relation at the end of its respective relation list. This requires
|R| ∗ (O(1 ) + O(1 )) number of operations. We can treat the cost of inser-
tion as constant as the relation is always inserted at the end of the list.
Thus the index for the insertion can be stored independently to speed up
the insertion6.
In the second parse, each relation is passed to the groupRelations
function. The function either advances its state by one step based on the
input relation7 or outputs the result of the pattern matching. In either
case, the number of operations scale with |R|. Hence, we can assume
a worst-case complexity of O(R) for grouping the relations. The lookup
table that stores the set of entities related to each unique entity, Tlookup,
6We already assumed the relations in R are sorted chronologically before hand.
7Advancement of the states is determined by the FSA patterns discussed in Section
4.4 of Chapter 4.
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Figure 5.13: Comparison between the amount of relations and entities for sys-
tem log files in the CSC’15 dataset
is also generated concurrently during this parse. This can be done by
extracting the target_entity field from each relation during the parsing.
By using a hash table with linked list data structure, the table can be
generated using |R| ∗ (O(1 ) + O(1 )) number of operations. By summing
the complexity for each parse, we can assume the time complexity of
the sort phase to be O(R ∗ (1 + 1 )) + O(R) + O(R ∗ (1 + 1 )) and can be
simplified to O(R) worst-case complexity.
In terms of space complexity, since R needs to be stored in Lsorted, the
amount of memory required by Lsorted is proportional to |R|. For the
worst-case scenario, we can assume every entity is connected to every
other entity. In such a case, the memory required to store the lookup
table Tlookup will be |E| ∗ |E|, where E is the entity set. Hence, the over-
all worst-case space complexity required for the reconstruction to take
place is O(R) + O(E 2 ).
Theoretically, the space required by the lookup table appears to be
large. However, in practice, |E| is significantly smaller than |R|. For
example, system logs from the NZCSC’15 dataset shows |E| is usually
smaller than |R| by at least a factor of 100 for systems used in the compe-
tition. Figure 5.13 shows the comparison between the two sets for each
system log file collected from the NZCSC’15. The worst-case scenario
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where every entity is inter-connected is also unlikely as not all processes
would communicate with one another directly in a computer system (e.g.
background processes performing routine system maintenance may not
interact at all with user applications).
In the find-instance phase, the algorithm attempts to find all relations
and entities directly connected to e, the object whose data provenance is
to be reconstructed. Retrieving, S, the set of entities directly connected
to e can be done in constant time using the hash lookup table, Tlookup and
e. On the other hand, retrieving all relations directly associated to e will
require the algorithm to scan the relation list for each s in the sorted
relation list Lsorted. Since the size of the relation list of s refers to the
amount of relations connected to s, |Lsorted[s]| is the degree of s, deg(s).
As such, the time complexity for the find-instance phase can be said to
be O(1 + |S | ∗ deg(s)), where |S| is the number of unique entities directly
connected to e.
In the reconstruction phase, the algorithm uses the findInOutEdges
function to determine which relation and entity should be considered
when reconstructing the source and derivative provenance of e. In the
following analysis, we assume the worst-case scenario where all entities
in the input data are relevant (i.e. E ⊂ DP(e)).
To reconstruct both source and derivative provenance, the algorithm
first computes the time window for relations to qualify. This is achieved
by finding the smallest and largest timestamp using the data-in and data-
out arrays respectively for each entity being processed. In the worst-
case scenario, the arrays would represent the in and out degrees of an
entity as all relations would be considered relevant to DP(e). Hence, the
complexity of finding the time window for each entity, i, being processed
is O(deg(i)).
After computing the time window, the algorithm will search through
the relation list for each unvisited entity, s, that is connected to i. As
discussed above, the complexity of searching the relation list of each
entity is deg(s). Since every entity will be processed in the worst-case
scenario, the worst-case time complexity of the reconstruction phase can
be said to be O(|E | ∗ (2 ∗ deg(s)).
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5.4 Context-based Provenance Reconstruction
Algorithm
Prior to the algorithm described in Section 5.2, an algorithm that lever-
age on Allen’s interval and the context information of each provenance
relation was explored. The context-based algorithm was inspired by
the concepts of precondition used in classic workflow planning [Vassos
2012] and description logic matching used in web service composition
[González-Castillo et al. 2001]. The underlying idea is to keep track of
the data obtained by each entity.
Relevance between two potential causally related provenance relation
(e.g. pair of read and write activities) is determined in two steps:
1. check if the temporal relationship between the two provenance re-
lations falls into one of the following Allen’s interval algebra: meet,
overlaps, starts, during, finishes, is equal to.
2. match contextual information of pairs of provenance relations that
satisfy the first check.
A data structure, precondition, is used to keep track of data held by
each entity. In reconstructing derivative provenance, read relations from
an entity are treated as the an entity obtaining a piece of data. An in-
formation set consisting of contextual information surrounding the data,
such as size of the data read or information regarding the data channel, is
constructed and assigned to the respective entity in precondition. When
a write relation from the same entity is encountered, contextual informa-
tion of the write relation is matched against those in precondition. The
matching results in one of the following three possibilities:
1. Equivalent - write-information set matches exactly to at least one
contextual information set in the precondition data structure.
2. Sub-match - write-information set is considered to be a subset for
each information set matched in precondition.
(e.g. sizewrite < sizeread)
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3. Super-match - write-information set is a superset of at least one
information set in precondition (e.g. sizeread < sizewrite) and is not a
subset or equivalent to any information set in precondition.
For equivalent and sub-match results, the write relation is treated as
having propagated data to other entities. Hence, the relation is added
to DP(e). In the case of super-match, the algorithm assumes that the
data propagated is not relevant. This is because the data being written
is larger than what was obtained by the entity and hence is likely not
relevant to the data the provenance is concern of. As a result, the relation
is ignored. Source provenance is reconstructed in the same manner.
The only difference is instead of populating precondition when a read
is observed, the update is done when a write is observed. Likewise,
matching with information set in precondition is done when a read is
found.
During testing, it was observed that the algorithm worked well in sit-
uations where data was propagated unmodified (i.e. creating duplicated
copies of a document). However, in cases where data is being modified
before being propagated to other entities, the logic used in the algorithm
would fail. An example of such a case is when a process
Such cases are common in users’ interaction with computer systems
where
Hence, the context-based algorithm was scraped as it could not recon-
struct the data provenance if the data is being modified during propaga-
tion. Having said that, the lesson learnt from the context-based algorithm
led to the idea of leveraging the causality of relations for the reconstruc-
tion.
5.5 Abstracting the Reconstructed Provenance
The work by Coe et al. [2014] highlighted how provenance graphs gen-
erated at different granularities can differ in shape and size, even if they
are describing the same events. These disparities between graphs of dif-
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ferent granularity will result in false negatives8 when evaluating the re-
constructed data provenance (i.e. DP(e)) against the ground truth prove-
nance. This is because the ground truth provenance is derived from user
layer events9 while the data provenance is reconstructed from log files
generated at finer granularity layers. To resolve the difference in gran-
ularity, the FSA discussed in Section 4.4, is used to map DP(e) to the
granular layer which contains the ground truth provenance.
Provenance relations in DP(e) are first sorted into separate lists of
provenance relations based on their source_entity value and ordered
chronologically by timestamp. Since the FSA focus on relations between
a pair of source_entity and target_entity, sorting the provenance rela-
tions allows the FSA to perform the matching by simply iterating through
each list.
The automaton takes in a list of provenance relations as a sequence
and attempts to find sub-sequences that match the patterns defined by
the FSA. Once matched, each sub-sequence is replaced with the corre-
sponding coarser granularity activity ascribed to the matched pattern.
For example, if a sub-sequence matches the pattern describing modify,
the sub-sequence is summarised and replaced with a modify relation.
The new provenance relation inherits the source_entity and target_entity
values of the sub-sequence10. However, a single time field is insufficient
to represent timestamps of the summarised relations. Instead, time is
represented as a range in the new provenance relation. The timestamp
of the first and last provenance relation in the sub-sequence is used as the
start and end time of the range. Start time is captured in the time field as
per the defined format, while end time is inserted into the context field
with the tag ‘endTime’ to denote the context of the value. Figure 5.14
illustrates the sorting and the outcome of the mapping by the automaton,
using sample provenance relations simplified to show the source_entity
and target_entity values of each provenance relation.
8A single read observed in the user layer may be made up of multiple read operations
in the finer granularity layers.
9Derivation of the ground truth provenance was discussed in Section 3.6.
10Similar to how grouping of provenance relations is done in Section 5.2.1, the automa-
ton only looks at provenance relations with the same source_entity and target_entity




open(t1, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
read(t2, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
read(t3, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
close(t4, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
open(t1, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
read(t2, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
read(t3, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
close(t4, pid:272, file:/text.txt, ...)
open(t5, pid:271, file:/net/dev, ...)
write(t6, pid:271, file:/net/dev, ...)
close(t7, pid:271, file:/net/dev, ...)
sort by source_entity
access(t1, pid:272, file:/text.txt, endTime:t4; ...)
modify(t5, pid:271, file:/net/dev, endTime:t7; ...)
aggregated results
automaton processes each list 
in a string-like manner
List: pid:271
open(t5, pid:271, file:/net/dev, ...)
write(t6, pid:271, file:/net/dev, ...)
close(t7, pid:271, file:/net/dev, ...)
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Figure 5.15: Illustration of the ground truth and reconstructed provenance
graph
Once DP(e) is mapped to the layer with the same granularity as the
ground truth provenance, they can be compared equally as each ob-
served event can be treated as structurally equivalent, as illustrated in
Figure 5.15. Any difference between the two provenance graphs can now
be treated as unexpected results produced by the reconstruction.
5.6 Summary
This chapter focuses on reconstructing the data provenance from prove-
nance relations modelled from log files. An algorithm, based on Lam-
port’s happened-before causal relationship, is proposed for achieving
this. Once reconstructed, the FSA discussed in Chapter 4 is used to
map the data provenance to the same granularity layer as the ground
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Log files
















Figure 5.16: From log files to reconstructed provenance
truth provenance. This allows the reconstructed data provenance to be
evaluated against the ground truth provenance without false negatives—
caused by the difference in granularity in the results. Figure 5.16 illus-
trates the reconstruction process, from log files to the reconstructed data
provenance.
Once the data provenance can be reconstructed from log files, the next
step is to evaluate how complete is the reconstructed provenance with
respect to the known derivation history of the data. However, review
of existing literature showed the lack of a methodology for evaluating
data provenance reconstruction. We discuss our proposed evaluation





To assess the reconstructed data provenance, in the context of address-
ing the thesis question, we require an evaluation methodology. However,
Chapter 2’s review showed the absence of such a methodology in the
literature. To address this gap, a methodology that evaluates a recon-
structed data provenance based on its completeness and correctness is
proposed in Section 6.1. Section 6.2 discusses the two errors found in
the dataset and discussed how they were resolved. The setup used for
the experiments is also discussed. The thesis question is then addressed
in Section 6.3 through a series of experiments that look at the data prove-
nance reconstructed from different types of log file. Based on observa-
tions obtained, Section 6.4 discusses approaches that can be applied to
reducing the number of errors in the reconstructed output.
6.1 Methodology for Evaluating Data Provenance
Reconstruction
The proposed methodology for evaluating reconstructed data provenance
is based on two dimensions related to information quality: correctness
and completeness. These dimensions were inspired by the work of Cheah
and Plale [2012] on assessing the quality of provenance captured in an
automated manner. The authors argued that other dimensions, such as
timeliness, validity and uniqueness are more applicable when assessing
information curated manually. This argument conforms to the context of
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this research as the reconstruction is done in an automated manner.
Although inspired by the work of Cheah and Plale [2012], the defini-
tions and approach to calculating the two dimensions differs in our pro-
posed methodology. Correctness and completeness are defined as follow:
Correctness - denotes the extent to which the reconstructed prove-
nance is error free with respect to the ground truth.
Completeness - denotes the extent to which the reconstructed prove-
nance captured the provenance relations found in the ground truth.
To simplify the evaluation, any provenance relations in the reconstructed
output but not in the ground truth are considered as errors. These errors
include provenance relations that are duplicated, redundant (i.e. noise)
or with erroneous fields.
Different approaches can be used to quantify these dimensions. For
example, Cheah and Plale [2014] count and score the number of errors
found on each node and edge of a provenance graph. A single quality
score that defines the quality of a provenance graph is then calculated
by averaging the sum of scores for each element over the number of
expected nodes and edges. Such a quality score allows different prove-
nance graphs to be compared and ranked based on their quality. How-
ever, applied to evaluating provenance reconstruction, the single scoring
approach cannot highlight which dimensions the reconstructed prove-
nance failed in. Our proposed methodology measures the two dimen-
sions separately using the metrics precision and recall. We argue that
by using different metrics, areas in the reconstructed data provenance
that require improvement can be identified through the evaluation. This
is demonstrated in the later sections on the experiments.
In the context of the proposed methodology, precision measures the
number of reconstructed relations that are in the ground truth against
the total number of reconstructed relations. It quantifies how much of the
reconstructed output is correct. Recall measures the amount of ground
truth being reconstructed and reflects completeness.
Comparison of provenance relations1 between reconstructed and ground
1A provenance relation is a construct that consists of two entities connected by an ac-
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of a pair-wise provenance relation and the possible out-
comes of comparison between the ground truth and reconstructed
provenance
truth data provenance is done in a pair-wise manner. Each comparison
results in one of the following outcomes:
1. match (true positive, tp) - the same pair-wise provenance relation
exists in both the reconstructed and ground truth provenance
2. error (false positive, fp) - a pair-wise provenance relation exists
only in the reconstructed provenance
3. miss (false negative, fn) - a pair-wise provenance relation exists
only in the ground truth provenance
Figure 6.1 illustrates the three outcomes. Note that the approach to
take the minimum count when computing tp, proposed by Papineni et al.
[2002], is adopted in our proposed methodology2.
Based on the tabulated outcomes, recall of the reconstructed data
provenance can be computed as follows:
Recall =
match





tivity that describes the relationship between the two entities, as defined previously
in Section 4.3.













Based on Equation 6.2, the complement of precision (i.e. 1 − precision)
would inform how much error is in the reconstructed provenance. It
should also be noted that the formulas used in Equation 6.1 and 6.2 con-
form to the standard formulas defined by Manning et al. [2009]. An ideal
result of the reconstruction is where the reconstructed data provenance
only contains matching relations and completely captures the ground
truth. This implies precision and recall would equate to 1, indicating
the reconstructed output mirrors the ground truth provenance.
6.2 Experimental Setup
This section details the setup used for the experiments described in this
chapter. The first subsection describes issues found in the log files that
can be resolved at the pre-processing stage (i.e. before running the re-
construction algorithm). The second subsection documents the experi-
ment setup.
6.2.1 Data Pre-processing
Initial inspection of the NZCSC’15 dataset, discussed in Chapter 3, un-
covered two types of sequencing error amongst the log entries. These
errors can affect the execution of the reconstruction algorithm. Hence
they need to be identified and rectified in the data pre-processing stage.
In this section, we discuss what these errors are and how they can re-
solved.
Since the procedure for generating kernel log entries by system log-
ging mechanisms is the basis for the occurrences of the errors, it is first








Figure 6.2: Illustration of the procedure for kernel log entry generation
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1428297037.360:1687673): syscall=4 ...
type=CWD msg=audit(1428297037.360:1687673):  cwd="/root"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1428297037.364:1687692): syscall=2 ...
type=CWD msg=audit(1428297037.364:1687692):  cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1428297037.360:1687673): item=0 name="/usr/sbin/tcpdump" ...
type=PATH msg=audit(1428297037.364:1687692): item=0 name="/root" ...
correct 
order
Log entry out of 
sequence order
Figure 6.3: Log sequence error in Linux Audit Framework (LAF) logs
Before describing the errors found, the procedure of how kernel log
entries are generated is explained first. This is so as to facilitate the
discussions later on. The procedure can be divided into three phases,
namely execution of the system call, event timestamping and log inser-
tion. When a process invokes a system call, the kernel would executes
the system call first. Upon completion, the event is timestamped by the
logging mechanism. Parameters to be logged, including the timestamp,
are then extracted from the various kernel data structures. These pa-
rameters are assembled according to the log format and inserted into the
kernel ring buffer. Log entries are then retrieved from the ring buffer in
a First-in-First-out (FIFO) order and output to log files in the user space.
Depending on the log format, one or more log entries may be gener-
ated for each system call. Figure 6.2 briefly illustrates this procedure.
It is important to note that while certain system calls are idempotent
(e.g. cannot be interrupted during execution), the kernel regards the log
generation portion to be non-critical and thus can be interrupted (e.g.
pre-empted).
The first type of sequencing error found is log sequence error, where
the order of two log entries in the same log file does not match the order
of their timestamp. An example of a log sequence error in the LAF logs
is shown in Figure 6.3.
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Log sequence errors occur commonly in kernel log files of systems
where the number of concurrent processes running challenge the sys-
tem’s capacity. In high load situations, processes may be context-switched
out of the CPU before it is able to completely emit all required log entries.
This results in log sequence errors.
Process concurrency in modern systems is achieved through context
switching at the CPU. This is managed by the scheduler and is per-
formed differently based on the scheduling algorithm used. In the rest
of this discussion, the round robin scheduling algorithm3 is used as an
example [Silberschatz et al. 2012]. Under round robin scheduling, CPU
usage is managed through time-slices being allocated to each process.
At the end of each time-slice, if the process is still running, the scheduler
would pre-empts it from the CPU in favour of the next assigned process.
By default, the size of a time-slice is usually based on the number of
processes running on the system. As a result, each time-slice becomes
significantly smaller when the system is heavily loaded.
Under a normal system load, each time-slice allocated to the process
would be sufficiently large for the process to complete the entire pro-
cedure, from invocation to inserting log entries into the ring buffer, as
shown in Figure 6.4a. However, when the system experiences heavy load,
the time-slices become significantly smaller. This results in increased
possibility of a process being pre-empted during the insertion of its log
entries into the ring buffer. If the next process also does insertion, the
log entries of the previous system call would be interleaved with entries
from the current system call. Since the log entries are timestamped be-
fore the insertion and pre-emption, the interleaved entries will appear
out of sequence. Figure 6.4 briefly illustrates how log sequence error
could result from smaller time-slices. Note that, although other schedul-
ing algorithms do not utilise time-slices for managing access to the CPU,
as long as pre-emption of process is enabled, log sequence errors can
take place when a process is pre-empted.
Log sequence error is an issue when extracting information from the
log files for modelling provenance relations. In situations where an event
































... system call 
timestamping
(b) Overloading the system may interrupt the logging procedure
Figure 6.4: Impact of system load on logging
is described using multiple log entries (e.g. Figure 6.3), the parser would
expect the respective entries to be in sequence. Log sequence errors may
cause the parser to miss out on certain key information, hence affecting
the modelling of entities. Log sequence errors can be remedied easily by
sorting the log entries based on their timestamp.
The second type of sequencing error found is a logic sequence error,
where the timestamps of a pair of causally dependent entries are logically
incorrect. Assuming a pair of causally dependent events A and B, where
B is dependent on A (e.g. A → B), the timestamp of A is expected to be
smaller than B as A has to happen before B. However, in logic sequence
error, the timestamp of A is larger than B.
In idempotent system calls, such as read and write, the main function
of the system call (e.g. during reading or writing of bytes) cannot be pre-
empted. However, timestamping of the event is not considered critical










read executes after the write, 





Figure 6.5: Logic sequence error due to system call being interrupted before it
can be timestamped correctly
if the process invoking a system call was context-switched out by the
scheduler before it managed to timestamp the system call event, logic
sequence error would likely occur. With reference to the log generation
procedure illustrated in Figure 6.2, Figure 6.5 demonstrates how a logic
sequence error could result due to context-switching. It should be noted
that logic sequence errors only manifest between two or more interacting
processes. System call invocation within the same process is sequentially
ordered (e.g. previous system call must be completed and logged first).
As such, the order of events within the same process can be assumed to
be logged correctly.
Our approach for resolving logic sequence errors in the NZCSC’15
dataset focuses on pairs of provenance relations that describe process
communication. Such pairs can be identified by searching for write-read
relation pairs, where the write shows process A writing to process B
while the read shows process B reading from process A. Each identified
pair is then checked for the error by comparing their timestamps.
Once found, the error can be fixed by changing the write timestamp to
be smaller or equal to the read timestamp or changing the read times-
tamp such that it is larger or equal to the write timestamp. However, any
changes made to the timestamps has to be done without violating the se-
quence order within the respective processes (e.g. if the write timestamp
is changed, the sequence order of the write amongst the events observed
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Algorithm 6 Resolving logic sequence error
1: Assume:
2: wbt = timestamp of relation before write
3: wt = timestamp of write relation
4: rt = timestamp of read relation
5: art = timestamp of relation after read
6:
7: if (wbt ≥ rt) and (art > wt) then . Change read timestamp
8: Set rt← wt
9: else if wbt < rt then . Change write timestamp
10: Set wt← rt
11: end if
for that process should remain the same). Algorithm 6 shows the psue-
docode for determining which timestamp is to be changed.
6.2.2 Description of Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup is based on the NZCSC’15 dataset and use cases
discussed in Chapter 3. Log entries in each log file of the dataset are
first sorted to resolve log sequence errors. After which, log entries are
modelled into a set of pair-wise provenance relations using the proposed
DFPM, described in Chapter 4. The modelled set of provenance relations
is then checked for logic sequence errors using Algorithm 6. The prove-
nance relation set and the name of the file whose data provenance is to be
reconstructed are given as inputs to the two-step reconstruction process4
to produce the reconstructed data provenance for each use case. Note
that each use case is reconstructed from its own set of relations. Finally,
the ground truth provenance for each use case, discussed in Section 3.6,
is compared against the reconstructed provenance, for evaluation. The
process of producing the reconstructed and ground truth provenance for
evaluation is illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Precision and recall for the reconstructed data provenance for each
4First the data provenance is reconstructed using the proposed reconstruction algo-









Figure 6.6: Workflow for reconstructing the data provenance and generating
the ground truth from the NZCSC’15 dataset
use-case are then calculated using the methodology described in Section
6.1. To describe how matching is done, the notation defined in Equation
5.1, shown in Chapter 5, for a pair-wise provenance relation is used:
rg = (r, t, e1, e2)
where r is the activity between the two entities e1, e2, t is the timestamp
indicating the time the activity happened, e1 is the source entity and e2
is the target entity. A pair of provenance relation between the recon-
structed and ground truth provenance is considered a match only if:
1. the timestamp, trp, of the relation from the reconstructed prove-
nance is within the threshold window δ, with respect to the times-
tamp of the relation from the ground truth provenance
2. the activity, r, source e1 and target e2 for both relations hold the
same value
As the time granularity in the ground truth is in minutes, δ is set to one
minute in the experiments described in Section 6.3.
The psuedocode for computing precision and recall is given in Algo-
rithm 7. Agents which use process ID for their entity ID would have their
entity ID field replaced with the corresponding process name, if captured
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Algorithm 7 Algorithm for computing precision and recall
1: Input: RP,GT
2:
3: GTlen← GT .length . Length of ground truth
4: RPlen← RP .length . Length of reconstructed prov
5:




10: for all rgrp in RP do
11: if GT .length = 0 then exit for-loop
12:
13: for rggt in GT do








22: tp← GTlen−GT .length
23: precision← tp/RPlen . Initial length of RP is tp+ fp
24: recall← tp/GT len . Initial length of GT is tp+ fn
in the context portion of the relation. This is to facilitate matching as
Agents are known by their process name in the ground truth.
For evaluation, use cases discussed in Chapter 3 are reconstructed us-
ing the NZCSC’15 dataset. To recap, the use cases are derived from
the NZCSC’15 video transcripts. Together, they cover different aspects
of interactions between elements in an operating system and data prove-
nance. These aspects include process-to-process communications, process-
to-file interactions and the source and derivative provenance of file ob-
jects. A brief summary of the use cases derived is as follows:
Use-case 1 - The reading and backing up of the file PrivateFile1 is cap-
tured in this use case. This use case aims to test whether the pro-
posed reconstruction algorithm is able to reconstruct the propaga-
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tion of data across different processes and over the network.
Use-case 2 - This use case shows the malicious modifications made to
a system critical file, /root/.ssh/authorized_keys. It demonstrates
file modifications by processes and shows the modified data being
propagated to other processes.
Use-case 3 - The injection of the malicious shell code, red.php, through
a running application by one of the red team is captured in this use
case. The use cases tests if the algorithm is able to reconstruct
sequence of events that describe the life cycle of a piece of data,
from creation, access, modification to deletion.
Use-case 4 - The final use case shows the propagation of the malicious
shell code injected in use-case 3 through interactions with different
applications. This use case tests the ability of the reconstruction
algorithm to reconstruct the source and derivative provenance of
the file ../test/red0.php.
6.3 Reconstructing Data Provenance from
Different Granularities
The first set of experiments investigates the outcome of the reconstruc-
tion when using log files of different granularity5. Recalling the NZCSC’15
dataset, described in Chapter 3, log files generated at the system and ap-
plication layer of the operating system were collected. As such, the log
files may differ in terms of the granularity of events and the observation
scope of the logging mechanisms. To investigate the impact of differ-
ent types of log files6 on the reconstruction, the NZCSC’15 log files are
divided into the following three sets of data:
D1 - The first set of data consists of log files from the system layer. This
includes the LAF, Sysdig and the network traffic log files.
5Granularity of a log file is determined based on the categorisation of log files using
the system granularity view defined in Section 1.5.
6Log files are classified according to their granularity, as discussed in Section 1.5.
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D2 - The second set of data comprises of log files from the application
layer. Log files generated by the Apache web server applications
form this set.
D3 - The third set of data is made up of log files from both the system
and application layers. It is comprised of log files in both D1 and
D2.
6.3.1 D1 - System Log Files
Table 6.1 shows the precision and recall of the data provenance recon-
structed for each use case using only system log files. Two observations
can be made from the results. First, the reconstructed data provenance
for all use cases exhibit low precision. This is especially so for use-case
2, 3 and 4, where relevant7 file objects were modified. Second, recall
varies by a large margin across the different use cases. This is especially
so with use cases involving the Apache process (i.e. use-case 3 and 4 ).
Low precision across the use cases indicates that the number of er-
rors (i.e. false positives) in the reconstructed data provenance is con-
sistently high. Analysis of the reconstructed output further revealed two
insights regarding the erroneous provenance relations. First, shared sys-
tem files and libraries made up the majority of erroneous entities in the
graph. Second, the reconstructed data provenance manifest as a single
connected graph. Erroneous entities are interconnected such that they
eventually connect to at least one relevant entity. Figure 6.7 illustrates
a captured screenshot, taken from a sample reconstructed data prove-
nance, demonstrating the interconnectivity amongst entities.
Table 6.1: Results of reconstruction for each use case using the system only set
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
Precision 0.2105 5.1194e-5 5.4317e-6 2.9981e-5
Recall 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.3142







Figure 6.7: Sample screenshot showing how erroneous and relevant entities
interconnects to form a single connected graph
As discussed in Section 5.2.3, reconstruction of paths is based on the
principles of causality between events. The inclusion of a data flow re-
lation (e.g. read, write, transfer) into the reconstructed data provenance
will prompt the algorithm to search for relations that are causally related
in the entity’s sorted list. Coupled with the two insights described above,
it is deduced that the expanded search for causally related relations was
the reason for the shared system files in the reconstructed output. This
issue is referred to as the dependency explosion problem and is discussed
in detail later in Section 6.4.
With respect to the second observation, our analysis of the recon-
structed output also shows that there are some provenance relations that
closely match the ground truth. These relations would overlap with the
expected relations (e.g. those in the ground truth provenance) in terms
of the time they happened. But they failed to satisfy the matching cri-
teria due to a mismatch in one of the entity fields (e.g. source or target
entity). As such, it is suspected that these relations are the expected re-
lations but with errors. Table 6.2 lists three samples of such close match
relations, taken from use-case 1 and 4. The bold entries highlight the
mismatched entities in each pair.
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Such mismatches can be traced back to errors in the parameters8
logged by the logging mechanisms. In his work on documenting prob-
lems with intercepting system calls, Garfinkel [2003] discussed how those
problems can lead to the kind of erroneous parameters we observed in
the log files.
The severity of the errors vary from minor inconsistencies that can be
resolved through visual inspection to the need for other sources of in-
formation for resolution to be possible. For example, the kernel logging
mechanisms used in the NZCSC’15 inconsistently label the web service
process, Apache, either by its process name ‘httpd ’ or by its fully quali-
fied path name ‘/usr/local/apache2/bin/httpd ’. This is shown by the first
two pairs of mismatch in Table 6.2. Although automatic comparison of
relations would flag these minor inconsistencies as errors, a visual in-
spection would reveal that the two labels are referring to the same pro-
cess. Based on the observations gathered from such visual inspections,
8The term ‘parameter’ is defined in Section 2.1.
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Table 6.3: Improvement in recall values after adapting the evaluation to the
inconsistencies observed in the log files
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
Recall before
adaptation
0.8 1.0 0.5 0.3142
Recall after
adaptation
0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
the entity labels can be manually canonicalised to produce a semantically
accurate evaluation of the reconstructed data provenance.
However, to automatically identify and canonicalise entity labels is not
a straightforward task. For example, in their discussion on matching het-
erogeneous events between different log files, Zhu et al. [2014] pointed
out similarity based approaches for automatically canonicalising labels
would fail if the difference between the labels is “opaque". Approaches
such as typographic similarity (e.g. string cosine similarity) and linguistic
similarity (e.g. using dictionary of ontology) would not work if the labels
are encoded or represented differently by the different logging mecha-
nisms.
Table 6.3 compares the recall before and after the adaptation. Entities
that are inconsistently labelled can now be correctly identified under the
adapted comparison scheme. The modification on the comparison re-
sulted in a stark improvement in recall for use-case 3 and 4. The recall
for those two use cases improved by at least two fold, showing the ground
truth to be completely reconstructed.
On the other hand, errors in the parameters such as a mislabelled en-
tity cannot be resolved without additional information (e.g. log files from
other layers). One such example is the third mismatched pair shown
in Table 6.2. From the ground truth, a provenance relation that de-
scribes a communication between the process sshd and a remote host
192.168.120.50 is expected. However, events captured at the system
layer associated the network socket to the local host address instead.
This results in a provenance relation that showed sshd communicating
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Table 6.4: Results of the reconstruction using only application layer log files
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
Precision - - 1 1
Recall - - 0.5 0.3428
with the local host, 192.168.120.519. Even though manual analysis could
reveal the error10, it is difficult to assert the correct identity of the en-
tity with whom sshd is communicating without additional sources of in-
formation. As Garfinkel [2003] pointed out in their discussion on their
experiences with system level logging, errors in parameter logging is
common due to various reasons, such as complex data structures used in
the system and race conditions. We discuss this further in Section 6.3.3.
From this experiment, we can observe reconstructing using system
log files can lead to data provenance with high recall but low precision.
The results with improved recall, shown in Table 6.3, demonstrated that
ground truth for most of the use cases were completely reconstructed.
This is attributed to the shared nature of the system devices, such as the
kernel and file system. Since applications running on the system all uses
the same set of devices, events logged by the system layer logging mech-
anisms will be a mix of activities from these applications. As a result,
the reconstruction algorithm has access to all necessary provenance re-
lations to fully reconstruct the ground truth. However, because of the
inability to accurately differentiate which pair of causally related prove-
nance relations are relevant, data provenance reconstructed using only
system log files suffers from large number of errors (i.e. low precision).
In addition, using only log files from the system layer makes it difficult to
resolve inconsistencies produced by the logging mechanisms.
9Association of IP addresses to hosts is based on knowledge of the network structure
of the NZCSC’15 competition.
10A host computer sending data over the network to itself would appear to be abnormal.
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6.3.2 D2 - Application Log Files
Table 6.4 shows the results of reconstructing the data provenance using
only application layer log files. Note thatuse-case 1 and 2 are not consid-
ered in this experiment as there were no application log files generated












(b) Ground truth data provenance for use-case 4
Figure 6.8: Comparing the data provenance reconstructed from dataset D2 to
the ground truth
Recall values for the applicable use cases indicated that the ground
truth could not be fully reconstructed from application log files alone.
Figure 6.8 shows the reconstructed and ground truth data provenance
for use-case 411. Figure 6.8a shows only the access from the httpd
process to the file of interest, ../test/red0.php, could be reconstructed.
11Note that the graphs illustrated display only distinct activities between entities (e.g.
multiple access to the file object, ../test/red0.php, by the process httpd is simplified
to a single access between the two entities).
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Provenance relations describing interactions between ../htdocs/red0.php
and applications such as mysql, rm and cp were absent. The situation
can be attributed to the fact that events from the missing applications
took place outside the observation scope of the Apache logging mech-
anism. Hence they were not included in the Apache log files. Since,
no log files were generated by the missing applications12, the resulting
set of provenance relations is incomplete. Likewise, the algorithm could
not establish the relationship between ../htdocs/red0.php and ../htdoc-
s/test/red0.php as the main provenance relations linking the two objects
through cp are missing from the modelled set.
Even though the dataset used in this experiment is composed of log
files from a single application type, the limitation surrounding the obser-
vation scope of logging mechanisms applies even if log files from mul-
tiple applications are used. The algorithm would only likely be able
to reconstruct the data provenance if the scopes of the log files con-
tiguously cover the ground truth (i.e. all relevant events are captured
across the different log files). However, once contiguity is broken, such
as deriving a new file object via applications that do not generate log
files, the completeness of the reconstructed data provenance will be af-
fected. The derivation relationship between ../htdocs/red0.php and ../ht-
docs/test/red0.php through cp in use-case 4 is an example of how a break
in the contiguity of the scope can affect the completeness of the recon-
structed data provenance.
6.3.3 D3 - System and Application Log Files
Table 6.5 lists the results for using both system and application layer
log files in the reconstruction. In comparison, the results are similar to
those shown in Table 6.3, where the dataset D1 is used but with adap-
tations made to the implementation of the comparison. Reconstructed
data provenance with high recall is the common outcome for both ex-
12Either because operating system native applications such as rm and cp do not gener-




periments. However, unlike using only system log files, the experiment
here does not require modification to the comparison for resolving the
errors in the system log files. Instead, provenance relations modelled
from the application log files acted as redundancy, providing the means
to “self-correct” the inconsistencies.
Table 6.5: Results of reconstruction different use-cases using both system and
application layer log files
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
Precision 0.2105 5.1194e-5 1.0861e-5 9.538e-5
Recall 0.8 1 1 1
Duplicated 
provenance relations
Errors can be spotted through
duplicated relations such as
the ones shown here
Duplicated 
entities
Figure 6.9: Duplicated provenance relations in data provenance reconstructed
using dataset D3
In situations where both application and system layer logging mech-
anisms are logging events concurrently, the same event will likely be
logged twice. Hence, duplicated provenance relations will result from
the modelling of log files. In situations where an error such as the mis-
labelling of entities described in Section 6.3.1 occurs, the duplicated re-
lations will instead appear as pair of closely matched relations. This is
because most of the information captured in the two relations will be
overlapping (e.g. activity observed, timestamp, entities involved), except
for the mislabelled entity. In the absence of ground truth, these closely
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matched relations can highlight the error to users analysing the prove-
nance graph, as demonstrated in Figure 6.9.
However, using log files that overlap in terms of events observed will
also lead to duplicated entities in the reconstructed provenance. This is
because different logging mechanisms may assign different identifiers to
the same entity. For example, a process would be identified by its process
name in the application layer and its process ID in the system layer. This
causes the provenance model to treat both as different entities. Graph
entity resolution techniques such as those described by Bhattacharya and
Getoor [2005] can be used for removing such duplicates.
Experiment using dataset D3 also showed errors resulting from issues
in the system logging mechanisms, such as those discussed by Garfinkel
[2003], may be partially resolved using log files obtained in the applica-
tion or higher layers. This highlights the importance of using multiple
sources of information when reconstructing the data provenance.
From the experiments discussed thus far, we can conclude that the
observation scope of the logging mechanism is crucial to reconstructing
a complete data provenance. Obtaining a set of application layer log files
that have an unified scope sufficient enough to cover all required events
is difficult. This is so as not all applications generate log files. The lack
of application log files for use-case 1 and 2 in dataset D2 substantiate
this claim. In contrast, system layer log files contain events that describe
activities across all applications running on the system. This is attributed
to the shared nature of system devices. As a result, data provenance with
high or perfect recall can be reconstructed using system layer log files.
However, the reconstructed data provenance is difficult to analyse as the
output contains large number of redundant provenance relations (e.g.
errors). These errors obfuscate the relations that matter (e.g. ground
truth) and are caused by the inability to differentiate relevant provenance
relations from the set of causally related relations. In the next section, we




This section first describes the dependency explosion problem associ-
ated with the use of system log files for provenance reconstruction, as
highlighted in Section 6.3.1. Following which, possible approaches for
reducing effects of the problem are discussed.
6.4.1 Understanding the Dependency Explosion Problem
Throughout the execution lifetime of a process, it may load and utilise
different files and objects, as dependencies, for access to external func-
tionalities or as part of its programmed execution. The dependency ex-
plosion problem occurs when the reconstruction algorithm mistakenly
adds such dependencies into the provenance graph being reconstructed.
In certain cases, dependencies can also be shared by different applica-
tions. Such shared behaviour of dependencies further worsen the effects
of the problem.
During reconstruction, because of the inability to identify exactly the
conjoining provenance relations from the set of causally related relations,
some of the dependencies appear in the reconstructed output as errors.
Figure 6.10 illustrates an example of how this can happen. Upon dis-
covering the write relation to a file object, the algorithm would search
for provenance relations that could influence the write. Since depen-
dencies such as library files are mostly loaded (e.g. treated as access
or read ) during the early phase of a process (e.g. initialisation phase),
relations that associate dependencies to the process would satisfy the
causal dependency requirement and be added to the reconstructed data
provenance.
However, in cases where the dependencies are used by different pro-
cesses (e.g. a shared system resource), the search for relevant prove-
nance relations may result in an explosion of dependencies being added
to the reconstructed data provenance.
With reference to Figure 6.11, if a dependency is regularly accessed










connected to relevant entity
Relevant entities 
and relation
Dependencies included into graph due to
the relations satisfying 
the causal dependent requirement
Figure 6.10: Dependencies directly connected to relevant process nodes in the
reconstructed data provenance graph
may be chained along the different entities added to the reconstructed
data provenance. Figure 6.12 captures a sample screenshot showing
such a chained explosion of dependencies in the reconstructed output.
The end result is the large number of errors observed in the experiment
with using only system log files.
One approach to reduce the number of errors is by pruning dependen-
cies from the set of modelled provenance relations before reconstruction.
In the following subsections, we discuss approaches that can be used to
identify and prune dependencies.
6.4.2 Blacklisting Dependencies
A naive approach for identifying and pruning dependencies is blacklist-
ing. From the Linux system man pages [Faith et al. 2016], the following
list of directory prefixes are put together as the blacklist. This list of
directories represents known structures of the file system where shared
system resources are stored. Note that application specific dependen-
cies, such as those stored under the application’s home directories, are
not included in the list.
Figure 6.13 compares the precision of the reconstructed data prove-
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Dependencies included because the relations are 
causally dependent on the relation between the 
dependency and the relevant entity
Figure 6.11: Indirect dependencies explosion when reconstructing derivation
provenance
Figure 6.12: Chained dependency explosion through shared system resources
pruned using the blacklist approach. Note that the Y-axis is in log scale,
with the best precision value, 1, located at the bottom. As such, a lower
bar indicates better precision. By simply removing the dependencies,
precision is improved significantly by approximately a factor of 100 in
use-case 2, 3 and 4.
However, blindly pruning a fixed list of dependencies may result in the
loss of relevant provenance relations. As shown in Table 6.6, complete-
ness of the reconstructed data provenance for use-case 4 is observed to
suffer from pruning. Attackers are known to hide malware in directo-
ries used for storing dependencies. In other situations such as a binary
planting attack [OWASP 2013], malicious users or hackers are known to
replace dependencies or executables on the system with malicious codes
of their own. As a result, provenance relations describing the activities
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Figure 6.13: Comparing precision of the reconstructed output between using
system log files with no pruning and blacklist pruning (Y-axis is in
log scale)
Table 6.6: Results of reconstruction using blacklist-pruned system log files
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
Precision 0.235 4.36e-3 2.2465e-4 1.8955e-3
Recall 0.8 1 1 0.9714
of these malicious codes would be lost to the reconstruction algorithm as
the corresponding entities would have been pruned away. In such situa-
tions, impact to the completeness of the reconstructed data provenance
would affect its usage.
6.4.3 Process-access Based
A second approach for identifying dependencies to be pruned is by analysing
each file’s usage pattern and number of unique processes accessing it
(e.g. process-access value). The premises are as follow:
1. Dependencies are likely to be files used by a large number of pro-
cesses.





“/dev/”,“/etc/”, “/proc/”, “/usr/lib/”, “/usr/include/”,
“/usr/share/”, “/lib/”, “/var/”, “/tmp/”, “/sys/”
without affecting much of the ground truth as no new data is being
propagated through these dependencies (e.g. pruning these depen-
dencies will not result in loss of sub-graphs).
Process
Dependencies
Figure 6.14: Explosion of dependencies connected to a process—the depen-
dency explosion problem may lead to file dependencies used for
the initialisation and execution of a process to be included into
the data provenance
Based on the premises, the approach targets read-only dependencies.
Read-only file objects (e.g. file objects with only read or access relations)
are classed as dependencies to be pruned if its process-access value ex-
ceeds a pre-defined threshold. The goal is to avoid clusters of read-only
dependencies such as those shown in Figure 6.14 while still allowing
other activities pertaining to processes to be reconstructed. The decision
to keep dependencies with write relations associated is mainly due to
write representing a propagation of data to new entities. Removing such
dependencies would risk losing important segments of the data prove-
nance graph that may help identify abnormalities such as a disguised
malware. Hence in this experiment, we simulate retaining dependencies
with write relations.
File objects identified as dependencies are pruned before the recon-
struction process so as to avoid incurring redundant computation cost
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when searching for the next conjoining relation. However, the main chal-
lenge is defining a threshold value for the classification of file objects.
Objects identified should help reduce the number of errors in the re-
constructed data provenance while not compromising completeness. As
such, finding the correct threshold is crucial. Figure 6.15 tabulates file
objects having the same process-access value into histograms for each
system log file used for the reconstruction of each use case. Note that
use-case 3 and 4 both use the same system log file, hence share the same
histogram.
The x-axes show the process-access value for each group of files while
y-axes count the number of files in each group. From the right end of
each histogram, we can observe that only a small number of files, with





(c) Use-case 3 and 4
Figure 6.15: Histograms showing the number of dependencies sharing the




fits the first premise.
To determine the threshold, file objects are iteratively added to a list of
files to be pruned starting from files with the highest number of process-
access (i.e. right end of histogram). This process iterates until recall
is affected. Table 6.7 compares the results from the first iteration of
the pruning with the first iteration that yields the best precision without
compromising recall. Results for all iterations are listed in Appendix C for
reference. The last column puts into perspective the percentage of total
unique processes required to be sharing a file for it to be considered for
pruning if the threshold value is set at the corresponding process-access
value.
From the percentage of total processes and the process-access value,
we can observe that the process-access value that provides the best pre-
cision varies across different use cases. One reason is because errors in-
curred in each use case may be caused by different dependencies. Since
the file objects are ranked according to the process-access values, the
dependencies that caused the errors may be pruned only at a later iter-
ation. Hence, the use of process-access value as threshold may produce
results that may differ based on the situation rendering this approach un-
reliable. Furthermore, determining the threshold becomes more difficult
without the ground truth since it is required for calculating recall.
Figure 6.16 compares the precision of the reconstructed output using
process-access based pruning against blacklist pruning and no pruning
done. While process-access based pruning performs slightly better in
use-case 2, the precision is significantly worse than blacklist pruning for
use-cases 3 and 4. Further analysis of the reconstructed data provenance
showed that there were many dependency files that were used only by
a single process, such as temporary files. This observation refuted the
first premise, listed in the beginning of this subsection, which hypoth-
esize that dependencies are files used by a large number of processes.
It also indicates that identifying dependencies based on the number of
processes accessing the file objects cannot be generalised for all cases.
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Figure 6.16: Comparing precision of the reconstructed output for process-
access based pruning with blacklist and no pruning (Y-axis is in
log scale)
6.4.4 Clustering
Instead of determining file objects to be pruned based on the number
of processes accessing the object, the third approach uses clustering to
identify groups of files used in a similar manner. Clusters can then be se-
lected, according to usage pattern, for pruning. The following file object
attributes are considered for the clustering:
• Number of unique processes - Determines how many unique pro-
cesses uses the file object.
• Read-to-Write ratio - Defines a file object’s usage pattern. It ranges
from 1 to -1, with 1 being read-only and -1 being write-only.
• Interaction Mean - Statistically denotes how frequent each file ob-
ject is being used by a single process.
• Interaction Variance - Statistically denotes how each process uses
the file object differently.
K-means is used as the clustering algorithm. The implementation, from
the Python based machine learning package scikit-learn [scikit 2010],
used in our experiment utilises Euclidean distance as the distance mea-
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sure. Attributes for each file object are consolidated into vector form and
normalised before clustering. The elbow-method [Ketchen and Shook
1996] is used to estimate the number of clusters, k.
The elbow method is based on the premise that as more clusters are
added, the data could be split into distinct groups (e.g. better modelling
of the data), until a point where adding more clusters would result in
dissimilar clusters. By visualising the percentage of variance against the
number of clusters, one can infer the value of k that best models the data
by observing where the graph starts to flatten. Percentage of variance is
computed as follows:








nj(xj − x)2 (6.4)






(xij − x)2 (6.5)
where k is the number of clusters, nj is the number of file objects in
cluster j, x is the overall mean and xj is the mean for cluster j. To esti-
mate k, the file object vector is computed and clustered using k-means,
with k varying from 2 to 10. The percentage of variance is calculated
for each k and plotted. To obtain a general value for k, such that it can
be applied generally to the system log files in the NZCSC’15 dataset, we
apply the described process on each system log file in the dataset.
Figure 6.17 illustrates the plot for the system log file used for use-
case 2. Results for other system log files are not shown here as they are
similar. Instead, they are listed in Appendix D for reference. It can be
observed that gradient of the curve starts decreasing when k is 5. As a
result, we estimate k to be 5.
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Figure 6.17: Percentage of variance measured for different values of k for sys-
tem log file used in the reconstruction of use-case 2
Table 6.8: Attributes of the best-performing cluster for each use case
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
No. of processes 1.47 457.7 8 8
R/W ratio -0.868 0.991 0.757 0.757
Mean 11.91 2.519 3418.48 3418.48
Variance 7.88 0.109 22255786 22255786
To evaluate the number of errors that can be reduced using the clus-
ters produced, each use case is reconstructed five times, once for each
cluster produced. In each iteration, files from one of the five clusters
are pruned from the corresponding system log file before running the
reconstruction algorithm. Summary of the precision, from pruning each
cluster, is shown in Figure 6.18. Note, missing bars for each use case in-
dicates the reconstruction failed to reconstruct anything as the required
files were pruned away (e.g. zero recall and precision). The arrows in the
figure mark the best performing clusters.
Table 6.8 shows the attributes defining each of the best performing
clusters. It shows the usage patterns for each cluster of files to be differ-
ent from one another. This is attributed to the reason mentioned previ-
ously with the process-access based pruning approach; errors in each
of the use case may be caused by different dependencies. However,
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Figure 6.18: Summary of precision for pruning each cluster from system log
file, for each use case (Y-axis in log scale)
Table 6.9: Attributes of clusters that resulted in zero recall (no ground truth)
Use-case 1 Use-case 2 Use-case 3 Use-case 4
No. of processes 8.534 7.452 1.204 7.435
R/W ratio 0.989 0.988 -0.962 0.99
Mean 6.252 6.437 9.342 6.671
Variance 3032.2 3791.2 54.62 1550.36
in comparison with pruning using a threshold value, clustering allows
files used in the same manner to be selected in one iteration. Cluster-
ing files according to their usage patterns also prevents abnormal files,
such as dependencies being replaced in a binary planting attack, to be
pruned. When dependencies behave abnormally, the behavioural change
will cause the clustering algorithm to cluster it with other more similar
behaving files.
Although the usage patterns shown in Table 6.8 hint that dependencies
cannot be described by a fixed set of usage patterns, it is interesting to
note clusters that result in an impact on recall (e.g. zero recall) showed
certain consistent patterns among them. Table 6.9 summarises the usage
patterns of files for clusters which resulted in the lost of ground truth
when pruned from the system log files (e.g. recall is zero). These files
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generally have low mean and high variance. This observation indicates
the usage patterns for the same file differs between processes and that
the interaction between each process and the corresponding file is not
frequent (i.e. in comparison to clusters which exhibits over three thou-
sand interactions).
Building on this observation, the reconstruction is executed again. How-
ever, this time around, instead of pruning one cluster from the system
log files, clusters which do not impact the recall in Figure 6.18 are all
pruned instead. Figure 6.19 compares the outcome of the reconstruc-
tion with other approaches discussed thus far for removing dependen-
cies. Although the clustering approach generally performs better than
the process-access approach, it performed the worst for use-case 2. How-
ever, the clustering approach provides more flexibility in choosing files to
prune compared to the process-access approach as groups of files can be
quickly selected based on patterns in the clustering attributes. The clus-
tering approach can also pick up on changes in file behaviour, such as
the case of a binary replacement attack, since clustering is based on file
usage patterns. In certain cases, such as use-case 3, it even performed
better than the blacklisting approach. This is because the clustering ap-
proach was able to pick up some of the application specific dependencies
that are not included in the blacklist.
Although the clustering shows some promise for separating relevant
files objects from the set of file objects in the modelled set of provenance
relations, the observations drawn here are not representative of depen-
dencies. This is mainly because the NZCSC’15 dataset only captures a
specific type of user interaction with the underlying system13. Datasets
that describe different types of system behaviour (e.g. system log files
from data centres, file servers or other types of system) would be re-
quired for a more extensive study.
13Because of the nature of the competition, the participants’ interaction with the sys-
tems are influenced and targeted at achieving a specific set of goals, such as moni-
toring the system for attacks. As a result, the dataset is not well suited for studies
aimed at understanding expected usage patterns of files.
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Figure 6.19: Comparing precision of reconstructed data provenance for clus-
tering based pruning with other discussed approaches (Y-axis in
log scale)
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, a methodology for evaluating reconstructed data prove-
nance against the ground truth provenance is presented. Using the pro-
posed methodology, data provenance reconstructed using different sets
of log files from the NZCSC’15 dataset are evaluated.
Results of the experiments showed data provenance with high recall,
with respect to the ground truth, can be reconstructed from system log
files. The experiment that combined the use of application and system
layer log files has also shown relations modelled from the application log
files can resolve inconsistencies generated during the logging of system
events.
Having said that, provenance reconstructed using system log files were
observed to have low precision (i.e. contains a large number of redundant
relations). The poor precision is attributed mainly to the inability to ac-
curately identify relevant relations from the set of causally related rela-
tions. Low precision may induce ambiguities when attempting to deduce
the derivation history of the data from the provenance. While having low
precision provenance is undesirable in critical scenarios (e.g. data audit
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or system security), low precise provenance may still provide useful in-
sights to figuring out information such as potential processes that holds
the data and how they obtained a copy of the data. Having said that, we
do not discuss the impact and possible applications of data provenance
with low precision as exploring the applications of the reconstructed data
provenance is out of the scope of this thesis.
To reduce the number of errors produced from reconstructing using
system log files, several approaches for identifying and pruning depen-
dencies are discussed. In most cases, blacklist-based pruning was able
to improve precision by a factor of ten to a factor of a hundred. However,
statically identifying file objects as dependencies and pruning them may
result in losing important segments of the provenance graph. These seg-
ments may be crucial for identifying abnormalities in the system. Identi-
fying file objects for pruning based on the number of processes accessing
them faces the issue of selecting a suitable threshold for the classifica-
tion. In addition, observation drawn from the results also showed that
dependencies cannot be identified from just the number of processes ac-
cessing the file object. Clustering provided a more dynamic approach as
it allows a set of file attributes to be considered. However, further stud-
ies on the attributes used will be required as the experimental results
showed that current attributes used cannot definitively identify depen-
dencies.
Through the experiments discussed in this chapter, we can observe
data provenance with high recall can be reconstructed using system
layer log files. However, the resulting provenance suffers from low pre-
cision due to the dependency explosion problem. Although having low
precision in the reconstructed provenance may affect its usage, the ap-
plications of the reconstructed provenance is not the focus of this thesis.
Hence we do not discuss the implications of using reconstructed data
provenance with low precision. It should also be noted that results of the
experiments and the conclusion is based on the event causality based
algorithm proposed for the reconstruction.
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Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusion
Motivated by the issues surrounding actively collecting data provenance,
this thesis investigates the reconstruction of data provenance from log
files obtained off a computer system. Log events are first modelled into
pair-wise provenance relations using the proposed multi-layered prove-
nance model, DFPM. An algorithm, based on the principles of causality
between events, then reconstructs the provenance for a given piece of
data from the modelled relations.
A methodology that evaluates the correctness and completeness of the
reconstructed output, using the metrics precision and recall respectively,
is proposed. The methodology helps address the second part of the thesis
question; how the reconstructed data provenance compares to its known
derivation history. Results from experimenting with log files of different
granularity revealed high recall provenance can be reconstructed from
system log files. This is attributed to the system wide scope of system
layer devices.
Experiments also showed the use of application log files in conjunction
with system log files can help resolve inconsistencies that are generated
during logging in the system layer. Doing so improved the recall of the
reconstructed data provenance. Concurrent use of log files from different
layers of the system can also help to mitigate the effects of not being
able to automatically canonicalising entity labels. In three out of the four
use-cases used in the experiments, the ground truth was shown to have
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been completely reconstructed without having to adjust the comparison
to compensate for the inconsistencies.
The experimental results also showed a large number of redundant re-
lations in the provenance reconstructed using system log files. These
relations have the adverse effect of reducing the precision of the recon-
structed output, obfuscating the ground truth in the provenance. Result-
ing from the dependency explosion problem, these relations are mostly
interactions with shared library files or program dependencies. Analysis
showed the dependency explosion problem is attributed to an inability to
accurately identify relations relevant to the data from the set of causally
related relations. Although low precision in the reconstructed output
may impact the usability of the data provenance, the usefulness of low
precise reconstructed data provenance is not discussed as the discussing
the application of the reconstructed data provenance is out of the scope
of this thesis.
Three approaches for identifying and pruning dependencies are consid-
ered for improving the precision of the provenance reconstructed from
system log files. The blacklist approach statically identifies file objects
as dependencies and prunes them from the modelled relations. Although
precision can be improved by a factor of a hundred in some use-cases,
the approach can affect the detection of abnormal objects in the system.
While the other two approaches do not perform as well as the black-
list approach, they factor in the behaviour of the file objects, hence are
less susceptible to abnormalities such as malicious activities that involves
masking potential malware as file objects. Identifying and pruning of file
objects, based on the number of processes accessing them, has the issue
of selecting a suitable threshold for classifying file objects. Also, obser-
vations drawn from the analysis of the results showed that dependencies
cannot be identified solely from the number of processes accessing the
file object. Clustering file objects based on their properties was able
to perform equally or better than process-access approach in most use-
cases. However, analysis on the clusters showed the attributes used are




Overall, the blacklist and process-access approaches for identifying
and pruning dependencies showed promising results in terms of improv-
ing the precision. However, it is not easy to generalise the two ap-
proaches due to the dynamic nature of how processes interact with de-
pendencies. While the clustering approach for identifying dependencies
showed promising results, due to the lack of a comprehensive dataset,
further studies on identifying attributes that can be used to identify de-
pendencies would be required.
In conclusion, although data provenance with high recall can be recon-
structed from system log files, the output suffers from a large number of
redundant relations caused by the dependency explosion problem. While
approaches to prune dependencies have significantly improved the pre-
cision, further studies on identifying dependencies is required for a more
accurate classification. It should also be noted that this conclusion is
drawn based on reconstructing data provenance using an event causality
based approach. The reconstruction workflow and evaluation methodol-
ogy established in this research provides the platform for future research
on provenance reconstruction.
7.1.1 Summary of Contributions
Besides addressing the question of data provenance reconstruction, this
thesis makes the following contributions to the area of provenance:
- Dataset for Provenance Reconstruction Research
Having a suitable dataset that can be used to evaluate solutions for
provenance reconstruction is crucial. However, a review of existing
literature and publicly available datasets showed the lack of such a
dataset. In this thesis, a set of requirements is defined to guide the
selection of datasets that can be used for provenance reconstruction
research. Leveraging on the NZCSC’15 competition, held at the Uni-
versity of Waikato, a dataset that comprises a set of log files and tran-
scripts, that describe participants’ screen activities, is constructed. The
transcripts allow the derivation of ground truth provenance that can be
used to evaluate provenance reconstructed from the log files.
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- Data Flow Provenance Model (DFPM)
Most existing provenance models operate with the assumption that prove-
nance is of single granularity. However, log events captured at different
granularity layers of a computer system can differ in terms of level of
detail, even if they are describing the same observed event. As a re-
sult, modelling log events using existing provenance models will lead
to disparities among the resulting provenance. This is an issue for the
reconstruction as the ground truth provenance and the reconstructed
output are of different granularity.
The Data Flow Provenance Model (DFPM) is proposed for modelling
provenance relations from a data flow perspective. Provenance con-
cepts defined in the model are organised into granularity layers that
reflect the hierarchically layered view of an operating system. A set of
patterns are then defined for mapping concepts between the different
granularity layers. These patterns are implemented using FSA so as
to allow the mapping of the reconstructed data provenance to be done
automatically.
- Application and Evaluation of a Causal-based Approach for Re-
constructing Data Provenance from Log Files
An algorithm that is based on Lamport’s happened-before causal rela-
tionship is proposed for reconstructing data provenance from the mod-
elled provenance relations. Building on further, a evaluation method-
ology was also proposed for evaluating the completeness and correct-
ness of the reconstructed data provenance. In doing so, we were able
to study and understand some issues that could be encountered when
applying a causal-based approach for reconstructing data provenance
from log files.
7.2 Future Work
Two areas that can benefit from further research have been identified
throughout the course of this research.
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7.2.1 Translation between Log and Provenance Domain
As discussed in Chapter 4 and in most existing provenance models, the
translation of events to the provenance domain has always been assumed.
Although knowledge of the log files can be used to derive the transla-
tion, different groups of people may have a different interpretation of log
events captured. This may in turn induce inaccuracy or inconsistency in
the modelling of log events.
One approach is to infer the translation from a more static and neutral
source of information, such as the source code of the respective appli-
cations. The objective of the analysis will be to uncover the functions
or portions of the application that emitted those log events. Techniques
such as source code analysis [Huq et al. 2013] can be applied to analyse
the syntax used, so as to deduce the nature of those functions. Based on
the deduced understanding, the translation can be inferred. Approaches
based on other types of analysis, such as binary [Rosenblum et al. 2008]
or control flow analysis [Cesare and Xiang 2010], can also be studied and
compared.
7.2.2 Resolving the Dependency Explosion Problem
Resolving the dependency explosion problem is currently an open re-
search problem. Approaches proposed, such as those from Lee et al.
[2013], involve instrumenting the logging mechanism to segment the sys-
tem call traces during logging. However such approaches are often con-
sidered intrusive and cannot be applied to legacy systems or log files that
are generated from non-instrumented mechanisms. Other approaches
such as the framework proposed by Khan et al. [2007] adopt a learning
approach, using neural networks to learn the behaviour and patterns of
running applications. These approaches are not flexible as the trained
network can only segment system call traces of applications it is trained
for.
Drawing from the experiments conducted on improving precision of
the reconstructed provenance, further studies into how dependencies
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can be identified may help mitigate the effects of the problem. Through
analysing and mining datasets that represent different types of system
usage and process behaviours, an attribute set that can be used for clas-
sifying dependencies from other file objects can be obtained. Once iden-
tified, dependencies can be pruned from the input dataset, hence elimi-
nating the cause of the dependency explosion problem. Although prun-
ing can be said to be an indirect approach to resolving the problem (i.e. it
does not address the issue of how to accurately identify relevant relations
or events), it can help reduce the impact of the problem.
7.2.3 Extending the Data Flow Provenance Model
The current proposed DFPM model focuses on modelling file interac-
tions. However, in a computer system, transient data can flow between
processes through memory regions. Such data flows are important as
data may be transformed in-memory (e.g. arithmetic computation). The
current proposed model does not model transient data flows because
such events are not captured in normal log files. As a result, tools that
can monitor and capture in-memory system activities would need to be
developed first.
Another aspect in which DFPM can benefit from future work is extend-
ing the activities modelled at the user layer. Currently, only copy and
merge are defined. Depending on the situation and nature of the prove-
nance, other activities that captures a richer form of user interaction may
be required. For example, to model data leakage, extending the user
layer to include activities such as taking of screenshots or the download-




List of Attacks Carried Out in
Challenge
The following table lists the labels and categories of the attacks observed
to have been carried out by the red teams in round 2 of the New Zealand
Cyber Security Challenge 2015.
Table A.1: Categories and labels for attacks carried out by the red teams
Category Attack Label Brief Description
Fingerprinting nmap
Uses the tool, nmap, to perform hosts and
ports scanning.
DoS1 crontab
Edits victim host’s crontab to periodically
kill Apache service.
DoS config-tamper
Tampers with Apache service’s
configuration file so as to achieve the




Tampers with permission of ssh key file so
as to deny access to host.
DoS process-kill
Forcefully terminate running process on
terminal of remote host. Attacker used this
to either terminates running service or
disconnect victim from their host (remote
connection).
1Denial of Service attacks.
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Table A.1: Categories and labels for attacks carried out by the red teams (con-
tinued)
Category Attack Label Brief Description
DoS firewall
Tampers with victim host’s firewall rules to
drop packets for target services. This is to
achieve the effect of a DoS attack.
Remote shellshock
Exploits a vulnerability in CGI script





Uses brute force approach to guess the
password on a login page on the web
browser.
Remote php-backdoor
A Metasploit exploit that exploits an
arbitrary code execution vulnerability in
phpmyadmin v.3.5.2.2. Runs a reverse shell




A Metasploit exploit that exploits
phpmyadmin’s replace_prefix_tbl
vulnerability. Runs a reverse shell to
connect to host.
Remote sql-injection
Exploit the lack of parameter sanitisation
for injecting and executing arbitrary code
and queries through the SQL database.
Others inject-key
Attacker injects their own ssh keys into
victim’s ssh authorized key list. Usually the




Attacker logins to victim’s machine
through ssh.
Others exe-tamper
Rename program executable so as to hide









Scenarios for Designing Finite
State Automata
This appendix lists the sets of scenarios designed for discovering pat-
terns that can represent the application and user layer activities defined
in DFPM.





Create a new file using Linux native
application, touch
touch file.txt
Create a new file using Linux
redirect and input terminal
echo “data” >
file.txt
Create a new file using the editor,
vim
vim file.txt
Create a new file using the editor,
vim, and write data into the file
vim file.txt
data is written using
the vim interface.
File is saved and
closed.
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Read data off a file using Linux
native application, cat
cat file.txt
Read data off a file using Linux
native application, tail
tail file.txt
Read data off a file using Linux
native application, fmt
fmt file.txt
Read data off a file using the editor,
nano
nano file.txt




grep acts as a
receiving process for
the redirected data.
Read and redirect content of a file
using Linux pipes
fmt < file.txt
fmt acts as a
receiving process for
the redirected data.









Read content of a file using C file





File is accessed using
fopen in the stdio.h
library. Data read is
printed to terminal
Read content of a file using cat and




Read content of a file using cat and









Write data into an empty file using




Empty file is newly
created separately.
Append data into an empty file
using Linux native application,




Empty file is newly
created separately.






Empty file is newly
created separately.
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Empty file is newly
created separately.




interface and edit the
content.




interface and edit the
content.
























Copy content of a file using Linux









Copy content of a file into a new file









Append content of a file into
another existing file using Linux
redirect with append mode and cat
cat file.txt »
result.txt
Append “string” from input
terminal to an existing file using









This appendix documents the full list of results for the experiment on
pruning file objects based on the number of processes accessing the file
object (i.e. process-access).





total no. of unique
processes
0.2105 0.8 1539 54.38%
0.2105 0.8 1343 47.45%
0.2105 0.8 1302 46.00%
0.2105 0.8 1292 45.65%
0.2105 0.8 1289 45.54%
0.2105 0.8 1226 43.32%
0.2105 0.8 1129 39.89%
0.2105 0.8 891 31.48%
0.2105 0.8 856 30.24%
0.2352 0.8 830 29.32%
0.2352 0.8 695 24.55%
0.2352 0.8 636 22.47%
0.2352 0.8 602 21.27%
0.2352 0.8 586 20.70%
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total no. of unique
processes
0.2352 0.8 506 17.87%
0.2352 0.8 486 17.17%
0.2352 0.8 455 16.07%
0.2352 0.8 453 16.00%
0.2352 0.8 401 14.16%
0.2352 0.8 361 12.75%
0.2352 0.8 353 12.47%
0.2352 0.8 308 10.88%
0.2352 0.8 307 10.84%
0.2352 0.8 304 10.74%
0.2352 0.8 280 9.89%
0.2352 0.8 278 9.82%
0.2352 0.8 268 9.46%
0.2352 0.8 248 8.76%
0.2352 0.8 247 8.72%
0.2352 0.8 245 8.65%
0.2352 0.8 239 8.44%
0.2352 0.8 238 8.40%
0.2352 0.8 231 8.16%
0.2352 0.8 227 8.02%
0.2352 0.8 223 7.87%
0.2352 0.8 222 7.84%
0.2352 0.8 212 7.49%
0.2352 0.8 197 6.96%
0.2352 0.8 192 6.78%
0.2352 0.8 182 6.43%
0.2352 0.8 172 6.07%
0.2352 0.8 161 5.68%
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total no. of unique
processes
0.2352 0.8 128 4.52%
0.2352 0.8 120 4.24%
0.2352 0.8 109 3.85%
0.2352 0.8 103 3.63%
0.2352 0.8 101 3.56%
0.2352 0.8 99 3.49%
0.2352 0.8 95 3.35%
0.2352 0.8 90 3.18%
0.2352 0.8 88 3.10%
0.2352 0.8 82 2.89%
0.2352 0.8 80 2.82%
0.2352 0.8 78 2.75%
0.2352 0.8 77 2.72%
0.2352 0.8 69 2.43%
0.2352 0.8 67 2.36%
0.2352 0.8 64 2.26%
0.2352 0.8 62 2.19%
0.2352 0.8 58 2.04%
0.2352 0.8 56 1.97%
0.2352 0.8 55 1.94%
0.2352 0.8 53 1.87%
0.2352 0.8 52 1.83%
0.2352 0.8 51 1.80%
0.2352 0.8 50 1.76%
0.2352 0.8 47 1.66%
0.2352 0.8 44 1.55%
0.2352 0.8 43 1.51%
0.2352 0.8 41 1.44%
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total no. of unique
processes
0.2352 0.8 39 1.37%
0.2352 0.8 37 1.30%
0.2352 0.8 36 1.27%
0.2352 0.8 35 1.23%
0.2352 0.8 34 1.20%
0.2352 0.8 33 1.16%
0.2352 0.8 32 1.13%
0.2352 0.8 29 1.02%
0.2352 0.8 28 0.98%
0.2352 0.8 27 0.95%
0.2352 0.8 26 0.91%
0.2352 0.8 24 0.84%
0.2352 0.8 23 0.81%
0.2352 0.8 22 0.77%
0.2352 0.8 21 0.74%
0.2352 0.8 20 0.70%
0.2352 0.8 19 0.67%
0.2352 0.8 18 0.63%
0.2352 0.8 17 0.60%
0.2352 0.8 16 0.56%
0.2352 0.8 15 0.53%
0.2352 0.8 14 0.49%
0.2352 0.8 13 0.45%
0.2352 0.8 12 0.42%
0.2352 0.8 11 0.38%
0.2352 0.8 10 0.35%
0.2352 0.8 9 0.31%
0.2352 0.8 8 0.28%
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total no. of unique
processes
0.2352 0.8 7 0.24%
0.2352 0.8 6 0.21%
0.2352 0.8 5 0.17%
0.2352 0.8 4 0.14%
0 0 3 0.10%
0 0 2 0.07%
0 0 1 0.03%





total no. of unique
processes
5.12e-5 1 2436 41.51%
5.39e-5 1 1901 32.39%
5.39e-5 1 1798 30.64%
5.39e-5 1 1785 30.41%
5.39e-5 1 1702 29%
5.56e-5 1 1691 28.81%
5.73e-5 1 1573 26.8%
5.73e-5 1 1561 26.6%
5.97e-5 1 1386 23.61%
5.97e-5 1 1315 22.4%
6.44e-5 1 1039 17.7%
6.44e-5 1 1025 17.46%
6.61e-5 1 881 15.01%
6.61e-5 1 868 14.79%
6.89e-5 1 859 14.63%
6.89e-5 1 785 13.37%
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total no. of unique
processes
7.10e-5 1 723 12.32%
6.92e-5 1 709 12.08%
7.33e-5 1 675 11.5%
7.45e-5 1 649 11.05%
7.45e-5 1 645 10.99%
7.45e-5 1 633 10.78%
8.85e-5 1 619 10.54%
9.05e-5 1 605 10.31%
9.21e-5 1 586 9.98%
1.00e-4 1 570 9.71%
1.01e-4 1 544 9.27%
1.01e-4 1 540 9.2%
1.01e-4 1 539 9.18%
1.01e-4 1 537 9.15%
1.01e-4 1 530 9.03%
1.01e-4 1 525 8.94%
1.01e-4 1 523 8.91%
1.01e-4 1 522 8.89%
9.80e-5 1 507 8.64%
9.80e-5 1 505 8.6%
9.80e-5 1 504 8.58%
1.19e-4 1 503 8.57%
1.19e-4 1 502 8.55%
1.19e-4 1 496 8.45%
1.22e-4 1 417 7.1%
1.22e-4 1 412 7.02%
1.22e-4 1 372 6.33%
1.22e-4 1 368 6.27%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.22e-4 1 358 6.1%
1.22e-4 1 356 6.06%
1.22e-4 1 343 5.84%
1.24e-4 1 338 5.76%
1.24e-4 1 327 5.57%
1.24e-4 1 326 5.55%
1.24e-4 1 325 5.53%
1.24e-4 1 323 5.5%
1.24e-4 1 318 5.41%
1.24e-4 1 316 5.38%
1.24e-4 1 300 5.11%
1.24e-4 1 261 4.44%
1.24e-4 1 235 4%
1.24e-4 1 230 3.91%
1.25e-4 1 221 3.76%
1.25e-4 1 180 3.06%
1.25e-4 1 179 3.05%
1.25e-4 1 177 3.01%
1.27e-4 1 147 2.5%
1.27e-4 1 137 2.33%
1.27e-4 1 136 2.31%
3.82e-4 1 134 2.28%
3.82e-4 1 132 2.24%
3.82e-4 1 118 2.01%
3.82e-4 1 102 1.73%
3.82e-4 1 101 1.72%
3.82e-4 1 100 1.7%
3.82e-4 1 99 1.68%
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total no. of unique
processes
3.82e-4 1 98 1.67%
3.82e-4 1 97 1.65%
3.82e-4 1 96 1.63%
3.82e-4 1 95 1.61%
3.82e-4 1 90 1.53%
3.82e-4 1 88 1.49%
3.82e-4 1 74 1.26%
3.82e-4 1 72 1.22%
3.82e-4 1 70 1.19%
3.82e-4 1 69 1.17%
3.82e-4 1 63 1.07%
3.82e-4 1 62 1.05%
3.82e-4 1 61 1.03%
3.82e-4 1 60 1.02%
3.82e-4 1 59 1%
3.82e-4 1 57 0.97%
3.82e-4 1 55 0.93%
3.82e-4 1 53 0.9%
3.82e-4 1 52 0.88%
4.01e-4 1 51 0.86%
4.01e-4 1 49 0.83%
4.01e-4 1 47 0.8%
4.01e-4 1 46 0.78%
4.01e-4 1 45 0.76%
4.01e-4 1 44 0.74%
4.05e-4 1 43 0.73%
4.05e-4 1 40 0.68%
4.05e-4 1 37 0.63%
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total no. of unique
processes
4.05e-4 1 36 0.61%
4.05e-4 1 35 0.59%
4.05e-4 1 34 0.57%
4.05e-4 1 33 0.56%
4.05e-4 1 32 0.54%
4.05e-4 1 31 0.52%
4.05e-4 1 27 0.46%
4.05e-4 1 26 0.44%
4.05e-4 1 25 0.42%
4.05e-4 1 24 0.4%
4.05e-4 1 23 0.39%
4.05e-4 1 22 0.37%
4.05e-4 1 21 0.35%
4.05e-4 1 20 0.34%
4.05e-4 1 19 0.32%
4.05e-4 1 18 0.3%
4.05e-4 1 17 0.28%
4.05e-4 1 16 0.27%
4.72e-3 1 15 0.25%
5.49e-3 1 14 0.23%
5.49e-3 1 13 0.22%
5.50e-3 1 12 0.2%
5.50e-3 1 11 0.18%
5.50e-3 1 10 0.17%
5.50e-3 1 9 0.15%
5.50e-3 1 8 0.13%
5.58e-3 1 7 0.11%
5.58e-3 1 6 0.1%
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total no. of unique
processes
5.58e-3 1 5 0.08%
5.58e-3 1 4 0.06%
0 0 3 0.05%
0 0 2 0.03%
0 0 1 0.01%





total no. of unique
processes
1.09e-5 1 4367 54.26%
1.11e-5 1 3855 47.9%
1.12e-5 1 2378 29.54%
1.12e-5 1 2339 29.06%
1.12e-5 1 2325 28.88%
1.12e-5 1 2309 28.69%
1.13e-5 1 2239 27.82%
1.14e-5 1 2102 26.11%
1.14e-5 1 2003 24.88%
1.16e-5 1 1574 19.55%
1.16e-5 1 1541 19.14%
1.17e-5 1 1362 16.92%
1.17e-5 1 1344 16.69%
1.17e-5 1 1309 16.26%
1.17e-5 1 1232 15.3%
1.17e-5 1 1152 14.31%
1.17e-5 1 1067 13.25%
1.17e-5 1 1011 12.56%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.17e-5 1 1010 12.54%
1.22e-5 1 999 12.41%
1.22e-5 1 996 12.37%
1.22e-5 1 981 12.18%
1.22e-5 1 908 11.28%
1.22e-5 1 881 10.94%
1.22e-5 1 811 10.07%
1.23e-5 1 784 9.74%
1.24e-5 1 762 9.46%
1.24e-5 1 749 9.3%
1.24e-5 1 748 9.29%
1.24e-5 1 746 9.26%
1.26e-5 1 740 9.19%
1.26e-5 1 711 8.83%
1.26e-5 1 699 8.68%
1.26e-5 1 692 8.59%
1.26e-5 1 676 8.39%
1.26e-5 1 672 8.34%
1.26e-5 1 663 8.23%
1.26e-5 1 659 8.18%
1.26e-5 1 636 7.9%
1.26e-5 1 628 7.8%
1.26e-5 1 598 7.43%
1.26e-5 1 586 7.28%
1.26e-5 1 559 6.94%
1.26e-5 1 550 6.83%
1.26e-5 1 511 6.34%
1.26e-5 1 502 6.23%
193
Appendix C Experimental Results for Process-access based Pruning





total no. of unique
processes
1.26e-5 1 500 6.21%
1.26e-5 1 499 6.2%
1.26e-5 1 474 5.88%
1.27e-5 1 473 5.87%
1.27e-5 1 463 5.75%
1.27e-5 1 434 5.39%
1.62e-5 1 420 5.21%
1.62e-5 1 380 4.72%
1.62e-5 1 369 4.58%
1.62e-5 1 361 4.48%
1.62e-5 1 347 4.31%
1.62e-5 1 344 4.27%
1.62e-5 1 342 4.24%
1.62e-5 1 341 4.23%
1.62e-5 1 333 4.13%
1.62e-5 1 316 3.92%
1.63e-5 1 303 3.76%
1.63e-5 1 302 3.75%
1.64e-5 1 285 3.54%
1.64e-5 1 241 2.99%
1.64e-5 1 240 2.98%
1.64e-5 1 238 2.95%
1.64e-5 1 231 2.87%
1.64e-5 1 225 2.79%
1.65e-5 1 224 2.78%
1.65e-5 1 222 2.75%
1.65e-5 1 215 2.67%
1.65e-5 1 214 2.65%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.65e-5 1 213 2.64%
1.65e-5 1 210 2.6%
1.65e-5 1 208 2.58%
1.65e-5 1 207 2.57%
1.65e-5 1 197 2.44%
1.65e-5 1 196 2.43%
1.65e-5 1 195 2.42%
1.65e-5 1 189 2.34%
1.65e-5 1 187 2.32%
1.65e-5 1 186 2.31%
1.65e-5 1 182 2.26%
1.65e-5 1 180 2.23%
1.65e-5 1 179 2.22%
1.65e-5 1 175 2.17%
1.65e-5 1 174 2.16%
1.65e-5 1 173 2.14%
1.65e-5 1 172 2.13%
1.65e-5 1 171 2.12%
1.65e-5 1 170 2.11%
1.65e-5 1 169 2.09%
1.67e-5 1 165 2.05%
1.67e-5 1 164 2.03%
1.67e-5 1 163 2.02%
1.67e-5 1 158 1.96%
1.67e-5 1 157 1.95%
1.67e-5 1 156 1.93%
1.67e-5 1 154 1.91%
1.67e-5 1 151 1.87%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.67e-5 1 147 1.82%
1.67e-5 1 145 1.8%
1.67e-5 1 139 1.72%
1.67e-5 1 138 1.71%
1.67e-5 1 137 1.7%
1.67e-5 1 136 1.68%
1.67e-5 1 135 1.67%
1.67e-5 1 132 1.64%
1.67e-5 1 130 1.61%
1.67e-5 1 126 1.56%
1.67e-5 1 125 1.55%
1.67e-5 1 124 1.54%
1.67e-5 1 119 1.47%
1.67e-5 1 109 1.35%
1.67e-5 1 108 1.34%
1.67e-5 1 107 1.32%
1.67e-5 1 106 1.31%
1.67e-5 1 105 1.3%
1.67e-5 1 104 1.29%
1.67e-5 1 103 1.27%
1.67e-5 1 93 1.15%
1.67e-5 1 92 1.14%
1.67e-5 1 88 1.09%
1.67e-5 1 87 1.08%
1.67e-5 1 85 1.05%
1.67e-5 1 84 1.04%
1.67e-5 1 83 1.03%
1.67e-5 1 82 1.01%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.67e-5 1 81 1%
1.67e-5 1 80 0.99%
1.67e-5 1 78 0.96%
1.67e-5 1 77 0.95%
1.67e-5 1 76 0.94%
1.67e-5 1 75 0.93%
1.67e-5 1 73 0.9%
1.67e-5 1 72 0.89%
1.67e-5 1 71 0.88%
1.67e-5 1 70 0.86%
1.67e-5 1 69 0.85%
1.67e-5 1 66 0.82%
1.67e-5 1 65 0.8%
1.67e-5 1 62 0.77%
1.67e-5 1 61 0.75%
1.67e-5 1 60 0.74%
1.67e-5 1 57 0.7%
1.67e-5 1 56 0.69%
1.67e-5 1 55 0.68%
1.67e-5 1 54 0.67%
1.67e-5 1 53 0.65%
1.67e-5 1 52 0.64%
1.67e-5 1 51 0.63%
1.67e-5 1 49 0.6%
1.67e-5 1 48 0.59%
1.67e-5 1 47 0.58%
1.67e-5 1 46 0.57%
1.67e-5 1 45 0.55%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.67e-5 1 44 0.54%
1.67e-5 1 43 0.53%
1.67e-5 1 42 0.52%
1.67e-5 1 41 0.5%
1.67e-5 1 40 0.49%
1.67e-5 1 39 0.48%
1.67e-5 1 38 0.47%
1.67e-5 1 37 0.45%
1.67e-5 1 36 0.44%
1.67e-5 1 35 0.43%
1.67e-5 1 34 0.42%
1.67e-5 1 33 0.41%
1.67e-5 1 31 0.38%
1.67e-5 1 30 0.37%
1.67e-5 1 29 0.36%
1.67e-5 1 28 0.34%
1.67e-5 1 27 0.33%
1.67e-5 1 26 0.32%
1.67e-5 1 25 0.31%
1.67e-5 1 24 0.29%
1.67e-5 1 23 0.28%
1.67e-5 1 22 0.27%
1.67e-5 1 21 0.26%
1.67e-5 1 20 0.24%
1.67e-5 1 19 0.23%
1.67e-5 1 18 0.22%
1.67e-5 1 17 0.21%
1.67e-5 1 16 0.19%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.67e-5 1 15 0.18%
1.67e-5 1 14 0.17%
1.67e-5 1 13 0.16%
1.67e-5 1 12 0.14%
1.67e-5 1 11 0.13%
1.04e-4 1 10 0.12%
1.04e-4 1 9 0.11%
1.04e-4 1 8 0.09%
1.04e-4 1 7 0.08%
1.04e-4 1 6 0.07%
1.04e-4 1 5 0.06%
1.04e-4 1 4 0.04%
0 0 3 0.03%
0 0 2 0.02%
0 0 1 0.01%





total no. of unique
processes
9.54e-5 1 4367 54.26%
9.75e-5 1 3855 47.9%
9.83e-5 1 2378 29.54%
9.83e-5 1 2339 29.06%
9.83e-5 1 2325 28.88%
9.83e-5 1 2309 28.69%
9.61e-5 1 2239 27.82%
9.73e-5 1 2102 26.11%
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total no. of unique
processes
9.73e-5 1 2003 24.88%
9.89e-5 1 1574 19.55%
9.89e-5 1 1541 19.14%
9.95e-5 1 1362 16.92%
9.96e-5 1 1344 16.69%
1.03e-4 1 1309 16.26%
1.03e-4 1 1232 15.3%
1.03e-4 1 1152 14.31%
1.03e-4 1 1067 13.25%
1.03e-4 1 1011 12.56%
1.03e-4 1 1010 12.54%
1.06e-4 1 999 12.41%
1.06e-4 1 996 12.37%
1.07e-4 1 981 12.18%
1.07e-4 1 908 11.28%
1.07e-4 1 881 10.94%
1.08e-4 1 811 10.07%
1.08e-4 1 784 9.74%
1.09e-4 1 762 9.46%
1.09e-4 1 749 9.3%
1.09e-4 1 748 9.29%
1.09e-4 1 746 9.26%
1.10e-4 1 740 9.19%
1.10e-4 1 711 8.83%
1.10e-4 1 699 8.68%
1.10e-4 1 692 8.59%
1.10e-4 1 676 8.39%
1.10e-4 1 672 8.34%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.10e-4 1 663 8.23%
1.10e-4 1 659 8.18%
1.10e-4 1 636 7.9%
1.10e-4 1 628 7.8%
1.10e-4 1 598 7.43%
1.11e-4 1 586 7.28%
1.11e-4 1 559 6.94%
1.11e-4 1 550 6.83%
1.11e-4 1 511 6.34%
1.11e-4 1 502 6.23%
1.11e-4 1 500 6.21%
1.11e-4 1 499 6.2%
1.11e-4 1 474 5.88%
1.11e-4 1 473 5.87%
1.11e-4 1 463 5.75%
1.11e-4 1 434 5.39%
1.38e-4 1 420 5.21%
1.38e-4 1 380 4.72%
1.38e-4 1 369 4.58%
1.38e-4 1 361 4.48%
1.38e-4 1 347 4.31%
1.38e-4 1 344 4.27%
1.38e-4 1 342 4.24%
1.38e-4 1 341 4.23%
1.38e-4 1 333 4.13%
1.38e-4 1 316 3.92%
1.39e-4 1 303 3.76%
1.39e-4 1 302 3.75%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.4e-4 1 285 3.54%
1.4e-4 1 241 2.99%
1.4e-4 1 240 2.98%
1.4e-4 1 238 2.95%
1.4e-4 1 231 2.87%
1.4e-4 1 225 2.79%
1.406e-4 1 224 2.78%
1.406e-4 1 222 2.75%
1.406e-4 1 215 2.67%
1.406e-4 1 214 2.65%
1.406e-4 1 213 2.64%
1.406e-4 1 210 2.6%
1.406e-4 1 208 2.58%
1.406e-4 1 207 2.57%
1.406e-4 1 197 2.44%
1.406e-4 1 196 2.43%
1.406e-4 1 195 2.42%
1.406e-4 1 189 2.34%
1.406e-4 1 187 2.32%
1.406e-4 1 186 2.31%
1.406e-4 1 182 2.26%
1.406e-4 1 180 2.23%
1.406e-4 1 179 2.22%
1.406e-4 1 175 2.17%
1.406e-4 1 174 2.16%
1.406e-4 1 173 2.14%
1.406e-4 1 172 2.13%
1.406e-4 1 171 2.12%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.406e-4 1 170 2.11%
1.406e-4 1 169 2.09%
1.43e-4 1 165 2.05%
1.43e-4 1 164 2.03%
1.43e-4 1 163 2.02%
1.43e-4 1 158 1.96%
1.43e-4 1 157 1.95%
1.43e-4 1 156 1.93%
1.43e-4 1 154 1.91%
1.43e-4 1 151 1.87%
1.43e-4 1 147 1.82%
1.43e-4 1 145 1.8%
1.43e-4 1 139 1.72%
1.43e-4 1 138 1.71%
1.43e-4 1 137 1.7%
1.43e-4 1 136 1.68%
1.43e-4 1 135 1.67%
1.43e-4 1 132 1.64%
1.43e-4 1 130 1.61%
1.43e-4 1 126 1.56%
1.43e-4 1 125 1.55%
1.43e-4 1 124 1.54%
1.43e-4 1 119 1.47%
1.43e-4 1 109 1.35%
1.43e-4 1 108 1.34%
1.43e-4 1 107 1.32%
1.43e-4 1 106 1.31%
1.43e-4 1 105 1.3%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.43e-4 1 104 1.29%
1.43e-4 1 103 1.27%
1.43e-4 1 93 1.15%
1.43e-4 1 92 1.14%
1.43e-4 1 88 1.09%
1.43e-4 1 87 1.08%
1.43e-4 1 85 1.05%
1.43e-4 1 84 1.04%
1.43e-4 1 83 1.03%
1.43e-4 1 82 1.01%
1.43e-4 1 81 1%
1.43e-4 1 80 0.99%
1.43e-4 1 78 0.96%
1.43e-4 1 77 0.95%
1.43e-4 1 76 0.94%
1.43e-4 1 75 0.93%
1.43e-4 1 73 0.9%
1.43e-4 1 72 0.89%
1.43e-4 1 71 0.88%
1.43e-4 1 70 0.86%
1.43e-4 1 69 0.85%
1.43e-4 1 66 0.82%
1.43e-4 1 65 0.8%
1.43e-4 1 62 0.77%
1.43e-4 1 61 0.75%
1.43e-4 1 60 0.74%
1.43e-4 1 57 0.7%
1.43e-4 1 56 0.69%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.43e-4 1 55 0.68%
1.43e-4 1 54 0.67%
1.43e-4 1 53 0.65%
1.43e-4 1 52 0.64%
1.43e-4 1 51 0.63%
1.43e-4 1 49 0.6%
1.43e-4 1 48 0.59%
1.43e-4 1 47 0.58%
1.43e-4 1 46 0.57%
1.43e-4 1 45 0.55%
1.43e-4 1 44 0.54%
1.43e-4 1 43 0.53%
1.43e-4 1 42 0.52%
1.47e-4 1 41 0.5%
1.47e-4 1 40 0.49%
1.47e-4 1 39 0.48%
1.47e-4 1 38 0.47%
1.47e-4 1 37 0.45%
1.47e-4 1 36 0.44%
1.47e-4 1 35 0.43%
1.47e-4 1 34 0.42%
1.47e-4 1 33 0.41%
1.47e-4 1 31 0.38%
1.47e-4 1 30 0.37%
1.47e-4 1 29 0.36%
1.47e-4 1 28 0.34%
1.47e-4 1 27 0.33%
1.47e-4 1 26 0.32%
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total no. of unique
processes
1.47e-4 1 25 0.31%
1.47e-4 1 24 0.29%
1.47e-4 1 23 0.28%
1.47e-4 1 22 0.27%
1.47e-4 1 21 0.26%
1.47e-4 1 20 0.24%
1.47e-4 1 19 0.23%
1.47e-4 1 18 0.22%
1.47e-4 1 17 0.21%
1.47e-4 1 16 0.19%
1.47e-4 1 15 0.18%
1.47e-4 1 14 0.17%
1.47e-4 1 13 0.16%
1.47e-4 1 12 0.14%
1.47e-4 1 11 0.13%
0 0 10 0.12%
0 0 9 0.11%
0 0 8 0.09%
0 0 7 0.08%
0 0 6 0.07%
0 0 5 0.06%
0 0 4 0.04%
0 0 3 0.03%
0 0 2 0.02%
0 0 1 0.01%
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Appendix D
Graph Plots for Determining
Number of Clusters
This appendix lists the graph plots, generated from each system log file in
the NZCSC’15 dataset, for determining the number of clusters, k. Based
on the elbow method, used for estimating the number of clusters to be
used with the k-means algorithm, the plots demonstrate k is estimated
to be 5 for majority of the system log files in the dataset.
Figure D.1: Blue Team 1 - Web server system log file
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Figure D.2: Blue Team 1 - File server system log file
Figure D.3: Blue Team 2 - Web server system log file
Figure D.4: Blue Team 2 - File server system log file
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Figure D.5: Blue Team 3 - Web server system log file
Figure D.6: Blue Team 3 - File server system log file
Figure D.7: Blue Team 4 - Web server system log file
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Figure D.8: Blue Team 4 - File server system log file
Figure D.9: Blue Team 5 - Web server system log file
Figure D.10: Blue Team 5 - File server system log file
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Figure D.11: Red Team 1
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